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INTRODUCTION
PURPOSE
The purpose of this study was to determine the merits of propulsion system
development testing utilizing the existing data base of technical reports and people
and to organize and present available data along with conclusions and
recommendations for use by management in the structuring of future vehicle
development programs.
SCOPE
The study encompassed a review of all available test reports of propulsion
system development testing for the Saturn stages, the Titan stages, and Space
Shuttle main propulsion system. The knowledge on propulsion system
development and system testing available from specialists and managers was also
"tapped" for inclusion. The data from the numerous sources was analyzed and is
included in the report along with conclusions and recommendations, program risk
involved if propulsion system testing is not conducted, and a verification trade study
to select a preferred verification alternative using the analytical hierarchy process
(AHP).
AUTHORITY
This study was performed in response to a task from Stennis Space Center to
contract NAS8-36700.
DATA GATHERING PROCESS
Static firings that were chosen as having applicability to this study went back
approximately 30 years, consequently considerable time was spent locating data
for screening. The MSFC Repository and Library, the Redstone Scientific
Information Center, the MSFC Technical Information and Services Branch, the
University of Alabama-Huntsville library, and a number of individual employees of
NASA and the Satum stage contractors were contacted for leads to Saturn data.
Some documents were located in the personal files of individuals, however, it was
found that the major part of the documents had either been destroyed or had been
sent to the Federal Archives and Records Center in East Point, Georgia. Retrieval
from that location proved to be quite lengthy and incomplete. To provide additional
data, a survey form requesting data inputs was also distributed to 138 propulsion
system specialists.

SUMMARY
The importance of, and necessity for, propulsion system testing has been
investigated to provide a data base and recommendations for assisting program
managers who may be confronted with propulsion system testing decisions.
Two complementing approaches have been used in the study
implementation. First, a survey form and instructions distributed to 138 propulsion
system/engine design and test experts throughout the nation requested information
relative to propulsion system testing, and secondly, all NASA launch vehicles and
some Air Force missile development programs since 1960 were evaluated relative
to constructive contributions from propulsion system test programs. Significant
findings from these activities, including conclusions and recommendations, are
presented.
Program managers and chief engineers, managers of major engineering
organizations, and active design and test engineers experienced in both vehicle
and engine development were included in the survey. In response to one major
survey request, "Summarize your opinion of the role of "all-up" system testing in
verification of a new propulsion system prior to first launch," response strongly
supported/urged such testing with most considering such testing mandatory. Only
one respondent was opposed to system testing. A few expressed qualifications
related to manned versus unmanned vehicles and similarity of designs with
previous designs. A series of other survey "choice type" questions permitted
assessment of the relative importance of cost, schedule, and reliability. As was
expected, reliability was easily the winner.
Evaluation of previous vehicle development programs was accomplished by
obtaining and reviewing static firing test reports from battleship, all systems vehicle,
and in some cases, flight stages acceptance fldngs. Other data sources were used
where noted test reports were not available. For S-IV, documentation was totally
unavailable, thus personnel memory was the d.ata source. Programs included in
the evaluation were all stages of Saturn I (1959-1965), Saturn IB (1961-1968),
Saturn V (1961-1972), and Space Shuttle from NASA's reservoir and Titan ICBM,
Gemini Titan, and Space T'rtan from the Air Force reservoir. These programs
represent a wide spectrum of propulsion system hardware -- single and multi tanks
for each propellant, various propellant combinations including both cryogenic and
storable, various engine designs including both single and clustered engine
configurations, propulsion systems for booster stages, and space type vehicles with
altitude ignition.
Compared with today's state of the art in rocket engine and stage design and
testing, the technological base in the late 1950's and early 1960's was lacking in
many areas. As a result, the Saturn I, IB, and V programs, initiated at that time,
experienced many problems that in hindsight could have been prevented. The
Shuttle program and Air Force programs, initiated approximately 10 years later,
benefited from these early mistakes. While some problems encountered on Shuttle
and late Air Force programs were common with those of earlier programs, many
_v
had not previously been experienced. Similarly, for any program initiated today,
Shuttle experiences should be more valuable than prior program experiences.
Thus in evaluating data within this report, experiences on Shuttle are emphasized
since it represents later technologies.
Included in the reportare vehicleconfiguration descriptions, system operation
descriptions, system test objectives, and test accomplishments. Accomplishments
are presented based on an evaluation of flight or launch operation failure
avoidance. Data is also included on hardware changeout frequency, hazardous
leakage, fires, and sating procedures developed during testing. Lessons learned,
test program cost considerations, test schedule requirements, and representative
future test program requirements are discussed.
Even though Space Shuttle development could capitalize on the data base
created by previous programs and many management, design and test personnel
involved in Shuttle had been involved in prior programs, Space Shuttle propulsion
system testing identified, as reported herein, three discrepancies which could be
catastrophic during flight and three during preflight operations. Also identified were
5 additional discrepancies classified as unworkable which would be experienced
in flight and 17 during preflight operations. Unworkable implies a mandatory
change, although the consequence may not be catastrophic. Other less serious
discrepancies were observed and numerous product improvement activities
resulted from the program. The above tabulations are conservative inasmuch as
most vehicle and engine hardware descriptions are excluded from the above
tabulations and these discrepancies are numerous and serious as evident from a
study of the included tabular data. A careful review of Space Shuttle
discrepancies, cost data suggesting prevention of one vehicle loss or loss of one
mission may exceed total test program cost, and test schedule data suggesting
serious program delays without propulsion system testing removes all doubts
relative to the program benefits of propulsion system testing. This deduction is
further emphasized by reviewing the risks associated with individual disciplines c f
propulsion system design in the absence of a supporting propulsion system test
program. Risks for potential launch delay are high for most disciplines, and risks
for catastrophic flight failure and mission loss are high for a number of disciplines.
Discrepancies in operational procedures, inadequacies in the vehicle
propulsion systems and hardware, and inadequacies in engine hardware were
also numerous for NASA programs prior to Shuttle. Air Force programs
,xpedenced difficulties also; however, available information on Air Force programs
is incomplete, thus its usefulness relative to the current study is limited.
Problems/discrepancies encountered in the eadier NASA programs involved most
disciplines. For example, on Saturn I (the clustered tank and engine configuration)
the flexible heat shield about the four gimballed engines failed structurally in the
severe thermal, acoustic, and dynamic environment, thus requiring extensive
development prior to flight. On Saturn V S-IC vehicle, helium bottle retainer nuts in
the liquid oxygen tank became loose during firing. Also, the terminal countdown
sequence was found to be flawed, thus output of all commands occurred at one
time when a malfunction or loss of power supply occurred. On the Saturn V S-II
stage numerous switch failures occurred, thus soldered seals were abandoned for
3
welded seals. Also liquid oxygen tank fill-and-drain valves failed to actuate on
command and particulate contamination resulted in unacceptable leakage. On
Saturn V S-IVB stage, whose initial start occurred at altitude approximately eleven
minutes after liftoff with second start in earth orbit several hours after first burn
completion, data was collected relative to engine and feed system "warm up"
characteristics after first burn and chilidown characteristics prior to second start.
This type information and representative analytical techniques were vital for orbital
engine start. A thorough review of these early vehicle propulsion system test
findings support the earlier stated conclusion for Shuttlempropulsion system
testing provides significant benefits. A similar tabulation, as noted earlier for Space
Shuttle, of numbers of problems having potential catastrophic effects, and features
which were unworkable is impressive.
Propulsion system testing is expensive, requires extensive time to properly
plan and implement, and can conceivably delay initial flight vehicle launch. The
test article cost can be affected by the extent of new technology utilization, vehicle
complexity and the extent to which vehicle launch facility interface hardware is
simulated. Cost data based on a number of programs indicated propulsion system
testing activities which prevent loss of only one vehicle may be cost effective.
Vehicle programs can differ in purpose, thus risks which programs can accept may
vary significantly. Vehicle complexity may vary dependent upon flight mission and
also the extent to which advanced technology concepts and hardware designs are
used. These various aspects and others have been evaluated and are reported in
appropriate text, conclusions, and recommendations. Man rated programs require
the highest reliability and are most demanding of propulsion system test programs,
while unmanned, expendable programs using state-of-the-art technology are the
least demanding.
Trade-offs relative to the method used to collect necessary propulsion system
data also are possible. Programs with less demanding needs may forego the
formal propulsion system test program for an expanded FRF plus analyses or an
expanded FRF, flight test program and analyses. The engineering staff and
program manager must realistically evaluate each situation giving proper
consideration to parumetem such as loss of life potential, cost, schedule, advanced
technology involved, design similarity with other programs, test site capability, and
other factors. The report text provides propulsion system testing requirement
guidance to the maximum extent possible.
Table 3-1 (appendix), for Space Shuttle, lists the hundreds of specific
individual technical requirements for which test data was sought and obtained.
While these many requirements are of utmost importance, the primary reason for
testing is to identify unknowns, many of which result from the interactive
environments of the many independently designed systems. _.nalvtical models
and oersonnel insiahts are inc'-nnable of a mature reoresentation of all events.
4
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NASA'S HISTORICAL VERIFICATION PROCESS
The Saturn V vehicle's first launch on November 9, 1967, was almost perfect
in spite of the fact that neither the S-IC stage nor the S-II stage had been flight
tested. The restart of the S-IVB stage, after a three hour orbital coast, was equally
successful on the first attempt.
Books have been and will continue to be written on the success of the Saturn
launch vehicle. It is contended that never before nor since the Saturn program has
a technical endeavor been so successful. There was not one Saturn mission
failure, no goal was written off, and most of all, national pride flourished for a brief
time, without grief over loss of life in flight. Table 1 lists Saturn launches and
provides information on each.
The Space Shuttle continues to provide a never before achieved flexibility in
space operations. The reusable spacecraft offers a large cargo capacity and
relatively mild launch environment. These characteristics enable earth orbit and
outer space launch capability for a wide variety of payloads previously restricted
due to weight, shape, or launch sensitivity.
SATURN STAGES
A very real, much overlooked reason for the tremendous Saturn success was
extensive ground testing and retesting--including propulsion system testing.
Stage static firings were conducted during early development, during late
development, for flight verification, between test flights for anomaly resolution, and
finally for checkout prior to each launch.
Starting with the first clustered engine firing in March 1960, NASA's emphasis
was on stage static firing or, in other words, propulsion system testing. NASA's
approach was first to prove system concepts using heavy-weight tanks and non-
flight components where necessary and then to perform development testing to
refine the stage and procedures with flight components where possible or practical.
Wet countdown demonstration tests (propellant Ioadings) were performed at
the launch site. S-IB, S-IV, and S-IVB all-systems-test-stages were either never
built or never fire(I; however, much development testing was actually accomplished
during flight stage acceptance firings. Each stage flown was static fired or
acceptance tested at least once prior to launch.
The propulsion test verification process that evolved for Saturn consisted of:
• Component development test program
• Component qualification test program
• Special subsystem testing
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• Propulsion system (stage) development testing
• Stage acceptance firings
• Vehicle flight test program
• Additional stage static testing for continued development, for resolution of in-
flight anomalies, and for increased reliability.
Structural test stages, dynamic test stages, and dummy "facilities check"
stages were fabricated and tested in addition to propulsion system test articles.
The schedule permitted S-I and S-IB flight tests with dummy upper stages but this
luxury was not available for the S-IC or S-II stages.
SPACE SHU'1-1"LE MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM
NASA's Space Shuttle MPS testing program, although abbreviated, was
comparable to the previous Saturn program. Three non-firing tests and twelve
combination development/verification firings met planned pre-test objectives. The
main propulsion test article (MPTA) was flight configuration with a few practical
exceptions:
• Non-flight external tankinsulation.
• Auxiliary power unit (APU) simulated by ground powered hydraulic system.
• Shuttle avionics test set (SATS) instead of flight computers.
• Truss type load bearing structure forward of the 1307 bulkhead.
• Simulated payload bay purge into aft compartment.
Some non-flight GSE consoles (however, most GSE was intended to be flight
fidelity).
Non-flight propellant loading configuration (emergency drains added to the
external tank).
• Non-flight ground umbilical disconnects
Many MPS components were adapted from Saturn, and thus qualified for
main propulsion test (MPT) use by similarity or a delta qualification when
necessary. New design components were subjected to rigorous development and
qualification testing prior to use on the test article.
MPT static firings were not used to resolve inflight anomalies, in part because
no serious anomalies occurred that were not understood. The first launch was
April 12, 1981, and the last MPT firing was performed January 17, 1981. However,
11
propellant loading tests were performed with the MPTA after the flight program
started.
Other Develooment/Vedfication Testinn
Management started questioning the use of checkout firings for stage
acceptance late in the Saturn development program, thus no true acceptance firing
was planned for the integrated Shuttle configuration. A short duration FRF concept
finally evolved for new orbiters, a new launch facility, or after extensive down time.
It was later seriously argued that this minimum test was unnecessary even after the
FRF for Challenger (OV-099) resulted in detection of a gross hydrogen leak which
could have been catastrophic under flight conditions (without purging).
Extensive development testing was performed at KSC with the flight vehicle
prior to the first launch to improve propellant loading procedures and to resolve
other problems. Due to a thermal protection system ('FPS) failure on the external
tank and to the desire to increase onboard propellant mass, several unplanned
propellant loading tests were conducted both with the MPTA and with the flight
vehicle at KSC.
In addition to MPT static firings, structural test articles were built and tested,
approach and landing tests were performed, an all-up hydraulic simulator Flight
Control Hydraulic Laboratory (FCHL) was developed and used, a mated vehicle
ground vibration test (MVGVT) program was conducted, a Shuttle Avionics
Integrated Laboratory (SAIL) was and is used, ,along with the Hydraulic Simulation
Laboratory (HSL), for software verification prior to launch, and full scale external
tank terminal drain tests were conducted. v
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EVALUATION OF PROPULSION SYSTEM TEST PROGRAMS
An evaluation of propulsion system test programs which have been conducted
previously are discussed in this section. The intent is consolidation and focusing of
significant aspects of various programs which may be beneficial to future programs.
Major emphasis is placed on the Space Shuttle program since it is currently
operational; the design is a benefactor of prior programs, and it represents, as
much as any program, current, state-of-the-art technology. Data is also presented
for the Saturn program. Further information and data on each program are
presented in the various appendices.
SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM
MPTA is the Space Shuttle propulsion system test article. The test program
was conducted at NASA's test site in Mississippi, and the program involved NASA
and Space Shuttle element contractors: (1) Rockwell International, Space Division
(orbiter); (2) Rockwell International, Rocketdyne Division (main engine); (3) Martin
Marrietta (external tank); (4) Rockwell International, Space Division (integration
and test site operation).
MPTA Test Schedule
Figure 1 contains schedule data for the program. The planned program
involved 12 hot firings, 1 propellant loading test, and 2 structural resonant survey
tests. The 15 tests plus several attempted tests were completed before the initial
Shuttle flight. This program would satisfy all identified requirements presented in
Appendix 3 of this report. The schedule for testing established on October 10,
1977, two months prior to test initiation, depicts 12 tests with the last test on
December 14, 1978. Test initiation was as planned, but Test 12 was not completed
until January 17, 1981_ years later than planned. Later planning schedules,
one developed on April 20, 1979, and one developed February 11, 1980, were
almost equally in error. The actual schedule indicates 4 tests were necessary to
obtain necessary structural and propellant loading data and 20 hot firing attempts
were necessary to achieve 12 successful tests.
".
The actual schedule shows three intervals in which major modifications were
necessary. These pedods were for updating vehicle and engine hardware and to
repair damaged hatOware. The total time for these modification periods was 17
months, approximately one half the actual time of the test program.
The following section provides more information on the test program, although
important observations are possible from Figure 1. These observations follow:
• The approximate thres-week interval between tests reflected in planning
activities was correct.
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Complexity of the vehicle, facility, and the total operations necessitates
recognition of test abort possibilities and inclusion for same in test activity
planning.
Inclusion of time for major modification/repairs is necessary for realistic
scheduling of test programs for complex vehicte designs.
• Vehicle maturity will not exist in any complex vehicle design, test hardware, or
flight hardware until some minimal system testing is performed.
MPTA Events Summary
A summary of some significant events from the propulsion system test
program are presented in Table 2; and for purpose of convenience, information on
aborted tests and causes of aborted tests have been extracted from Table 2 and
presented in Table 3. Also, for convenience major changes made during the three
modification periods are shown in Table 4.
The features of Table 2 may be considered as a measure of vehicle maturity
or lack thereof. Table 2 lists all tests, identifies those which were aborted and why
aborted, when aborted, those which experienced propellant leakage either
internally or externally, those experiencing fires, those for which fire indicators were
activated, those for which installed safety enhancement features of internal
gaseous nitrogen purges (5,000 and/or 30,000 Scfm) and internal/external water
systems were activated and other pertinent data. To assist in comprehending the
material in Table 2, the following observations of a statistical nature are presented:
• There were 20 hot firing attempts.
• Two of the twenty attempts did not result in engine ignition. These failures are
classified as vehicle failures. Tests 1-001 and 6-02,
• Seven of the twenty attempts were hot firing test aborts. All seven were engine
related.
• Hot firing aborts were distributed throughout the 20 firing attempts, although
frequency of occurrence decreased after tests 6-03.
Twenty-six terminal counts were required. Fourteen were required during the
first six firing attempts. After test 5A, only one per test was required, although
frequent, simple "work arounds" were required.
Hydrogen leakage within the aft compartment occurred on 12 tests. Two tests
experienced high leaks--engine hardware failures--Et/orbiter 17-incl
disconnect was a frequentbut relatively moderate "leaker."
• The emergency 5,000 SCFM (5K) nitrogen safing purge (ground test system)
within the aft compartment was used for 11 tests to enhance safe operation.
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Table 3. MPTA Test Abort Summary
TEST
NUMBER
1-001
6-1
6-2
6-3
7-1
9-1
i0-I
ii-i
TEST
DATE
04/ii/78 0
06/12/79 54
07/02/79 19
11/24/79 0
11/04/79 l0
02/01/80 5
04/16/80 6
07/12/80 106
11/03/80 20
ACTUAL
TEST
DURATION
(sec.)
PLANNED
TEST
DURATION
(sec.)
2.35
520
520
520
520
562
591
550
581
ABORT
SOURCE
SSME and
vehicle
SSME
SSME
vehicle
SSME
SSME
SSME
SSME
SSME
DISCUSSION,
ABORT CAUSE
Instrumentation failures.
Redline violations.
Faulty engine pump
accelerometers.
Engine main fuel valve
cracked and vehicle
structural damage
resulted. External fire.
Aft compartment hazardous
gas system faulty reading.
Excessive HPOTP secondary
seal cavity pressure cut
test. Engine steerhorn
(H2 line) ruptured and
engine went 02 rich.
HPOTP turbine discharge
temperature spike cut test
High HPFTP turbine
discharge temqgerature
indication.
Engine H2 preburner burn
through resulted in aft
compartment fire.
High HPFTP discharge
temperature cut test.
Nozzle aft manifold failed
structurally.
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Table 4. Test Hardware ModificationDefinition
MODIFICATION
PERICD
IIA-
If S n
i|Ct!
POST TEST
6-1
TIME INTERVAL
DATE
I0
07/07/78
to
04/04/79
07/02/79
to
10/24/79
07/12/80
to
11/13/80
PROGRAM
DRIVER
SSME
SSME
SSME
DISCUSSION/
CHANGE IDENTIFICATICN
Engine pumps capable of
KPL operation required.
02 flow meter, HPOTP
development, engine main
02 valve vibration
problems and SSME 2001
fire complicated develop-
ment, and extended testing
delay. Stub to flight
nozzle change.
Engine main fuel valve
cracked. H2 expelled in
large quantities but no
internal fire.
Investigation necessary
plus repair of extensively
damaged vehicle.
Compartment fire due to H2
preburner burn through.
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• Similarly, the emergency 30K purge was used on three tests.
Fires occurred for nine firings-one huge extemal fire, three major external fires
with one also internal to the aft compartment. Eight of the nine fires resulted
from engine discrepancies.
• Four of the fires near the vehicle base were typical of main fuel valve leaks
through the engine after shutdown.
• The one aft compartment fire resulted in extensive hardware damage.
• Two of the external fires produced significant damage to the vehicle and
facility--particularly instrumentation.
Hydrogen gas responsible, for the huge external fire originated within the aft
compartment and raised compartment pressure sufficient for structural failure of
the vehicle heat shield and aft structure.
• Water was used extemal to the vehicle to suppress fires on eight tests.
• Water was not used within the aft compartment to suppress the single internal
fire.
• Fire detection systems identified rive rims.
The above observations do not address aspects of technical design which
must be verified but attempts to focus attention on the complexity of the total activity
and the risk involved in propulsion system development and verification for space
and military vehicles. While complexity is apparent from Table 2, it is further
demonstrated by Table 5 which is selected action items developed after the MPTA
initial propellant loading test and the attempted/accomplished first static firing.
Similar actions were necessary for subsequent testS; however, action items
numbers and consequences of issues/actions addressed began decreasing after
several tests had been conducted.
Risks involved in propulsion system development and verification is not
represented completely by Table 2. Another important aspect is associated with
specific technical requirements-the real objective of testing-to
develop/demonstrate mstudty, performance, and functional capability of the
vehicle, fadlity, and GSlE, and to demonstrate functional compatibility of the three
elements. Detailed test requirements to accomplish these purposes are included
in Appendix 3. This test requirement list contained approximately 25 percent fewer
entries when initial testing commenced. These "add on" test requirements resulted
from oversight, failure to understand functional aspects properly, and hardware
changes. Testing identified oversights which could have sedous consequences
under differing circumstances later in the development program. Five examples
follow:
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Table 5 Main Propulsion Test Program - Test Site Edited Action List-
Post Propellant Loading Test (12/21/77)
ITEM NO
1
2
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
ACTION REQUIRED
Review I..H2high point leedline liquid level sensor operation dudng propellant load
test and repair. Review the need for redundancy
Correct channelization of LH2 tank liquid level sensors (20% to 80% and 98% to
100%)
Troubleshoot and isolate the noise problem associated with the EIU SATS
interlace which resulted in a SATS fail condition
Determine the cause of tripped circuitbreaker for LH 2 recirculation pump #2
Determine cause for the LH2 disoonnect purge
Determine requirements for a backup GHe injectionsystem for the LOX amigeyser
system operation
Review the system requirements and re-activate MEC backup power
Provide necessary engineering to connect the KSC hazardous gas detection
system to the LH2 vent system
Perlorrn engineering to insulate the RTLS dump line
Provide necessary analysis and engineering to correct the LH2 high point bleed
•system
Pedorm special cryogenic test of LOX and LH2 auxiliary dump valves using a
solenoid actuatad system as well as the existing I:¢essure control actuation system
and reco,aneml system changes required to imlxove valve performance
Review the need for changing the 1/8" sample line on the bottom of the LH2 tank
to a 1/4" or larger h to facilitate tank sampang and verfcation of purge
procedures
Provide a change to SATS software to preclude opening engine LOX or LH2 main
va_,es ruth premmm in feed ducts Soprevent potentiaJspinning of engine
fiownmers and low pressure pumps
Review the need for MEC cooling during the _proximate eig_-hour period from
set-up of pneumMlo equipment until start of countdown operations
LOX facilly system to provide a safer operational approach to LOX off-
loading under existing constraints for the LOX fBIand drain system
Review and revise LH2 system purge procedures to effect a better and faster
operational method of system inerlJng,both pre- and post-test
Review the adequacy of the fire detection sensors inthe vehicle aft compartment
Determine the cause and corrective action for the LH2 prevalve dual indication on
engine #2
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Table 5
ITEM NO.
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
Main Propulsion Test Program. Test Site Edited Action List
(Continued) - Post Propellant Loading Test (12/21/77)
ACTION REQUIRED
Review recent facility system valve failures and determine corrective action
Perform a complete design review of SATS, lOPS, EIU, interconnecting cabling,
and associated software
Troubleshoot the lower vehicle LH2 .:apacitence probe to determine the cause of
data loss
Determine operational changes required to prevent LOX/LH2 ullage pressure
overshoot during terminal count sequence
Troubleshoot LOX antigeyser point Levelsensor measurements
Verify that all shipping covers and blanking plates have been removed prior to
static firing
Evaluate drift in pressure measurements which occurred during propellant load
test
Data evaluation inc, rovements are needed. Evaluate
Automatic propellant replenish system requires modificationprior to static finng
Nora: Tweflly-eigtt of lo_j-eighl itcluOed
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Tao/e 5 Main Propulsion Test Program - Test S_te Edited Action ,_,=,"_'
(Continued)- Post Test 1-001 (04/11/78)
ITEM NO
1
3
7
8
,
10
11
12
13
14
ACTION REQUIRED
- Assess all redline parameters with respect to need and limits.
Work with Interlocks Working Group
• " " - Review the method presently used for calibration of
criticalmeasurements with respect to accuracy and cryogenic effect
- Review the current Sequence and Interlocks Document with
the idea of eliminating as many as possible. Emphasis should be on eliminating those
analog functions which can be verified visually through other recording and
rnonitodng techniques. Also, determine those software changes required such that
they can be coordinated and implemented rapidly
- Concentrate on the evaluation of the terminal count
sequence -540 seconds through T-O to identify all auto sequence problems
..... to determine
the clarity of instructions,correct labeling of control panels, the inclusion of adequate
warning/caution notes, complete/correct instructions for countdown roll-back and
recycle operations. Pay particular attention to manual functions not in rollback
sequence. Review format for clarity and sequential understanding. Review
emergency procedures for setup and presentation for rapid referral when required.
• • with respect to flow reduction and change
hardware to accommodate
...... reported during
test.
_ with respect to ET pressurization to reduce number of tank
pressure cyOles.
with respect to
reducing rite requinmlent to that which is necessary rater than that desired. Review
purge procedures.
FlevimN LOX Chilidmm PmcadUre to determine what can be done to chill down faster
w_ 3,500 GI=M odlk:e klstalled.
Revk_w dmo ,,,n an'arm_mant and size and change as required to accommodate the
liquid U/nlm_n accumulated during the test.
Review ¢xecadu_ with respect to static firing turnaround in case of an abort
prior to eng/m start to minimize work performed prior to the next test. This should
include data review, barge turnaround, and retest activity.
Review the potential increase in the LH2 tank pressure to off-load at an increased
rate.
Review the possibilityof rHstablsJhing propellant topping when a hold or a rollback.
Note: Fourteenof th_-ei_ incUled
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Table 5 Main Propulsion Test Program - Test Site Edited Actyon List
(Continued) - Post Test 1-002
ITEM NO
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
ACTION REQUIRED
Conduct a complete review of every redline measurement with respect to the sensor
used, how it is transmitted and signal conditioned, how it is recorded, and the method
of checkout end-to-end. Include in this review the upper and lower limits of each
measurement.
Prepare a plan for and complete the troubleshooting associated with SATS/EI U #2
problem.
Review the entire software verificationprogram to determine whether or not it si
complete. Identify shortcomings and method to correct.
Re-evaluate the LH2 manifold temperature measurement with respect to the probe
used versus what is required to produce a valid reading.
Investigate the problem of warm LOX and determine changes in loading procedure,
hardware design, etc., in order to provide colder LOX at ET/Orbiter interface.
Change OCP-M0005 to positively start the LH2 recirculatlon pumps prior to
termination of fast fig.
Determine system changes, i.e., hardware/software required to prevent pre-pressure
overshoot aml vent valve cracking prior to the next static firing.
Correct operator panel legends between Firex water console and fire detect console
forcompatN:)iBy in order to eliminate confusion when Firex water is required. Review
all other panels for similarproblems.
Investigate the need for redundancy in the Free Hydrogen Bumoff temperature
sensors and igniters to prevent potential countdown delays.
Determine whoffi_ or not the fire ball seen at teat termination is normal and, if so,
determine the enrages neceuaw to minimize the effect such as adding a purge,
leaving engine wlmr on, etc.
Establish a team of Ip/stems engineers to completely review ag Test Profile Tables.
Review the knstnanentationon the Orbiter feed system with respect to adequacy
under dyrwn_ conditions while firing and/or POCK) pulsing. Incorporate resonance
survey data Imo mvlew.
Pedorm rnuluremenl of ET forward support boll to determine pre-load relaxation and
determine whetllM ratorqulng is required.
Review the response of the 98% point level sensor in both the LH2 and LOX systems
wit respect to lengthening the time constant for fast fill termination to enhance
propellant loading time.
Determine the hardware and soltwam required to improve the 60KB system to
provide all three SSME parameters simultaneously and alternate page selection from
at least two users.
Investigate the discoloration of the LH2 GSE fill and drain flex line with respect to
damage. Also, determine if additional heat protection is required in umbilicalareas.
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• Main fuel valve structural failure and associated release of large hydrogen
quantities. Design/manufacturing methods were changed.
• Fuel preburner burn through and associated release of combustion products.
Design changes made.
Automated prevalve closure was impossible under some failure conditions.
Manual closure was delayed under some failure conditions until prevalve
benefits were seriously compromised--To +6.5 minutes before closure was
possible. Control computer/engine controller software changes necessary.
• Faulty procedure for unloading oxygen from ET/orbiter created severe pressure
surges within facility hardware.
• Necessity for and location of launch facility igniters to burn engine released raw
hydrogen at engine start. KSC established requirements for the igniter system.
Technical accomplishments from propulsion system development testing of
Space Shuttle to satisfy the above stated general objectives and the specific
technical requirements in Appendix 3 are presented and discussed in Appendix 3.
Each accomplishment has been assigned to one of four classifications: (1)
potentially catastrophic; (2) unworkable, thus unacceptable without change; (3)
workable - modification needed and anticipated/planned; and (4) improvement of
some type. Also, each accomplishment is assessed relative to the time of events,
detection or likely occurrenc_flight or preflight. Table 6 is a summary tabulation
of accomplishment as classified. Twenty-eight accomplishments are classified to
be catastrophic or unworkable, with three of six catastrophic events related to flight.
Three of twenty-two unworkable events are also related to flight. Twenty-eight of
the forty total events are preflight related. The three potential catastrophic events
for flight occurrence are: (1) structural failure of the main engine steer horn and
resultant dumping of large quantities of hydrogen in the vehicle base, (2) the
marginal stability characteristics of the ET/Orbiter 17-inch oxygen quick disconnect
valve, and (3) the oxygen low level cutoff system inadequacies. While catastrophic
and unworkable preflight accomplishments may be viewed to be less serious; they,
in fact, are equally sedous, as vehicle launch cannot occur and extensive time and
testing activity are necessary to satisfactorily resolve them.
Table 6. Reported Propulsion System Testing Accomplishments Classified by
Consequence and Time Phased- MPTA
Stage
Shuttle
Catastror_
Flight Preflight
3 3
Unworkable
Flight Preflight
5 17
Workable Mad.
Flight Preflight
3 6
Improvement Total
Per
Flight Preflight St_e
1 2 40
The preceding discussion attempts to put in perspective the requirement for
propulsion system testing, the magnitude of the task, and the complexity and
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associated risk in developing and verifying a propulsion system for space vehicles
by using actual-data from a modern day, current operational vehicle. Maturity is a
prerequisite for a successful flight program, thus any new development/verification
program may be expected to encounter similar experiences. Conclusions to assist
in subsequent program developments are:
• Propulsion system complexity precludes total dependency on analytical
methods for establishing flight worthiness.
• Propulsion system maturity results from rigorous system testing.
• Rigorous testing involves significant numbers of system tests and long duration
tests.
• High risk to test vehicle/facility are associated with the testing.
• Flight schedules established for programs without adequate propulsion system
testing may be relatively meaningless.
Delay of propulsion system testing until vehicle/engine hardware achieve some
minimal maturity may be beneficial for reducing risk, cost, and test time. Launch
site hardware and software requirements must be properly considered.
• Propulsion system testing should be considered exceptionally high risk without
inclusion of safety enhancement features.
SATURN STAGES
Space Shuttle used data developed during the Saturn Program for
vehicle/facility design, manufacturing, and test operations to the maximum extent
possible. The Saturn Program had many unique requirements, thus it is important
to review Saturn propulsion system testing expedences to ensure that conclusions
presented are complete and correct.
Included in this section are all stages of Saturn I, Saturn IB, and Saturn V.
More specifically the S-IV, and S-I stage of Saturn I, S-IVB and S-IB stages of
Saturn IB and S-IVB, S-II, and S-IC stages of Saturn V. Available data for these
stages are less plentiful than for Space Shuttle, thus the assessment is less
complete.
Summary of Findinas
Table 7 contains tabular information about static firings for various stages
developed. Information relative to stage and engine design for the various vehicles
are included in Table 8. The time span for these test programs is from early 1960
through August 1968. Several observations are possible from the two tables:
• Two propellant combinations were used on the various stages--
oxygen/hydrogen and oxygen/RPl.
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Table 7. Saturn Program Summary
Saturn V
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All System
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• Various stages used either single or multi tanks for each propellant.
• Stages used from one to eight engines.
Stages with single burn capability and both sea level and altitude start
capability are included, as is a stage having duel burn capability--altitude start
and earth orbit start.
• All flight stages were acceptance tested prior to flight.
• All stages were successful during flight.
• Two flight stages were destroyed during acceptance testing.
• Two propulsion system development stages were destroyed during testing.
Original planning for each oxygen/hydrogen stage included both battleship and
all system test hardware, whereas each oxygen/RP1 stage included only all
systems "equivalent" hardware. S-IVB/M all system stage was diverted to
structural testing after structural test stage failure.
• The S-II all systems stage was destroyed early in the test program.
The S-IVB/V battleship stage testing was very limited, and the stage was
shipped to Arnolcl Engineering Development Center for attitude testing. Many
stage requirements were satisfied by S-IVB/IB battleship testing. Note S-IVB/IB
was a single burn stage, whereas S-IVB/V was essentially the same design but
with dual start capability.
Numbers of attempted static firings varied significantly for various stages--a
sum of 63 for S-II battleship and all systems test article to 15 for S-I and 15 for
S-IC. Numbers of tests exclude several ignition tests for each test article and
initial testing when less than a full complement of engines were tested. See
later text.
• Similarly, the number of aborted tests varied significantly--from 6 for S-I, 5 for
S-IC, and 33 for S-II.
',
• S-IB stage development testing is limited since differences from S-I are not
significant.
• Data for S-IV anti S-IVB stages are incomplete. Presented firing attempts are
believed to be approximately correct, but test aborts and other data are lacking.
Staoes Destroyed
Two ground test stages were destroyed during development testing as were
two flight stages during acceptance testing. Such stage loss must be prevented in
future programs. Lessons learned from these experiences were highly beneficial
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to the Shuttle program and should benefit future programs. The S-IVB
was destroyed prior to actual hot firing when an ambient temperature high pressure
helium storage sphere located internal to the stage on the thrust structure ruptured.
Post rupture failure analysis identified unacceptable welding material had been
used in sphere construction. The S-IC ._ failure experienced a hydraulic
fluid fire internal to the stage which resulted in an aborted firing with much
propellant remaining onboard. Improperly implemented securing procedures
resulted in the oxygen feed system geysering, not once but twice, with resultant
feed system structural failures. Approximately 50,000 gallons of oxygen was
dumped within the stage. The S-ll _ test stage failed during check out
operations. The liquid hydrogen tank ruptured during helium pressurization. Tank
pressure was significantly above acceptable limits through a series of human
errors. The oxygen tank of the S-IV _ test stage was overpressured
preparatory to a static firing. The stage was destroyed and the facility badly
damaged. Redundant tank vent valves failed to relieve--the pilot valves were
adversely affected by solid oxygen particles created by extremely cold helium
pressurant gas.
Discussion of Development Fidno Proorams
Information presented in Table 9 provides greater insight" into test programs
for which data is available. The figure includes such things as: (1) the number of
planned and completed full duration firings; (2) the number of tests which were
terminated prior to plan because of stage fires, malfunctioning instrumentation
which aborted tests, observers inadvertently aborting tests, tests aborted for
legitimate reasons; (3) tests conducted early in the respective programs which
have been excluded from other numbers presented in this table and in Table 7.
SIC. It is obvious from Table 9 data that S-IC was an exceedingly successful
test program. Necessary test data were obtained from one vehicle configuration,
number of tests were reasonable, preparatory testing considering a new test stand
and a stage of such enormous thrust were reasonable, no fires developed and gas
leaks occurred on only two tests. Instrumentation failures caused no test aborts,
although three tests were aborted unnecessarily by human error. These results are
explainable: (1) design experience--the stage was designed and manufactured
by MSFC who had designed, manufactured, and tested the S-I stage and two
earlier military vehicles; (2) the propellants were the same, oxygen/RP1, used on
previous vehicles; (3) MSFC designers/managers had worked closely with the
rocket engine developer on prior programs and each respected the other and were
knowledgeable of work methods.
_. The S-I stage was also a highly successful program although
considerably more testing was performed than for S-IC. The additional testing is
easily justified. The S-i program preceded the S-IC program and represented the
"basement floor" in learning and technology development. It represented
approximately an eight fold increase in total stage thrust for liquid propelled stages.
It used, for the first time, engines in a clustered configuration to create stages with
"huge" thrust. It incorporated, for the first time, clustered state-of-the-art
manufacturable relatively small diameter tanks to store these *huge" propellant
32
Table9. SaturnProgramPropulsionSystem Test Summary
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quantities, and it required large thrust multi-use test stands with water cooled
deflectors. This program was truly a learning experience in liquid rocket
propulsion. No test or flight stages were lost. Fires were experienced on only two
tests, and damage was small. Four of the twenty firings were aborted for
instrumentation failures, and two additional tests were aborted for legitimate
reasons. It served as the data base for the later S-IB stage which used uprated
engines, longer tanks, aerodynamic fins for stability purposes, and other minor
changes.
S-IV. While no detail data is available for the S-IV stage, the approximate
number of attempted firings of the battleship and all systems stages were 28. This
stage used oxygen and hydrogen as propellants and an existing engine with
15,000 pound thrust. No stage had previously flown using these propellants,
although General Dynamics was developing a stage using the same propellants
and engine. Douglas Aircraft (DAC) had acquired rocket development experience
with the ballistic missile Thor which used oxygen/RP-1 propellants, but experience
with hydrogen within the country, DAC, and MSFC was limited. This program,
similar to S-l, while developing a stage which flew successful on six occasions,
served the dual purpose of training and technology state-of-the-art advancement
for hydrogen rocket systems.
S-IVB. The Apollo program, at some later date, required stage total impulse
and thrust greater than S-IV could provide. The S-IVB stage was developed to
meet such requirements. It was used on a two-stage vehicle, Saturn IB, and three-
stage vehicle, Saturn V. The stage for Saturn V required two separate bums, one
approximately seven minutes after liftoff and the second several hours later from
earth orbit. DAC was the S-IVB contractor and again propellants were
oxygen/hydrogen. A single, newly-developed engine of 200,000 pound thrust was
used instead of six clustered engines for S-IV. A total of approximately 21 static
firing attempts were conducted with the S-IVB stage. Again data does not exist to
develop more details. S-IVB flight stages on Saturn IB and Saturn V were all
successful. Without the oxygen/hydrogen data base developed on S-IV, the S-IVB
stage development program would have been less fiexible, and more static firings
would likely have been required.
S-II. Detail data are available for S-II, the second stage of Saturn V, which
also used oxygen/hydrogen propellants. The stage was developed by North
American Aviation, who had neither designed, developed, nor flown rocket
propelled stages. Extensive training was required as noted previously for other
stages. This was a "huge" stage using five 200,000 pound thrust engines, and, as
was true for other stages of Saturn IB and V, was man rated. Total firing attempts
for battleship and all systems vehicles were 63. There were 33 aborted tests.
Sixteen successful full-duration firings were accomplished from twenty-eight
attempted full-duration firings. Six tests were terminated because of internal fires--
relatively small to moderate damage. Ten tests were terminated for other legitimate
reasons, and sixteen tests were terminated because of control instrumentation
failures. The number of tests may be excessive relative to other Saturn programs
and Space Shuttle, which may be considered comparable in complexity.
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Pre-Shuttle stage designs and development activities were complex and
involved awesome risks. Trained personnel were not available to the same extent
as they were for Space Shuttle development, and technology which virtually did
not exist had to be developed in stage and engine disciplines. In spite of these
circumstances, the vehicle flight programs were all successful and many "lessons
learned" were acquired. These lessons were of great benefit to Space Shuttle
devetopment, and the total list from Saturn, Space Shuttle, and from Air Force
programs discussed later should benefit future programs.
Th_ maior conclusion from these pre-Shuttle programs is that the Apollo
Program would have been a disaster without the comprehensive propulsion
system test program which was conducted. Experiences from the Saturn Program
do not violate any conclusions presented earlier for Space Shuttle. Actually,
experiences reinforce presented conclusions accomplishments.
Many technical accomplishments are presented and discussed in the
respective appendices, 4 through 8, for all Saturn stages (S-IV stage of Saturn 1
information is incomplete). These data are presented in the same format as was
done previously for Space Shuttle's MPTA. Table 10, a tabular summary of this
data presented according to technical and timing classifications, contains issues for
each stage judged to be catastrophic and/or unworkable for either flight or preflight.
A careful review of individual accomplishments in the respective appendices
clearly shows the necessity for extensive propulsion system test programs.
A memorandum entitled "Static Firing Saturn Stages" authored by Daniel H.
Driscoll, Jr. on December 6, 1968, Js included in Appendix 10. The question at
hand was the necessity for continuing to conduct acceptance firings on each
Saturn flight stage which had been, and was, standard policy. A thorough review
of NASA's Saturn Program results to that date and the Army and Air Force's large
rocket programs was conducted and results reported in subject memorandum. The
objective of the study differed from the current study objectives, however, data
presented relates to the current subject and should benefit management. The
memorandum includes data on number of flights, number of failures, stages which
been acceptance fired, length of acceptance firings, and some causes of stage
failures.
Conclusions drawn from the investigation are that acceptance firings of flight
stages had been benefidal for enhancing safe flight and that the data provided little
insight relative to the approximate time that acceptance firings could be deleted.
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Table 10. Reported Propulsion System Testing Accomplishments Classified by
Consequence and Time Phased v
Stage
S-IC
S-V
S-IVB
S-I/ B
S-IV "
Catastrophe
Flight: Preflight
4 0
2 0
8 0
5 1
2 0
Unworkable
Flight Preflight
3 3
8 8
6 3
4 2
3 1
Workable Mod.
Flight Preflight
1 0
2 0
0 1
2 0
0 0
Improvement Total
Per
Flight Preflight Stage
1 1 13
1 0 21
2 0 2O
1 0 15
0 0 6
"Incomplete
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LESSONS LEARNED
The NASA programs of Saturn and Space Shuttle have remarkable flight
records--60 successful missions and only 1 failure (which was attributed to non-
liquid propulsion systems). The non-flight phases of development programs have
been less spectacular and problems of almost every conceivable type have been
experienced. This is to be expected since basic technology establishment and
personnel training was necessary in parallel with hardware and system
development for many of the programs. Many of these experiences may not be
readily anticipated and yet may be beneficial for future programs. Some of these
more significant experiences designated "lessons learned" are presented.
Presented "lessons learned" are from NASA's Saturn and Shuttle programs and
from the Air Force Titan programs.
Presented "lessons learned" emphasize testing and limited design aspects of
propulsion systems. The items listed collectively demonstrate the contribution to
successful space flight which ground test programs have made. In spite of the
many "lessons learned" from the Saturn Program, the Shuttle Program is also
credited with "lessons leamed," thus it is reasonable to expect future development
programs will likewise contribute their own lists.
. Verify functional performance of feed system; pressure drop, pressure
surges, water hammer response, resonance.
.
Preclude combinations of incompatible commodities in fluid systems. Three
basic principals to follow:
a. Provide absolute separation of incompatible commodities. Isolation
valves and check valves are not sufficient.
b Provide absolute controls during assembly, maintenance, checkout to
mitigate migration, e.g., provide dry purges, dry enclosures to preclude
moisture intrusion.
c. Maintain systems under significant cleanliness controls during all
operations.
, Assure procedures and processes are incorporated to achieve
contamination control of contamination sensitive systems.
.
°
Verify facility to launch vehicle interface design and operating procedures in
conducting a ground test or firing of a flight propulsion system.
Simulate actual environments, conditions, and designs. This usually
appears to be impractical, costly, or near impossible, and it may be in some
cases.
6. Demonstrate margin.during subsystem or system level test.
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10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
Use system level testing to fully understand the environments required for
component qualification tests.
Incorporation of a document which establishes guidelines for qualification,
verification, and acceptance test of components and systems can be
beneficial. The importance of the document would be guidelines to
demonstrate margin for workmanship as well as performance purposes.
The Air Force accomplishes this purpose through implementation of MIL-
STD-1540B.
Stainless steel tubing control lines are required. Aluminum control lines fail
structurally.
Fuel and oxidizer prevalves are absolutely required for static firing and
recommended for flight. They must be capable, both structurally and
functionally, of closure at full flow conditions in the event of an engine failure.
Safe engine shutoff by prevalve closure should be demonstrated in a
subsystem test prior to propulsion system testing. Valve closure
acceleration characteristics must be carefully monitored.
Thermal control of propulsion system components and electrical
components is critical to satisfactory functional performance. Compartments
containing such hardware must be purged for hazardous gases. Local
thermal control of some hardware may be required. Caution is of utmost
importance as such events as valve loss of lubricant, lubricity may be
compromised, hydraulic fluid may freeze, etc. Such events may have
disastrous effects to vehicle/engine performance.
A loss of ground power may result in an inability to terminate a firing. An
emergency system to terminate a firing is required.
Single rocket engine development testing should simulate vehicle feed
system start/main stage/shutoff conditions and engine compartment thermal
conditions as may be realistically possible. This may reduce engine testing
and operational aspects of the total propulsion system.
Launch facility to vehicle supply lines for cryogenic propellants (particularly
oxygen) must be designed carefully/properly to permit flow diversion and
control during chill clown to prevent vehicle hardware damage. Procedures
must be developed and concurred on by both facility and vehicle operations
personnel. Verification at a non-launch site is advisable.
Cryogen fluids, principally oxygen, geysering during propellant loading and
standby operations both pre- and post-firing can create unacceptable
pressures leading to structural failure of the feed system and/or tankage and
possible vehicle loss. Procedures must be carefully prepared by
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17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
knowledgeable/experienced personnel, procedures properly focused, and
personnel trained accordingly. Verification at a non-launch site is advisable.
The opening of a valve to a system or partial system containing cryogen
liquid propellant which have been "trapped" for some finite time can result in
serious hardware damage. Provisions for pressure relief should be
incorporated or special procedures adopted to minimize damage.
Temperature and pressure instrumentation directly mounted to hardware at
cryogenic temperature may be expected to drift, thus the indicated
parameters may be significantly in error, and unacceptable as "redline"
measurements. Test aborts will result. Remote mounting is necessary.
A reliable hazardous gas detection and measuring system is required for
stage static firing programs and pre-flight operations prior to launch.
Rapid response leak detectors located both internal and external to the
vehicle are required for safe operation.
A reliable fire detection system is required for static test programs and may
be required for launch site operations---subject to evaluation.
Fire protection capability and internal protective neutralizing purges are
required for static test programs and may be required for launch site
operationHubject to evaluation.
Specific pre-planned and measured personnel training and demonstration
of qualification is a prerequisite for reliable, repeatable success. System
failures were not responsible for the destruction of four stages in the Saturn
program which have been identified.
For hydrogen propelled stages, as a minimum, a ground system to safely
dispose of engine discharged, unburned hydrogen as part of start up is
required to m/old excessive pressure spikes which may be incompatible with
the stage.
Steps to assure effective shift change communications and use of only
exbefienced and qualified personnel is required.
A process where contractor and government safety can perform spot checks
on all hazardous work control documentation and operations is beneficial.
Availability of an "off line" stage/facility during the early flight phases of a
development program have proven highly beneficial. Data obtained from
both cold and hot test of S-IVB at MSFC provided essential data for both the
S-IVB and S-II stages. MPTA propellant loading tests likewise supported
Shuttle.
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28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
Recirculation of rocket engine plume low energy gases into the vehicle base
may be the predominant heat source for clustered engine vehicles. Heat
flux measurements from ground test programs to determine the relative
contributions of convective and radiative heating and analytical methods
developed to compensate for flight altitudes assist/establish design
requirements.
The phenomenon of "flow-induced vibrations" was initially experienced and
recognized as an unusual event. Research programs identified the actual
phenomena and developed guidelines for design. Major hardware losses
are probable if improperly implemented.
The phenomenon of subcooling a liquid propellant such as oxygen by
injecting a gas-like nitrogen or helium was discovered and has been used
extensively to thermally manage fluids on rocket systems.
The necessity for a pressurant diffuser which gently distributes incoming
pressurant gas within the tank ullage to avoid rapid ullage pressure decay is
a requirement for effective tank pressurization. Extensive ground testing and
analytical model development have been conducted to better understand
requirements for pressurization systems.
Severe fluid oscillations within heat exchangers as cryogenic liquids are
converted to pressurant gas can occur and must be avoided. Test and
analytical work provide useful design criteria.
A complex launch vehicle may have 1000 or more fluid connectors ranging
in size from one-quarter inch in diameter to eighteen inches or greater. A
large percentage contain combustible fluids at moderate to high pressure,
and a single leak can result in fire and vehicle damage/loss. Early design
emphasis is a prerequisite to success but is difficult to achieve for such a
non-glamorous discipline.
Cryogen insulation development for large vehicle tankage is not straight
forward, and each program is confronted with the commonly experienced, as
well as unique development problems. Some of the common problems are
insulation debonding, cracking, tank surface corrosion, inability to
adequately withstand aerodynamically created thermal loads, etc.
Conducting thorough development/test programs is essential, as is planning
for Insulation repair at the launch site after initial exposure to cold
temperatures.
Liquid nitrogen is formed on surfaces with temperatures below the boiling
point. This usually occurs in the closed engine compartment of liquid
hydrogen and liquid oxygen propelled stages and is to be avoided. High
quality insulation on rocket engines and selected stage components is
essential but is most difficult to achieve.
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Inclusion of design margins in the initial subsystem/system designs provides
flexibility to absorb stage requirement changes which frequently occur.
System level tests are necessary to verify end-to-end tolerances for timing,
limit checks, and remedial actions. Incremental subsystem tests do not
adequately provide the system response signature found in integrated
systems tests.
Design, development, and test verification of a pogo suppression system
prior to first launch is mandatory.
Vacuum jacketed cryogenic line maintenance procedures and requirements
must be developed prior to launch operations.
A separate and independent test peculiar propellant tank ullage pressure
instrumentation system must be installed for test stand operations.
Purge and pneumatic gasses must be dry.
Micro-switch operation is unreliable under cryogenic conditions.
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RISKS OF CURTAILING ALL-UP PROPULSION SYSTEMS TESTING
The purpose of this section is to discuss the actual risks created by curtailing
or eliminating system testing from a propulsion system verification program. The
approach is to examine key items, define the present level of understanding, and
make a judgement on the risk surrounding each item.
The results of the risk assessment for space vehicles and facilities are
presented in Tables 11 and 12. The evaluation considers no formal orooulsion
system test oroaram within the develooment oroaram. Results in Table 11 are for a
new program using oxygen and hydrogen propellants, tankage of similar size and
configuration to Space Shuttle, and a one burn mission with ignition on the launch
pad. Table 12 is a qualitative comparison of various vehicle configurations and
propellants with the configuration and propellant as shown in Table 11.
EVALUATION - OVERVIEW
For evaluation purposes, the propulsion system has been divided into a
number of subsystems/disciplines and each is evaluated. Evaluation parameters
and other material included are:
° Risk - catastrophic failure, mission loss, flight hardware damage, launch
complex damage, and launch delay and how these risks may be affected
by a 20 second FRF type test
2. MPTA experience identification for each evaluation subsystem/disciplines
3. Impact on components, subsystems, and flight test programs attributable to
no propulsion system testing
4. Impact to the required flight measuring program
The evaluation is qualitative. It was performed by personnel having many
years of experience in propulsion system design, development testing, and flight
support. Considered in the evaluation were analytical capability, including
deficiencies for each evaluation criteria, inherent design complexity and influence
of interacting systems, benefits derivable from propellant loading tests, design and
operational _ of space vehicles, and other factors. For additional insight to
data in Tables 11 and 12, a detailed discussion for each subsystem/discipline is
presented in Appendix 2. Risk classes used were extremely high, high, moderate,
low, or minor.
A number of observations are possible from Tables 11 and 12, and they
follow:
° Five of the fifteen subsystems/disciplines evaluated have
above for catastrophe or mission loss. The five criteria are "wrong"
component verification requirement, hazardous fluid leakage, POGO
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failure, pressurization system failure, and propellant performance margin
uncertainty.
2. Twelve of the fifteen subsystem/disciplines evaluated may be expected to
result in flight hardware damage.
, Five of the fifteen subsystems/disciplines evaluated are ranked moderate
or areater dsi_ to the launch facility. These are "wrong" component
verification requirement, instrumentation failure, hazardous fluid leakage,
propellant loading procedures, and stored gas operations.
, One or more twenty-second FRF type tests will reduce risks noted above
but will not eliminate risk. The risk of four subsystems/disciplines
evaluated remain moderate--hazardous fluid leakage, POGO failure,
pressurization system performance, and performance margin uncertainty.
, The potential for launch delay risk are not affected by FRF type tests. Ten
of the fifteen evaluation cdteria are rated moderate or hioher risk with three
being extremely high--instrumentation failure, hazardous fluid leakage,
and propellant mass uncertainty.
. Planned increases in component, subsystem, and flight development
testing are relatively unaffected, but the _ for increased
development flights prior to attaining operational status is likely for three
subsystems/disciplines evaluated--"wrong" component verification
requirement, pressurization system performance, and performance margin
uncertainty.
7. Flight vehicle instrumentation increases are necessary for eleven of fifteen
subsystem/disciplines evaluated.
, Six of the fifteen subsystems/disciplines evaluated will be influenced
additionally by changes in vehicle configuration, propellant type, location
of vehicle at time of engine ignition, and numbers of ignitions. The risk
increases significantly in some cases. The six affected criteria are: (a)
pressurization system performance; (b) propellant mass uncertainty; (c)
low level cutoff; (d) engine/feed system chill; (e) tank insulation; and (f)
h_ thermal control.
g° A common bulkhead configuration vehicle using oxygen and hydrogen
propellants with multiple ignition and ignition in earth orbit would have the
greater risk.
In summary, the broad message from the above material is that a vehicle
development program without propulsion system testing involves significantly
greater risks from engineering and hardware failures which adversely affect
program objective accomplishment, safety, and flight schedule predictability. While
a short duration static firing at the launch site may reduce engineering and safety
risks, the remaining dsks are relatively high, and flight schedule predictability is
J
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unaffected. The technology base for Shuttle configured propulsion systems is
more advanced than for other vehicle configurations and missions, thus
engineering, safety, and schedule risks for other configurations/missions will be
greater.
The evaluation under discussion includes structural/mechanical design
capability for only a limited number of subsystems/disciplines, yet such capability is
critical for accomplishing program goals. Some perception of hardware maturity
may be achieved from Table 13 where hardware changeout for the MPTA is
tabulated for each test attempt. The tabulation shows many vehicle and engine
hardware exchanges during the program. The risks in Tables 11 and 12 are thus
further enhanced. Tabulations in previously discussed sections dealing with test
scheduling, why tests were aborted, propellant leaks and fires experienced for the
MPTA program, and some similar data for earlier programs were also not used in
the subject evaluation. The risk which is evident from these earlier discussions
adds further credence to the risk presented in Tables 11 and 12.
PROPULSION SYSTEM TEST PROGRAM
This report has shown that available design knowledge and insight are
inadequate to ensure acceptable hardware and operational procedures can be
developed which satisfy both engineering and safety without propulsion systems
test data. Discussions have also clarified the role of short duration FRF type testing
for resolving issues of concern. While the FRF is beneficial, it fails to satisfy all
technical needs and does not benefit concerns relating to launch delay. The
obvious question is then what test program is required to satisfy engineering and
safety needs? The time and cost required to conduct such a program are
important, thus plan implementation to minimize program schedule and cost
impacts are necessary.
A test program to satisfy identified needs has been developed and is
presented in Tables 14 and 15. In as much as vehicle configuration and mission
profile may significantly impact the required test program, a vehicle and mission
have been selected. The test program presented is for a launch type vehicle with
ignition on the launch pad. Vehicles having altitude ignition, ignition in orbit, or
differing radically in configuration would require a few-two or three---additional
tests to address specific issues peculiar to those missions.
The test program presented in Tables 14 and 15 is a minimum program and
involves data collection for propulsion, structural, electrical, and computer/software
needs. Tests are specified for the vehicle without propellants, with propellants
aboard and no engines fldng, and with engines firing. The test program identifies
nine tests of which seven are hot firings and four of the seven are full duration
firings. The program includes test objectives, estimated time in hours required to
collect the necessary non-firing data, test objectives related to test number, and
other pertinent information.
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Table 14. Propulsion System Test Program Launch Vehicle- Ground Ignition
k--
_2
U.
_3
w-_J3
Non-Finng
Firing
MOTIVATION
z
..r. u.J
o :::
Resonant Model Vilxal]on X
Engme,rrar_, Purge X
ProDeliant Loadmg X X
Procedures
ProNltant Mitts X
Engme/Fe4KI System Chill X
Hardware Thermal X X
Component Environment X
Requirement
lnstnJmentltion Verificabon X
I-lezaraous Fluid Leakage X
Pressunza_on System X
Venficxiaon
Propellant M_in Um_ty X
_0 F(ulure X
Thrust VecIOr Coe_ml Failure X
Clusterod Engine X
Perfonnance
Low Level Cutoff X
Tank Insutal]on X
Note:
Stood Gas Mes=,,Ogemtionx X
i-
2 4 hrs elch
3 1 hr. imch
3 1 hr. each
3 3 htlL alch
3 1 hr. utah
3 3ha. each
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4 2 full ¢lumtton
_nimum
3 2 ful ¢lum_on
_nimtxe
4 3 ful ¢lumBm
3 3 raw lul
dumtMm
4 25_ tmaJ fldnO
lime
3 1_ totld fldng
time
2 ,StorY1
3 Full dunWon
3 2 =ho_1 long
2 2 nest ful
dun=ton
Space vehicle/altitude ignition vehicle requiresmodest additionaJ tes_ng lot broader
objectives,
_o
P 1/2 rYa
P 2/3/4 n/a
P 2/3/4 Na
P 3/4/5 We
P 2/3/4 Na
P 3/4/5 Na
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P 5/8/7 60/full
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P _ Full
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S _ SO/full
S 3/4/6 2.5/13/fu_
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Test 1 - dry; Test 2 -
02 only
Test 2 - 02 only; Test
3/4 - O2/H2
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3/4 - 02/1"12
All live O2/H2
Test 2 - 02 only; 3/4 -
O2/112
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=mulated engine loss
Dets ldso av_iMibie
Test 3
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NDH004.01
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Table 15.
OBJECTIVE
NON-FIRING
Propulsion System Test Program Summary
Launch Vehicle - Ground Ignition
TEST NUMBER
TIME HOURS
Resonant Modal Vibration 4 4
Engine/Tank Purge 1 1 1
Propellant Loading Procedure 1 2 2
Propellant Mass 3 3
Engine/Feed System Chill 1 1 1
Hardware Thermal 3,1 3a
TOTAL 4 7 7 7
FIRING
Firing Duration, Seconds
Engine Thrust - % maximum
FEATURES
Component Environment
Requirement
Instrumentation Verification
Hazardous Fluid Leakage
Pressurization System
Vedflcation
Propellant Margin Uncertainty
POGO Failure
Thrust Vector Control F_ka'e
Clustsrecl Engine Psrl_n_sme
Low Level Cutoff
Tank Insulation
Stored Gas Mass'Operations
, i
3a
Na rYa 2.5 15 60 Full
n/a rYa Na 70 100 100
X X
X
X
X
X
b
X
X
b
b
X
X
X
Full
100
engine
out
X
X
X
b
Full
100
lores=
valve out
b
b
b
Full
100
X
Note: a - Time not additive
b - Requirements affect test objective consolidation
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For purposes of comparison, the MPTA program plan was for fifteen tests
including three non-firing tests. Eight of the fifteen tests were to be for full duration;
however, only six full duration tests were actually conducted.
The reduction in recommended numbers of tests from fifteen for MPTA to nine
for current planning is realistic and is attributable to: (1) an engine which is more
mature, of current technology, and less complex than was SSME; (2) availability of
demonstrated analytical tools for facility water cooled deflector design; and (3)
availability of improved analytical techniques for vehicle design in a number of
areas, thus the need for less extensive testing. The number of test attempts to
complete the planned program should also be less than for MPTA due to
availability of a more mature and less complex engine thus fewer failures and
application of "lessons learned" relative to control instrumentation improvements
and fewer red line violations.
The test program in Table 15, as stated, may be considered the minimum
program considering technical requirements, although the test program may not be
compatible with minimum total program cost over the life of the program. This is
because the minimum test program is developed to be compatible with the
normally accepted method of developing/launching space vehicles--veh.icle
launch conducted and supported by the required, highly-trained technical
personnel necessary to successfully accomplish the mission. This approach
necessitates continual availability of significant numbers of highly-trained and
specialized personnel which inevitably leads to significant program cost. An
alternate approach whereby expanded propulsion system ground tests programs
are conducted may lead to vehicle launch with smaller and less specialized launch
crews. The acceptability of this approach has not been established nor is total
program cost reduction assured. Repeated launch delays or the unnecessary loss
of a single vehicle can affect total program cost and introduce extraneous factors
which could best be avoided. Thus, careful evaluation is necessary should launch
philosophy changes be contemplated.
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PROPULSION SYSTEM TEST COSTS/BENEFIT DISCUSSION
The rationale for test and verification (T&V) is that reliability will be improved
by detecting and correcting design or manufacturing errors before they can cause
failure during operations. The 'merit' of a T&V program can be evaluated by
comparing its costs (e.g., test facilities, test equipment, test articles, and test
operations) against its benefits (e.g., economic value of reduced failures).
TEST AND VERIFICATION COSTS
T&V costs rough-order-of-magnitude (ROM) in new launch vehicle programs
can be estimated from past program costs. According to Rockwell/STSD data, 'test'
costs (not including government furnished facilities and equipment or other
government costs) have averaged 4.9 percent of 'non-recurring' DDT&E costs
across Gemini, Saturn S-II, Apollo CSM, and Space Shuttle Orbiter programs.
Also, there have been only slight variations in 'test' costs as a percentage of 'non-
recurring' costs, ranging from 4.2 percent for the S-II program to 5.2 percent for the
orbiter program.
To the extent that 'test' cost data were recorded and are available at the
subsystem level, they indicate that structural, flight control (including hydraulics),
avionics and propulsion subsystems are characterized by higher than average test
costs (as a fraction of subsystem DDT&E). For example, on the orbiter program,
MPS test costs (excluding SSMEs) ran 8.3 percent of MPS DDT&E.
Based on historic T&V cost parameters, reasonable bounds on ROM T&V
costs for a new (undefined) launch vehicle run from 4 to 6 percent of non-recurring
• DDT&E (e.g., a $5,000M DDT&E advanced launch system would include between
$200M and $300M of T&V); Of that T&V cost, roughly .10 to 15 percent would likely
be spent on MPS testing (e.g., between $20M and $45M would cover the MPS test
effort, again exclusive of facilities, equipment and engines).
BENEFITS OF TEST AND VERIFICATION
The economic payoff of T&V efforts is lower 'loss'rathe product of fewer
failures during a system's operational phase or less serious consequences when
failures occur. For example, if a $45M MPS T&V program for an unmanned,
expendable advanced launch system were to prevent only one catastrophic failure
during the fleet's life-cycle of 200 to 500 launches, it would have justified itself ten
times over by avoiding the loss of a ~$50M to -$100M launch vehicle, the loss of its
-$200M to -$1,000M cargo, and the unavoidable waste of several hundred million
dollars in 'fixed' costs during a period of fleet grounding.
The economic payoff of T&V in manned, reusable or 'civil' space programs is
immensely higher than in unmanned, expendable programs since the
consequences of a catastrophic failure are immensely more severel For example,
loss of Challenger (-$1,500M replacement value), its TDRS/IUS cargo (~$200M
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replacement value), SRB re-design and 'fixed' costs of $3,000M - $5,000M during
the stand-down, dwarf by a factor of twenty to thirty times the orbiter program's T&V
outlays.
Perhaps other 'non-quantifiable', but real losses (the crew, the agency's
prestige, and the subsequent shifts in national space launch policy) could have
been avoided with more extensive T&V efforts earlier. One 'lesson learned' from
the history of launch vehicle development is that, while failures are both inevitable
and terribly expensive, eady T&V efforts to detect and correct the sources of failure
before they occur are both effective and relatively inexpensive.
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PROPULSION COMMUNITY QUESTIONNAIRE
One of the major reasons for performing this study was to record the thoughts
of many of the propulsion development engineers that have contributed so heavily
to the success of Saturn and Shuttle---the "old hands" that are now contemplating
new careers or retirement. A few Rockwell people have contributed heavily in this
endeavor, but a questionnaire distributed throughout the NASA and NASA
contractor propulsion community proved to be invaluable for preserving the
judgement of managers and engineers with years of propulsion background.
The response to the questionnaire was gratifying. Almost all respondents
indicated a high interest in the subject and took the time to fill out a rather lengthy
questionnaire. Table 16 is the list of respondents. The actual questionnaire is
reproduced as Appendix 11 and is included for the reader's information.
The responses to the question addressing the role of "all-up" system testing
were almost consistent. These are included verbatim (except two which were
paraphrased) in Table 17. In our view, the responses overwhelmingly make the
case for propulsion system testing.
The author's professional views on this question are included separately on
Pages 60 through 66.
ANALYTICAL HIERARCHY PROCESS
In addition to the primary questions, the questionnaire contained a number of
opinion trade questions which were analyzed by an analytical hierarchy process
(AHP). This process is an attempt to quantify the collective subjective opinions of
the respondents. The objective is to establish priorities based on cost, schedule,
and reliability from five system verification methods: systems analysis only;
battleship testing; flight configuration article testing; flight-reediness firing at the
launch pad; or flight test only. All of the verification methods assumed previous
component and engine development testing.
The analytical method used to analyze the respondents' opinions is based on
a book by Thomas L. Saaty, Decision Makiqa for Leaders--The Analytical
Hierarchy Process for Decisions in a Complex Wodd. published in 1986. To quote
the preface of this book, "... the AHP isa method of breaking down a complex,
unstructured situation into its component parts; arranging these parts, or variables,
into a hierarchic order; assigning numerical values to subjective judgements on the
relative importance of each variable; and synthesizing the judgements to determine
which variables have the highest priodty and should be acted upon to influence the
outcome of the situation." AHP is based on the fact that human reasoning works
best when faced with only two choices. The process calculates preference
weighted rankings of the different alternatives or choices available. (In this case,
the alternatives are the various levels of testing.) Certain criteda are determined to
be the most important factors in making a decision, and these are ranked according
to relative importance among them compared to all other alternatives considering
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strengths and weaknesses relating to each pre-determined criteria. After all
judgements and rankings have been made, a matrix is computed showing an
overall score for each choice. The program used for this process can also
consolidate the opinions and judgements of many individuals into a group choice.
The results are shown in the accompanying table. The numbers in this table
reflect the collective priorities based on the respondents' opinions. The absolute
values of the numbers are not meaningful, but the comparison between the
numbers for criteria and test methods is significant.
As was expected, reliability was the predominant criterion when compared to
cost and schedule. Based on the reliability criterion, the highest priority test
method was by flight configuration test article, followed by battleship testing. The
priority assigned to the other choices was significantly lower, and the lowest
ranking was given to analysis only.
Table of Results
Criteria: Which criterion is more important when planning a verification program
for an advanced propulsion system?
Cost Schedule
.126 •102 .772
Which test plan alternative will result in the most reliable propulsion
system?
_ Fliaht Confiauration FFIF
.038 .211 .484 .123 .145
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Table 16. Questionnaire Respondents
Adams, Alan / Pratt and whitney
Andrews, Byron / Rockwell
Baker, J. L. / Rockwell
Brasseaux, Hugh / JSC
Breedlove, Dave / Rockwell
Bruce, Jim / Rockwell
Burg, Roger / Rockwell
Burns, Robert / Rockwell
Carlson, Norm / KSC
Cobb, Bill / MSFC Retired
Coester, Steve / Rockwell
Connell, Don / Pratt & Whitney
Corn, Graydon / NASA Retired
Driscoll, Dan / NASA Retired
Driver, Orville I Calspan
Emerick, Bruce / Martin Michoud
Flauss, Emille / Martin Michoud
Fox, Ed I Martin Marietta Aerospace
(By George EIliott)
Glasgow, Lynn I Rockwell
Glasser, Sid / Rockwell
Harrison, Colin / MMC Denver
Harsh, George / MSFC
High, Dick / JSC
Hildebrand, Arnold / MSFC Retired
Hillbrath, Henry/The Boeing Co.
Hokanson, Roland I Martin Michoud
Jackson, Ed / Rockwell
Johnson, John / Martin Michoud
Johnstone, Harry / NASA Retired
Kaser, Ted / Rockwell
Kingsbury, James / The Boeing Company
Lamberth, Horace / LSOC
Lee, Sam / Rockwell
Lincoln, Bob / Rocketdyne
Lindsey, B111 / Rockwell
Lyddon, T. E. / Rockwell Retired
McCandless, Mark / Martin Mlchoud
McCool, Alex / MSFC
Mosbrook, Ed / Rockwell
Muller, Phil / MSFC
Norquist, Lawrence I Martin Marietta Corp.
Odom, Jim / NASA HDQS
O'Neal, Adrian / McDonnell Douglas
Owen, Jim ! MSFC
Pearson, Jim / U.T.C
Plait, Gordon / MSFC
Pride, Bob / MSFC
Redus, Jerry / MSFC
Reid, Bill / Rockwell Retired
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Ritter, Glenn / MSFC
Schaffer, Virgil / Rockwell
Schweikle, Dave / McDonnell Douglas
Smith, Carlyle / MSFC Retired
Smyly, Harold / MSFC
Stewart, Frank / MSFC Retired
Schwartz, Dick / Rocketdyne
(By Jerry Johnson)
Trott, William / Rockwell
Vizek, Bill / Pratt and Whitney
Winch, John / The Boeing Company
(By James Stansell)
Winstead, Tom / MSFC Retired
Witt, Don/ Pratt & Whitney
Wong, Dale / Rockwell
Wood, Charles / MSFC Retired
Wood, Jim / Eagle Engineering
Worlund, A. L. / MSFC
Zeise, Jlm/ Rockwell
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THE ROLE OF PROPULSION SYSTEM TESTING -- CHARLES C. WOOD
Is there a role for propulsion "system" testing for space vehicle development
today in the high technology age? Managers of new space vehicle and military
missile development programs are confronted with this issue. Considerable
pressure confronts each program manager to reduce high, up-front costs of
development programs. With limited ways to accomplish this low-cost objective,
the omission of propulsion system testing may be one alternative to achieve
desired funding reductions. Are such cost savings real or are they merely deferred
to reappear later? Is program reliability impaired by such action or can it be
achieved equally well by some other means?
More than 40 years devoted to the engineering aspects of space vehicle,
military missile development and aircraft research in which some failures and many
successes were achieved firmly imprints in my mind many important principals if
success is to be achieved. My opinion regarding the desirability of propulsion
"system" testing is unequivocally "yes," although circumstances may support
carefully selected testing omissions. The following paragraphs discuss various
aspects of propulsion "system" testing.
Pro oulsion "$y,_tem" Test Reauirements
Although exceptions are possible, propulsion "system" testing is essential for
newly-designed manned vehicle Dro_arams: in the practical world, exceptions are
limited. Circumstances which may permit propulsion "system" testing omission
would be design similarity and use of state-of-the-art technology for all systems,
both of which are unlikely for new vehicles. Prerequisites for vehicle programs
without propulsion "system" testing are: (1) all systems must be thoroughly
analyzed; (2) the interaction between systems must be thoroughly analyzed; and
(3) the benefits of Flight Readiness Firings (FRFs) are thoroughly evaluated and
implemented where shown to be beneficial. This approach is necessary because,
as experience has shown, supposedly benign design changes frequently lead to
serious operational or performance difficulties capable of inducing mission failure.
Therefore, to avoid such unacceptable occurrences, propulsion "system" testing for
manned missions is warranted when there is incorporation of a new engine
system, a new pressurization system approach and hardware, or a new feed
system design and hardware.
Objectives of a propulsion "system" testing program are: (1) to demonstrate
that each separate system provides the required performance when interacting
with other related vehicle systems; (2) to demonstrate that the structural capability
of all systems is adequate; (3) to verify that methods devised for operations of all
propulsion systems and the necessary supporting ground systems are correct,
safe, and compatible; and (4) to show that ground systems have adequate
capability and.margin. Altematives for determining flight worthiness of propulsion
systems - analyses, FRF, and flight test programs - may be considered, and while
they may provide program benefits, they also have major deficiencies. These
alternatives are discussed in later paragraphs.
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Aside from the engineering issues associated with propulsion "system" testing
are other important issues - public and political images. A major concern,
especially in manned programs, is public and thus political opposition. Launch site
test programs highly visible to the public, which experience hardware failures,
schedule delays and cancelled milestones are prime candidates for public distrust,
unfavorable publicity and potential budgetary problems. The American perspective
often overlooks the fact that failures are frequently necessary steps to achieve
success. Propulsion "system" testing is less visible than FRFs, aborted or delayed
flights, or in-flight failures with personnel aboard.
Propulsion "system" testing is not always essential for unmanned vehicle
_. From technical considerations, however, such testing is warranted, is
highly beneficial, and is believed to be cost effective. Technical needs are the
same as for manned vehicle programs. The public and political perceptions are
similar but at a lower intensity, and the visibility of events can be purposely
reduced. These features enhance the program manager's option to select
alternative ways to developand verify vehicle system performance to accomplish, if
possible, front-end cost reductions and, potentially, total program cost savings.
System Verification bv Analysis
Since initiation of the Apollo program, a technical revolution has occurred in
the aerospace field.
• The United States industrial complex has become more heavily involved in
space and missile programs.
• University graduates are better trained and have specialties in multiple aspects
of aerospace science.
• Computers with almost limitless capability are available for increasingly complex
analyses.
• Manufacturing machines and processes_ as well as improved materials and
methods of inspecting sophisticated products have all improved radically.
Ingredients thus exist today for providing vastly improved products. The
Space Shuttle program, initiated 15 years after Apollo, capitalized on many of
these improved capabilities, which are continuing to improve. Considering today's
technological base, why can't system integration development and verification be
accomplished by analysis? The answer to this question is provided in the following
paragraphs.
Development and verification of a space vehicle/missile involves many
disciplines and the interactive influence of each discipline. Examples of the
various disciplines are: static and dynamic loads and their distribution, structural
analysis and design, structural dynamics, acoustics, aerodynamics, fluid
mechanics, fluid dynamics, mechanical design, thermal analysis and design,
hydraulics, propulsion design, materials sciences (properties, corrosion, fracture
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mechanics, crack propagation, life cycle, etc.), electrical power and distribution,
power control, computers, and software. Many of the same disciplines are involved
for supporting ground systems. This necessary and formidable array of talent is
even more perplexing in that all disciplines must work together to assure success.
Computers only perform as programmed; thus the real burden for success rests
with design, analysis and system specialists. Assuming that the necessary
knowledge exists to design each subsystem, does the knowledge exist to establish
interactive influences of these many disciplines? Does management discipline
exist within the system not only to permit but to mandate such interrelated activity?
Do development schedules include sufficient time for such functions to be properly
completed? Is the work environment of those who must participate buffered from
every day pressures associated with normal development programs so that the in-
depth, multi-disciplined thinking can be accomplished? Based on history from
participation in more than 12 development and many research programs, the
answer to most questions is absolutely not!
Over_iaht Examoles
A few examples of "oversights" of consequence from past programs will
emphasize this conclusion. Also included for improved insight are a few examples
of data required from propulsion "systems" testing which are necessary for
integration analyses. The examples are drawn from the Apollo, Skylab, and Space
Shuttle experience.
'o
, On Skylab (the nation's only Space. Station to date) one of the two cable trays
running along the vehicle length was torn off the vehicle during powered flight.
Included within the tray was one of the two stored solar arrays. In orbit, the
Skylab's electric power was consequently less than planned, and the thermal
balance within the Skylab was lost; the mission was salvaged only by almost
super-human efforts. The provided cable tray vent area was either inadequate
or the local aerodynamic pressures at the vent locations were greater than
design values; thus vent flow was restricted and excessive pressures resulted.
. During static firing, one S-IC stage experienced a hydraulic fluid-fed fire.
Subsequent to successful test termination, two liquid oxygen (liquid oxygen)
feedline geysers occurred and ruptured hardware, allowing 50,000 gallons of
liquid oxygen to flow uncontrolled into the thrust structure and onto the engines.
Failure of the test conductor to follow procedures and failure of the procedures
to be propedy emphasized relative to geyser prevention were responsible.
Propulsion "system" testing benefits crew training and procedure development.
, The need to revise design requirements for propellant position control within the
liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen tanks (which permits venting of gases during
orbital operations) was detected late in the Apollo program, but fortunately early
enough to save the program from failure and embarrassment. The technical
issue involved was slight vehicle drag which repositioned propellants from the
designed zero gravity propellant configuration, thus preventing gas-only
venting. At that time, all related American research was based on zero gravity
conditions for earth orbit operations. Consequently, no liquid vapor separator
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existed to enhance workability of the designed system in the actual
environment. After the facts were realized, the propellant control concept was
changed, associated systems were redesigned with inclusion of much new
hardware and deletion of old hardware, and a special flight test experiment
vehicle was developed and flown to measure and photograph fluid behavior
and establish system performance. The basic cause of this incident was
inadequate perception of events that resulted in inadequate modeling,
incomplete research throughout the country and the unfavorable influence of
these factors upon the design specialist.
, Pressurant diffuser structural failure in the Space Shuttle liquid hydrogen tank
occurred several times. The diffuser was initially constructed of aluminum and
component testing had been successfully completed prior to propulsion
"system" testing. Structural failure of a diffuser in the liquid hydrogen tanks was
unexpected (although not unusual in the liquid oxygen tank) as were similar
failures for several modifications. The failure mechanism was flow induced
vibration; a change in material from aluminum to steel was required to achieve
a satisfactory design.
. Structural testing of tankage on Space Shuttle detected deficiencies in both the
liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen tanks. Problem resolution was possible
through major manufacturing changes which would be costly and result in
significant schedule delays. Although contrary to the original vehicle design
and operating philosophy, problem resolution was also possible by maintaining
positive pressure within each tank commencing with propellant tank loading.
Discovery of these problems coincided with initial propulsion "system" testing.
Studies revealed vehicle vent valve controlled cycling (alternately opening and
closing) during propellant loading and standby could be utilized to control tank
pressure within specified ranges; costly tank changes and schedule delay were
thus avoided. This approach for controlling tank pressure was developed and
vedfied during propulsion "system" testing and the approach continues today.
Unavailability of a propulsion "system" testing program would have delayed its
development until flight hardware and launch complex completion permitted
testing at the launch site. Program risk and cost would have been greater and
significant schedule delay would have occurred.
Tvoical Data Reouimments Examples
Three examples are included for which data are difficult to obtain other than
from propulsion "system" testing.
. Vehicle structural and propulsion system dynamic interaction (POGO) is a
complex phenomenon which can have devastating consequences.
Sophisticated analyses are necessary to establish stability margins and provide
assurance of safe operation. These analyses are dependent, however, upon
experimentally determined inputs which are generally the results of feed system
data collected both with and without controlled input pulsing of the feed system
during normal vehicle firing. These data are needed for various propellant
levels within the tankage. This operation introduces risk and requires
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modification to the vehicle flight configuration to accommodate the pulser and
necessary special instrumentation.
. This example represents a broad issue involving propellant management.
Included are propellant loading, propellant volumes within the tanks and safe
engine shutdown. Total data needs are unavailable from other sources unless
full-duration FRFs are performed. Safe engine shutdown involves operation of
the low level cutoff systems to assure adequate propellants are available during
the shutdown cycle. Such testing involves risk to both vehicle and facility.
Accurate propellant volumes are necessary for predicting vehicle performance.
It is important because vehicle tankage volumes are calculated from drawing
dimensions (including both plus and minus tolerances) while the finished tank
volumes change with thermal exposure and loading. Propellant loading relies
on accurate information to a known tank level. Involved are proper location of
sensors, reliable hardware, understanding of propellant flow currents within the
tanks, interaction of loading sensor electronics and ground computer systems,
and software/hardware compatibility.
. This example relates to preventing hydrogen gas venting during initial flight
phases. At altitudes below approximately 50,000 feet, burning of vented
hydrogen can result in unpredictable consequences. Involved are six
independent factors: (1) aerodynamic heating generated by the vehicle
configuration and trajectory; (2) vehicle insulation design which controls heat
input to the hydrogen; (3) pressurization system performance and control
system tolerance; (4) vent valve tolerance; (5) tank structural capability; and (6)
liquid hydrogen stratification within the tank. Data on each of these are
necessary to support analyses concerning hydrogen gas venting, and data on
all but (1) are obtained from propulsion "system" testing.
Other Considerations
If propulsion "system" testing is not performed, management must be prepared
to accept generous scheduling after flight vehicle arrival at the launch site
preparatory to launch to accommodate problem discovery, fix determination, and
probable retrofits. Furthermore, management must be prepared to deal with the
critical press, political, and public environments resulting from inability to launch as
planned and/or inflight anomalies. In spite of all design and integration analyses,
component testing, and subsystem testing which have been conducted prior to
arrival at the launch site, one should expect numerous malfunctions when initial
ground and vehicle systems interface. This fact is even more pronounced when
propellant flows begin as indicated in the preceding examples, which represent
only a few of many possibilities which may have to be resolved before launch can
occur. It may take weeks and several propellant Ioadings prior to complete
resolution. Resolution of these many issues introduces the concern of ever-present
safety factors which management must consider. Although cost has only been
mentioned in passing, total program cost without propulsion"system" testing could
easily approach or even exceed program cost had propulsion "system" testing
been included initially.
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System Verification bv Fliaht Readiness Firing
This subject has been discussed indirectly to some extent in preceding
paragraphs relating to analysis. It is now advantageous to consolidate thoughts.
As the name implies and as customarily conceived, the FRF assures vehicle
readiness for flight and readiness of the launch complex for performance of
required functions. The vehicle design, launch complex functions and integration
aspects should normally have been proven elsewhere. The FRF for each new
Space Shuttle vehicle, conceived on this basis, was fired for only 20 seconds,
being more than adequate to accomplish its limited objectives.
For a new development vehicle involving new technologies and/or numerous
dissimilarities from previous vehicles, an FRF can substitute for the propulsion
"system" test program, although it can not be oerceived as the limited test noted in
the immediately orecedina oaraaraoh. In essence, the FRF must become a
program itself--a propulsion-"systern" testing program conducted at the launch site.
Such an approach will: (1) increase the time between program initiation and first
launch due to delayed identification of problems and satisfactory resolution; (2)
increase risk to the flight vehicle and the launch complex resulting from conduct of
development tests, increased numbers of tests and longer duration tests; (3) result
in higher program cost because of greater launch facility complexity, increased run
requirements and imposed additional safety considerations; (4) measurably
distract launch site personnel from accomplishing normal launch site functions; and
(5) most importantly, reduce reliability of the vehicle and endanger the flight crew.
This approach is not recommended generally, although for vehicle programs
having considerable similarity with previous programs, it may be an acceptable
and effective approach.
The FRF or "mini" propulsion "system" testing program will necessarily involve
one to six propellant Ioadings and hot firing tests or more. The goal of the
expanded FRF program continues to be verification that the vehicle is ready for
launch. The issues discussed under the analysis section (and many others which
were not included) portray the real world-:-development activities must precede
verification for launch.
System Verification bv Fliaht Testino
The final issue to be considered is flight vehicle test programs_evelopment
programs without the customary propulsion "system" testing and including the
normal FRF. The FRF would resolve the many preflight development type issues
and those related to short duration firings but would not include long duration firing.
This approach is unaccootable for manned flight programs. The approach may be
acceptable for g,DJ]_tl_gl_ programs. For unmanned programs, prerequisites for
technical acceptance are thorough analysis of all systems individually and then as
integrated systems. Management prerequisites are also involved and include all
issues relative to the FRF in the absence of the normal propulsion "system" testing
program. These include cost, risk, public image, and other issues. The subject
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approach and postulated loss of an unmanned vehicle could easily result in total
program cost greater than initial inclusion of a formal propulsion "system" testing
program.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Propulsion system development test programs for the seven Saturn stages,
Space Shuttle, and some Air Force programs have been reviewed and evaluated
for the purpose of documenting significant results of those various programs for
future reference. Program benefits attributable to propulsion system testing are
emphasized. Key technical design parameters are identified and program risks
associated with curtailing propulsion system testing for each design parameter is
discussed. The following conclusions and recommendations result from this study.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Propulsion system testing has prevented several catastrophic flight failures.
, The complexity of intei'active characteristics of the propulsion, structural and
electrical systems defies accurate analytical representation. Propulsion system
testing provides the necessary test data for "model basing" thus enhancing
system analysis techniques.
3. A propulsion specialist survey characterizes propulsion system testing to be
"mandatory."
. Propulsion system testing determines hardware integrity and functional
performance in the best possible environment excluding flight. Testing also
certifies the environments utilized for component development and
qualification.
5. Propulsion system testing integrates vehicle and ground hardware and
procedures for propellant loading, sating, and firing operations for all systems.
. Propulsion system testing provides a resource for determining stage/engine
design margins, developing procedures and timelines and confirmation of
extrapolated criteria used in engine development.
. Potential risks for catastrophic flight failure, mission loss failure, vehicle
hardware damage, and launch complex damage is reduced by propulsion
system testing.
8. Potential risks for a delayed initial launch and subsequent launches is
significantly reduced by propulsion system testing.
D Propulsion system testing is required for new stage designs, advanced
technology concepts introduced within major systems of existing designs, and
possibly for existing designs modified to accommodate one or more major
system redesigns. Full duration test firings are normally needed to satisfy
system test requirements.
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10. The "economic payoff" of propulsion system testing in manned and reusable
space programs is higher than in unmanned, expendable programs since the
consequences of catastrophic failures are more severe.
11. Propulsion system testing which prevents loss of only one vehicle may be
considered cost effective to the program. For some programs, cost effectivity
may be realized without vehicle loss. For unmanned, expendable stages, a
program cost saving ratio for a single failure event may vary from near one to
five or greater dependent upon cost of lost payload, fleet grounding, and other
factors.
12. Factors to be included in propulsion system testing decisions are loss of life
potential, cost, schedule, state-of-the-art design and procedures, history of
design, design similarity with other programs, test site capabilities, and the
agency's prestige and subsequent shifts in the national space policy in the
event failure results.
13. Various methods for satisfying necessary program test and verification
requirements are a separate development test vehicle, the normal or modified
flight readiness program using flight hardware and a flight test program. Each
development program must establish necessary test requirements and seek
the single or combination of approaches which best satisfy established
requirements.
RECOMMENDATIONS
° New stages involving designs dissimilar to previous stage designs, stage
redesigns incorporating advanced concepts in major systems and/or including
advanced technology designs, hardware and/or materials shall include
propulsion system testing. Program managers shall assess and establish
programs for satisfying requirements including crew/passenger safety.
. New stages similar to existing designs which exclude new technology may
require propulsion system development and verification testing. Program
managers shall assess and establish programs for satisfying requirements.
. Propulsion system test hardware and test facilities necessary for conducting
propulsion system testing shall be retained for rapid activation to firing status
commensurate with resolving failures/anomalies from the early flight program.
° Vehicle propulsion system test hardware and facility interfacing hardware shall
duplicate flight vehicle/launch complex hardware wherever possible.
Engineering's concurrence is suggested for usage of substitute hardware.
Launch site operating procedures shall also be duplicated wherever possible.
° Test hardware maturity standards shall be established as a prerequisite for
propulsion system testing initiation. This may enhance safety, reduce risks to
hardware and test personnel, and reduce cost.
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, Accurate and reliable instrumentation is vital for any successful test activity.
Operating margin for hardware and systems may be the basis for reliability
enhancement. Testing within "actual" environments for which hardware must
perform is crucial to success. These three elements shall be evaluated and
incorporated realistically in test programs to the maximum extent practical.
, Development of a document which would serve as a guideline for all testing--
qualification, verification, and acceptance test of components and systems--to
demonstrate margins for workmanship and performance purposes would be
beneficial and should be considered.
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SID 67-684 Extended S-li Battleship Program Final Test Report
S-II Battleship Weekly Test Reports, December 1965- March 1966
S-II Battleship Monthly Test Reports, March 1966 - May 1967
SID 66-967 Saturn All Systems (S-II-T) Stage Static Firing Test Report
H. S-IVB REPORT
Douglas Report SM-46973
I. TITAN REPORTS
Titan II Missile N-1 Right Test Report
The Gemini Program Launch Systems Final Report No. TOR-1001 (2126-80)-3
J. SHU'I-FLE MAIN PROPULSION TEST REPORTS
Rockwell International bdefing charts entitled, "Main Propulsion Test Program,
NSTL."
History of MPT Test Program, dated February 9, 1986
MPT Tanking Test History, dated July 1983
Quick Look Test Report - MPTA Static Firing No. 1 - Tests MPT-S1-001 and
MPT-S1-002
Quick Look Test Report - MPTA Static Firing No. 2 - Test MPT-S2-001
Quick Look Test Report - MPTA Static Firing No. 3 - Test MPT-S3-001
Quick Look Test Report - MPTA Static F3dng No. 4 - Test MPT-S4-001
Quick Look Test
MPT-5
Quick Look Test
Quick Look Test
Quick Look Test
Quick Look Test
Quick Look Test
Quick Look Test
Quick Look Test
Quick Look Test
Report - MPTA Static Fidng No. 5A and 5 - Tests MPT-5A and
Report - MPTA Static Firing - Test MPT 6-001
Report - MPTA Static Firing Tests - MPT 6-02 and MPT 6-03
Report - MPTA Static Firing Tests - MPT SF7-001
Report - MPTA Static Firing Tests - MPT SF7-02
Report - MPTA Static Firing Tests - MPT SF8
Report - MPTA Static Firing Tests - MPT 9-01 and 9-02
Report - MPTA Static Firing Tests - MPT 10-01
Report - MPTA Static Firing Tests - MPT 11-01
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Quick Look Test Report - MPTA Static Firing Tests - MPT 11-02
Quick Look Test-Report - MPTA Static Firing Tests - MPT 12
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APPENDIX 2
RATIONALE SUPPORTING NON-TEST RISKS ASSESSMENT
An overview of the material presented in this appendix has been presented in
the main body of this report. Tables 2-1 and 2-2 are repeated here for reader
convenience and summarize the results in tabular form (Tables 11 and 12 in main
body). This appendix provides additional insight relative to the risks assignments
for each subsystem/discipline evaluated. The risks relate to propulsion system
development without propulsion system testing. The judgement classes for risk are
extremely high, high, moderate, low, and minor and are based on frequency of
occurrence in previous propulsion systems test programs, evaluation of analysis
and design capabilities, characteristics of stage design, including redundancy,
operational method, and other considerations.
"Wrona" Comoonent Verification Reauirement. The risk of early catastrophic
inflight failures due to components being verified to the "wrong" requirements is
judged to be extremely high. Examples of previous test failures of this type are the
hydrogen pressurization system diffuser failure in the Shuttle hydrogen tank
(potential hydrogen tank structural collapse due to insufficient ullage pressure) and
the SSME main fuel valve failure in the orbiter aft compartment (compartment
structural failure and fire damage).
Component operating and verification requirements are established well
before the propulsion system is assembled and operated. Computer simulation
analyses are well developed and are used to establish loads, pressures, operating
temperatures and flow rates. Vibroacoustic environments induced by the various
subsystems or components are difficult to manage, as are interactive influences of
various environments and subsystems. Validity of requirements depends on the
knowledge and experience of the design group, and yet the best of design groups
are unprepared for these hundreds of components in such complex environments.
Correct requirements are not known completely until a system test program is
conducted, including efforts required for data analyses and comparisons to
individual component requirements. It can be stated that no component is verified
until it has been subjected to a systems test program. FRF type firings can help to
quantify environments for components, although availability of such data is late,
and it must be carefully evaluated which results in delays. The flight
instrumentation program must be significantly enlarged and the complex/costly
launch site is exposed to additional risks.
Instrumentation Performance. The risk of launch delay is judged to be
extremely high, the loss of mission and other considerations moderate. Launch
scrubs and resultant schedule slips will result from inability to verify launch
constraints due to failed (actual failure plus inaccuracies due to environment)
instrumentation. Inability to analyze anomalies and inflight failures due to high
instrumentation failure rates may be expected, and decision-making capabilities
necessary to prevent failures will be adversely affected.
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The time required to correct instrumentation deficiencies and to verify
operational acceptability is usually extensive. All early propulsion system
operations experienced multiple instrumentation failures. For MPTA,
instrumentation failures resulted in cancellation of two planned firings. Terminal
count interruptions/delays necessary to devise new procedures, to work around
instrumentation failures, and to continue terminal count were also necessary on
numerous occasions. Similar problems occurring at the launch site would have
resulted in launch cancellations. The judged mission loss risk would be extremely
high, except that most critical sensors are normally redundant.
Ground test allows the use of drag on instrumentation with wide band width
capability. Flight vehicle instrumentation, on the other hand, is classically low band
width to verify normal expected operation of systems only. This is a fall out of the
telemetry total band width which precludes high frequency monitoring of a large
number of measurements. The ground test operation allows "quick response" with
additional measurements as needed as opposed to the flight systems which have a
long turnaround time.
Prooellant. Hydraulic Fluid and Hot Gas Leaks. The risk of an early
catastrophic and mission loss due to an inflight leak are judged to be high. The risk
to the launch complex is high, and the potential for launch delay is extremely high.
The quality of design depends on the knowledge and experience of the design
group.
Component and subsystem testing cannot simulate all thermal, vibration, and
transient loads of the total system. Fatigue failures, fracture mechanics, seal
compression, material creep aspects of design, and various manufacturing issues
are better understood today than previously, but various failure modes still plague
even mature systems. All programs using cryogenic propellants have experienced
serious leaks or component/line failures in early testing. Vehicle designs have fluid
connections ranging in size from one-quarter inch diameter to approximately
eighteen inches in diameter. The Saturn V launch vehicle had between four and
five thousand connections, while the S-IVB stage, which had only one engine, had
between four and five hundred connections.
Propulsion system testing accomplishes many necessary functions such as
resolving problems with the hazardous gas detection system used to monitor for
safety; determining the overall leak characteristics of the vehicle through repeated
exposure during loading and long duration firings, and identifying consistent
"problem leakers" permitting special action such as changing seal material,
increasing sealing load, and changing line supports.
Short duration FRF type testing may reduce risks of vehicle and mission loss
moderately. It does not influence launch delay risk.
POGO Effect. The risk of an early catastrophic inflight failure due to POGO is
judged to be moderate and loss of mission risk is high. Launch delay risk is judged
to be moderate. Natural longitudinal deflection frequencies of the vehicle structure
are predictable with current computer simulation programs and test data obtained
"o
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from independent structural test articles. Engine pump gains and thrust oscillations
due to inlet pressure fluctuations can be determined by single engine testing which
incorporates provisions for controlled pressure inputs/disturbances within the
feedline upstream from the engine inlet. Complex computer simulations using
noted inputs can be used to predict vehicle stability margins, although the accuracy
of such predictions, and thus the acceptability, from a program standpoint is
debatable.
Testing of flight type hardware with feed system pulsing is a likely
requirement. Structural system and propulsion system frequency reinforcement in
the lower modes will likely require hardware inclusion to ensure safe vehicle
operation. Functional aspects of such hardware systems also must be
demonstrated prior to flight. Such developments would add significantly to launch
delay risk and to vehicle and launch complex risk. Such testing should be
conducted remote from the launch site.
Thrust Vector Control (TVC_ p_rformances. The risks of early catastrophic
inflight and mission loss failures due to loss of TVC are judged to be low. This
judgement is based on the assumption that "I'VC and avionic subsystem testing will
be performed, that on-vehicle integrated testing and checkout will be performed
without the engines firing, and that single engine testing with live TVC actuators will
be performed. The remaining risk judgement is based on the fact that analysis
would have to be used to verify that matching frequencies did not exist between the
structure and TVC system and to verify that structural deflections did not allow
nozzle collisions during startup and at high gimbal rates. The S-I stage structure
had to be redesigned to decouple structure/TVC matching frequencies.
pressurization System Performance. The risks of early catastrophic and
mission loss failures due to pressurization system performance inadequacies are
judged to be moderate and high respectively. This subject involves many
disciplines requiring complex analyses such as feed system pressure loss,
propellant heating during ground and flight including propellant stratification
characteristics, the storage and heat sources for pressurant gasses, and time
dependent pressurant requirements.
The system also requires complex mechanical and electrical hardware which
must function near flawlessly under severe thermal, pressure, and vibration
environments. Failure of the system to function as designed may result in
inadequate NPSP to engines (explosion potential), inadequate tank pressure for
tank structural capability (tank structural failure) and/or excessive tank pressure
requiring flight venting of propellant tanks (potential vehicle fire damage) if vented
below critical altitude.
Overall system complexity, considering the number of complex
subsystems/components which must function as a unit and the physical number,
scope, and complexity of analyses involved in sizing all the systems, is the basis for
quantifying the risks. Independent component/subsystem development testing is
expected to be part of any development program but is judged inadequate
because of the limited simulation of such a complex system. Previous vehicle
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designs clearly show this to be the most troublesome vehicle system. Supporting
material is provided in several of the appendices
Vehicle simulation computer analyses of required pressurant flow rate versus
time, feed system pressure loss, heat inputs to propellants and resultant
stratification, and other type analyses for Shuttle are mature (after an extensive
ground test program and many flights) and are possibly adequate for new
programs using similar tank configurations. However, these analytical approaches
are not mature for significant departures in tank configuration, propellant type, and
other potential variables. Missions/designs requiring multi engine start or start in
earth orbit are additional complicating features and affect risk.
Short duration FRF type testing provides some very valuable information and
may reduce risk to some degree, however, needed answers to all requirements are
not provided and the remaining risk is judged to be moderate.
Prooellant Mass Uncertainty. The risk of early catastrophic and mission loss
failures due to launch with inadequate propellant mass aboard are considered
minor and moderate respectively. Launch delay risk is judged to be extremely high
and unaffected by an FRF type firing and the companion propellant loading test
conducted late in the program at the launch site.
Risk, as for pressurization, is based upon overall complexity of the operation
and not on any single, technical issue. Involved are properly located sensors
within propellant tanks, appropriate flow shields to avoid disturbing flow currents
capable of adversely affecting sensor output, propellant temperature for
determining density and controlling computer electronics, and calibration data to
permit integration of vehicle sensors and the ground based control system.
Propellant loading to acceptable accuracies for Space Shuttle, typical of any
vehicle loading requirement, necessitated extensive testing on the MPTA. Data
was collected on six different occasions with propellants aboard for a total time of
thirty hours. Additional data were obtained for each vehicle loading. Vehicle
instrumentation, in addition to flight instrumentation, is required to collect necessary
data.
Risk is relatively unaffected by vehicle configuration or propellants, although
vehicles requiring orbital restart may have higher risk.
On-board propellant mass at liftoff can be verified indirectly by data from initial
flights if a performance penalty on these flights is acceptable to make ample
allowance for loading inaccuracies, although such an approach may delay
achieving vehicle operational readiness. Under these conditions the risk is judged
to be minor, although launch delay risk remains high.
Prooellant Loadina ProcedureslOoerations. The risk of damage to flight
hardware and facility h,_rdware due to loading procedural complexity, errors and
hardware oversights is judged to be high. The risk of unacceptable launch delays,
while these procedures are being refined and hardware changes are made, is
judged to be extremely high. Even with the Saturn and Space Shuttle propulsion
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system test programs, loading problems plagued the first few Shuttle launches.
The resultant delays would have been worse without the system test data base.
The high risk assessment is based on the fact that examples of damage to test
hardware abound. The "close-call" the first time the external oxygen tank was
drained at MPT due to excessive flow rates and pressure surges is an example.
Basic tank structural or other deficiencies are frequent occurrences necessitating
changes in some phase of vehicle operation to avoid cost increases and schedule
delays. Such changes generally increase complexity and risk. Shuttle was no
exception--tanks were loaded under pressure which was contrary to original
design philosophy. Also, early in the program initial propellant quantities loaded
aboard the vehicle were controlled by newly developed lower tank bulkhead
thermal criteria. On the Saturn V S-II stage and earlier stages, hardware damage
at the launch site included destruction of liquid oxygen tank vortex devices and
feedline inlet screens. These failures were extremely hazardous--exposing raw,
torn aluminum to both liquid and gaseous oxygen.
Clustered Enaine Performance and Low Level Cut Off Sensor_. Both
evaluation criteria are judged to be minor in all risk categories except low level
sensors for which launch delay risk is judged to be moderate. An FRF of short
duration benefits only clustered engine performance as propellant levels prevent
low level cutoff sensor activation. Increased numbers of flights, prior to achieving
operational status, are likely for unmanned programs while the total operational
concept is not feasible for manned flight programs.
Clustered engine performance uncertainty can be verified in flight with minor
risks, although acceptance of a performance penalty may be required. Concerns
are feed system interactions and degradation of performance.
Minor flight catastrophic and mission loss risks for low level cutoff sensors is
because sensors are backup cutoff devices and other anomalies are required for
these sensors to be needed. Later flight program anomalies may be expected to
require cutoff sensors as payload demand decreases performance margins. No
safe inflight data gathering effort for these sensors is known. Acceptance of
identified risk assumes ample propellant allowance can be made on early flights
and that flights are unmanned.
Large vehicles usually have large diameter, long feedlines which contain
large masses of propellant residuals if propellants are not burned until levels are
well below the feedline inlet. Propellant levels within such feedlines vary rapidly
with time, thus the controlling system must be fast response and dependable. For
MPTA, extensive difficulties were experienced initially with the system and serious
flight failures would have resulted had its use been required and had development
testing not been performed. Technical issues involved sensor
inadequacies/failures, circuitry inadequacies and sensor location problems.
prooulsion Performance Maroin Uncertainties. Propulsion performance
margin determination requires input from a relatively large number of
subsystems/disciplines. Some of the more significant ones are: on-board
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propellant mass at liftoff, propellant temperature profiles, feeclline pressure drops,
pressurization system dispersions, engine operating dispersions, mission
dispersions, planned emergency operating requirements and dispersions,
minimum engine net positive suction pressure (NPSP) requirements, volume of
unusable propellants (residuals), vehicle mass dispersions, vehicle aerodynamic
drag loss dispersions, guidance loss dispersions, and low level cutoff sensor
performance characteristics.
Of these parameters, onboarcl propellant mass at liftoff, propellant temperature
profiles, feedline pressure drops, pressurization system performance, clustered
engine operating performance, propellant residuals, and low level cutoff sensor
characteristics are all verified during a propulsion system test program. Each of
these subjects has been discussed in preceding paragraphs.
The risk of early inflight catastrophic failure is judged to be minor, while risk for
mission loss is judged to be high. Mission loss risk may be reduced to minor by
conservatively loading propellants for early flights. Instrumentation, in addition to
the flight measuring program, and more flights may be required prior to achieving
operational status or manning. A short duration FRF is of limited value, providing
data on only two of six parameters relating to propulsion system performance.
Enaine/Feed System Chill. An inadequately cooled engine and/or feed
system usually results in engine failure to start and may result in engine damage.
A booster type vehicle with engine start prior to vehicle liftoff can consider this a
non-issue relative to flight catastrophe and mission loss risk. This is because the
function is complete at engine ignition. The risk for launch delay, however, is high.
Extensive chilldown development problems occurred during MPTA testing. Many
development difficulties were also experienced on stages S-II and S-IVB of Saturn
V and the S-IV stage of Saturn I--all three having engine altitude start
requirements. For that reason flight catastrophe and mission loss risk are judged to
be moderate for vehicles with engine start at altitude and high for vehicles with
engine start in earth orbit.
System design depends heavily 0n propellants, engine design, and vehicle
mission. Vehicles with engine start at altitude generally continue propellant chill
systems operation beyond littoff and until engines are started. Vehicles which start
in earth orbit experience fluid management problems due to the reduced gravity
environment in addition to engine/feedline chill problems which are more severe
because hardware is warmer and may be filled with vapor. Analytical methods for
defining engine/feedline chill are available but are of little value without basic data
to anchor the methods. Necessary data can be achieved during propellant loading
tests. The short duration FRF type tests provides actual proof of proper chill and is
beneficial. For orbital start requirements, analytical methods are more complex
and are even less dependable. Special ground tests are necessary including
engine start. Extensive analyses are then required to prove engine start in the
orbital environment is likely. Assurance of orbital start does not exist. An orbital
experiment with demonstrated engine start was required for Saturn V S-IVB.
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Testing, analytical methods, and correlation of analysis and test data require
significant time, thus for some vehicle configurations and missions sole
dependency on late testing at the launch site as the only source for data may prove
to be exceedingly costly.
Tank Insulation. Flight catastrophe and mission loss risks are judged to be
minor, while launch delay risk is high. A short FRF is beneficial but cannot be
considered essential; however, more than one propellant loading test is essential
to verify both thermal and structural performance. Instrumentation in excess of the
normal flight measuring program is required to collect necessary data.
Insulation usage is dependent upon propellant type, mission, and vehicle
configuration. Hydrogen filled tanks require insulation, while it may be optional for
oxygen tanks. Vehicle design may determine if tanks with RP-1 require insulation.
Insulated tanks filled with cryogenics often experience some insulation
debondingwboth small and large areas. Some factors affecting debonding are
tank surface preparation, insulation type, quality control exercised in application
processes, and tank deflections. For the early flight vehicles for programs without a
propulsion system test program, insulation debond areas may be identified during
propellant loading tests and repaired prior to flight. This can be highly ineffective
considering launch schedule. The propulsion system test vehicle at a remote site
provides for many Ioadings/firings relatively early in a development program and is
an ideal method to improve insulation systems prior to flight vehicle delivery and
exposure to cryogenic temperatures. Other necessary data from the loading tests
are insulation system total heat leak which affects pressurization system design
and ullage venting. Data obtained from tests require processing and extensive
analysis prior to vehicle flight. Other items of interest are heat shorts (deficiencies
in tank insulation) which may be conducive to liquid air/nitrogen formation--safety.
Analytical methods to predict insulation failures do not exist and possibly will
never exist, thus testing is necessary. Heat input to propellants can be analytically
determined but with significant inaccuracies, thus anchor points through testing are
needed, if heat leak test data are unavailable, program continuation based on
conservative designs are possible but can be costly in terms of weight, number of
flights, and increased instrumentation.
Hardware Thermal Control. Flight catastrophe and mission loss risk are
judged to be minor, however, launch delay risks are high. A short FRF type firing
demonstrates all equipment functions at temperatures prevailing at engine start.
The propellant loading test and standby periods preparatory to engine start are of
immense value. Temperature sensitive propulsion, electronics, and structural
hardware have temperatures determined during loading tests and compartment
gas purges adjusted in quantity, temperature, and exhaust location to bring
hardware within desired operational limits. Thermal insulation may be applied to
components, as may heater blankets. These activities generally require
considerable time, more than one propellant loading and instrumentation not
normally planned for flight.
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Vehicles with altitude start requirements may use such temperature data plus
analyses to determine thermally acceptable temperatures are available at engine
start. For missions requiring engine start in orbit, dependent upon elapsed time in
orbit before engine start, component thermal conditioning pre-launch is of no value.
Thermal analyses must be performed on all equipment, and those which are
thermally unacceptable must be heated by heater blankets or cooled by some cold
plate type system. Special testing independent of propulsion system testing may
be required.
Stored Gas System. Flight catastrophe and mission loss risks are judged to
be minor. Launch delay risk is. minor, and launch complex risk is moderate. This is
a high pressure system used to store gas which is needed by other
systems/hardware. Test objectives are to ensure structural adequacy, that the
charging procedure is compatible with vehicle/facility countdown and required
onboard mass of gas, that the distribution system includes necessary redundancy,
and that appropriate operational instrumentation is provided and is functional.
Most aspects of the system can be well analyzed, however, some test data is
beneficial for verification. Data from propellant loading tests verify most aspects
except structural adequacy in an actual firing environment and adequacy of the gas
mass. A short FRF will demonstrate environmental adequacy and limited
information on gas mass.
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APPENDIX 3
SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM
Shuttle Overview
The Space Shuttle is a reusable transportation system designed to transport
people and equipment to earth orbit, to transfer payloads from one orbital position
to another, and to return people and equipment to earth upon mission completion.
Space Shuttle, propelled by a combination of liquid cryogenic propulsion and solid
rocket propulsion systems, is comprised of three separate major elements which
must function as a system. These elements are: an orbiter, which is the only
element to reach earth orbit and includes personnel and cargo accommodations;
an external tank containing necessary propellant for the liquid engines; and a solid
rocket propulsive element providing lift capability during the initial two minutes of
flight. Space Shuttle is shown on Figure 3-1.
Liquid cryogenic propulsion, the subject of this report, is provided by
components located on the external tank (ET) and orbiter. Three Space Shuttle
main engines (SSMEs) are located on the orbiter as are portions of propellant
delivery systems, pressurization and loading systems, thrust vector control system,
and major control elements. The ET contains hydrogen and oxygen propellants,
propellant fluid system lines connecting the tankage to the orbiter, portions of
pressurization and loading systems, and a minimum of controls and valves.
Liquid and solid propulsion systems are ignited prior to liftoff, and utilized in
parallel during initial flight phases; both systems have nozzles which are gimbaled
for thrust vector control. Solid rocket boosters (SRBs) are separated from the
Shuttle approximately two minutes after liftoff, while the liquid system operates for
an additional approximately six minutes. Prior to orbiter orbital insertion, the ET is
separated from the vehicle. Neither liquid nor solid propellant systems are
involved in orbiter return-to-earth.
The SRBs include parachutes for descent after separation and are recovered
from the ocean for refurbishment and reuse on subsequent flights. The ET is
expendable.
Liauid Prooulsion System Overview
The orbiter-located SSMEs and liquid propulsion system hardware were
designed for reuse. The expendable ET propulsion equipment was minimized and
designed for minimizing cost.
An extensive data base containing analytical procedures, hardware design
practices, manufacturing practices, and development techniques was established
during the Apollo program. Since most of the information contained in this data
base was directly applicable to the Space Shuttle design, non-engine Shuttle
hardware and systems were designed maximizing the use of this information. The
3-1
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major new requirement imposed on the Space Shuttle was hardware reusability
(55 flight capability). This requirement obviously necessitated some new
technologies.
The SSME was an advanced concept, high-performance engine requiring
innovations in design practices, materials, manufacturing, and inspections. Reuse
requirements further complicated the development program.
The liquid propulsion system design for the Space Shuttle is shown
schematically in Figure 3-2. Physical design of the ET and orbiter are shown in
Figures 3-3 and 3-4, respectively, while Figure 3-5 shows the SSME fluid cycle.
Approximately one and one half million pounds of liquid oxygen and one quarter
million pounds of liquid hydrogen are carded by the ET. The three orbiter SSMEs
are supplied with propellants from the ET through orbiter/ET disconnects located aft
of the ET. SSME rated sea level thrust is 470,000 pounds, although the thrust is
varied between 65 and 104 percent rated thrust during flight (109 percent in
extreme emergencies).
Liauid ProDulsion Subsystems
Liquid propulsion systems consist of numerous subsystems and many
components which must function individually and collectively in an interactive
environment. Major subsystems are described and discussed briefly in the
following paragraphs.
Prooellant Delivery System. Principal features of the propellant delivery
system are:
• Fine mesh screens in each propellant tank at the entrance to each 17-inch
diameter feedline
• ET located long oxygen and short "siphon" configuration hydrogen 17-inch
diameter feedlines
• ET/orbiter interface 17-inch diameter quick disconnect and valving for each
propellant
• Orbiter-located 17-inch diameter feedlines connecting quick disconnects and
the respective propellant manifold
Orbiter-located 12-inch diameter feedlines, three from each propellant manifold
to 12-inch diameter prevalves--one prevalve per line-located immediately
upstream of the inlet to each low pressure pump (six in all).
• Orbiter-located 12-inch diameter lines between the prevalves and low pressure
pump inlets for each propellant (6 in all).
The 12-inch diameter feedlines have additional fine mesh screens located
immediately upstream of each low pressure pump inlet to assure no engine
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damage from contamination. The feedlines use appropriate gimbai joints to assure
required flexibility, and components use vacuum jacketed or foam insulation for
thermal control purposes. One four-inch diameter line on the ET parallel with and
connected to the oxygen supply line establishes a flow loop to maintain subcooled
liquid oxygen in the feedline during prelaunch and prevents oxygen feedline
geysering. An anti-geyser line, in which facility-supplied helium was injected to
prevent flow interruptions, has subsequently been determined unnecessary and
has been removed to save weight and cost although vehicle sensitivity to oxygen
geysering is increased.
Hvdroaen Feedline/Enaine Thermal Conditioning
Acceptable engine start requires heat removal from rocket engine
components so that sub-cooled propellants exist within the feedline at start
command. The system accomplishing these objectives consists of: (1) a bypass
line containing a valve and small electrically driven hydrogen pump about each
hydrogen prevalve - one per engine; and (2) a hydrogen flow return line from each
SSME hydrogen bleed valve to the ET hydrogen supply tank.
Return lines from each SSME bleed valve are manifolded prior to crossing the
orbiter/ET interface through the quick disconnect enroute to the ET hydrogen tank.
A high point bleed line--another significant feature of the system-is connected at
the hydrogen feedline high point and terminates within the hydrogen ground vent
line. Valving for controlling flow in this line opens during tanking and closes
immediately prior to engine start. Hydrogen recirculation system operation
commences during propellant loading and terminates immediately prior to engine
start when prevalves are opened.
Performance verification objectives for this system are accomplished prior to
engine ignition, and if properly conducted, do not entail significant program risk.
While specific test objectives and related events from testing are reported in later
sections of the report, it can be summarized here that testing has revealed marginal
performance capability which necessitated procedural and limited hardware
changes to achieve necessary performance.
Oxvaen Feedline/Enaine Thermal Conditionina
Requirements for oxygen hardware conditioning are similar to those for
hydrogen, although the approach for accomplishing hardware conditioning is
different. Prevalves and engine bleed valves are opened during propellant loading
to permit a regulated flow quantity to continually flow through the engines. Flows
exiting the SSMEs are ducted to ground systems for disposal. To assure
acceptable propellant quality within the feedline at engine start, oxygen bleed flow
from the ET is initiated only five minutes prior to start. This oxygen quantity from the
tank is considered in the oxygen tank loading manifest.
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HvdroaentOxvaen Prooellant Deoletion Sensors
Engine protection from propellant depletion is necessary to assure safe
engine shutoff. Sensors located within and near the bottom of the hydrogen tank
and within the oxygen suction lines accomplish this purpose. Sensors are located
to protect engines and minimize the unusable propellants. Multi-sensors are used
for both hydrogen and oxygen.
Performance verification objectives are accomplished during hot firing and
entail significant risks to engines and possibly vehicle and facility. Failure to satisfy
required NPSP to engines for each propellant can damage the engine-possible
pump explosion. Engine oxygen NPSP changes rapidly as the propellant tank is
emptied. Insufficient hydrogen to an engine results in unacceptably high
combustion gas temperatures which destroy hardware in milliseconds.
Propellant Delivery Dynamics
Interaction of vehicle feed system and engine flow disturbances with the
vehicle structure can lead to devastating consequences. Closeness of the
first/second mode structural frequencies to propulsion system frequency require
inclusion of protective features-passive suppressors-which are integrated into the
vehicle design. A suppressor is located between low and high pressure oxidizer
pumps of each engine, charged initially with orbiter supplied helium, and with
vaporized oxidizer from the heat exchangers during flight. Excessive suppressor
pressurant is discharged into the single 17-inch diameter oxygen feedline near the
orbiter/ET disconnect valve. Helium pressurant is substituted for oxidizer
pressurant at shutdown. Care is exercised to assure the liquid gas interface of the
suppressor is not broken. An approximate 25 percent shift in feedline frequency is
attributed to the suppressor system.
Required data are obtained during hot firings, and processes for acquiring
data entail some risks to the vehicle and facility. A hydraulic driven pulsing device
installed on the oxygen feedline inputs pressure pulse to the fluid at varying
frequency and amplitude... Accelerometers and pressure sensors, strategically
located on feedlines and engine, measure responses which are then used with
mathematics to predict structural stability characteristics of the vehicle. Other data
are collected as appropriate to assess performance of designs which may be
included to prevent the structural dynamic problem. Data are collected with varying
propellant levels in tankage and with the suppressor system in both inactive and
active modes. Numerous difficulties have been experienced in establishing testing
conditions desired and in collecting data; however, these difficulties are largely
non-flight hardware issues.
Prooellant Tank Pressudzatioq
SSME hydrogen and oxygen low pressure pumps require a minimum net positive
suction pressure (NPSP) if acceptable start, operation and shutdown are to be
achieved. Propellant tank ullage pressure is one of the controllable variables
affecting NPSP. Ullage pressure is also needed for oxygen and hydrogen tank
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structural stability during liftoff and flight.
requirements for each propellant tank.
are"
Systems have been designed to satisfy
Pressurization system principal features
• Pressurant gas sources
Relatively small high pressure lines from pressurant sources to flow controlling
modules
• Modules for controlling flow
• Lines from controlling modules to orbiter/ET quick disconnects and continuing
lines to propellant tanks
• Gas diffusing system within propellant tanks
• Devices for sensing ullage pressures within tanks and for controlling flow
control modules
• Vent/relief valves for tanks
• Ground-to-vehicle supply systems for pressurizing tanks
Hydrogen and oxygen tank pressurization systems are similar in design,
although the gas sources differ. Heated gaseous hydrogen (liquid hydrogen tank
pressurant) is available from each SSME nozzle wall coolant flow. Heated
gaseous oxygen (liquid oxygen tank pressurant) is available from each engine-
mounted heat exchanger. A ground storage supply provides ambient helium gas
for both tanks during prefiring-approximately the final three minutes prior to engine
start. Systems use gimbal joints and hardware insulation as appropriate to assure
structural capability and hardware operativeness. Tank pressurization systems are
shown in Figures 3-6 and 3-7.
Many specific objectives are included in system verification. The paramount
objective, however, for the pre-firing pre-pressurization system and the
pressurization system active during firings, is to maintain tank ullage pressures in
both hydrogen and oxygen tanks within specified control bands for all operational
phases and potential failure modes. The original designed system has met
requirements, although numerous problems have occurred relative to control
module orifice sizing, control valve sluggishness in operations, oxygen heat
exchanger internal coil pressures for some conditions less than the fuel rich hot
gas flow external to coils, software changes relating to pre-pressurization control
and other areas.
Prooellant Loadina
The Space Shuttle propellant delivery systems, previously described, are
used for both hydrogen and oxygen propellant loading. Additional required
hardware for each propellant is limited to: (1) a 12-inch diameter line from the
V
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orbiter-located manifold to the vehicle skin; (2) two series valves in this line; and
(3) an orbiter-to-ground quick disconnect valve. Critical to the loading process is
operational instrumentation - liquid level sensors within tanks for managing
operations; selective temperatures and pressures measured within tankage, vent
systems, propellant delivery systems, and ground located hardware for fluid
condition monitoring.
Aside from undesirable/unsafe aspects of hydrogen leaks during loading, the
physical process of transferring hydrogen from ground systems to the Space
Shuttle is simple relative to oxygen loading. Vehicle hardware damage attributable
to slugging oxygen flow during facility/vehicle hardware chilldown is a possibility.
Fluid geysering and resultant serious damage to hardware is possible once
oxygen commences collecting in facility vertical lines enroute to the vehicle and
within engine and vehicle lines. Thorough procedures are essential for these
operations. Many procedures developed prior to testing have been amended;
some were totally rewritten, based on new information, and all were verified during
the many months of testing. The many test requirements are defined in Table 3-1
and cover all aspects of normal and contingency operations.
Vehicle hardware used for propellant loading is used also for propellant
removal.
Prooellant Loadino At Elevated Tank Pressure
ET design philosophy was based on: (1) hydrogen and oxygen tanks being
capable of "free standing" on the launch pad and; (2) no required internal pressure
during propellant loading and standby operations with propellant aboard. This
philosophy changed during the propulsion system test program, and requirements,
which varied with time, were imposed for internal tank pressures during propellant
loading and some standby operations prior to and after firings. Vehicle vent valve
cycling to control internal tank ullage pressure within specified limits during
propellant loading and post loading operations was investigated, selected as the
preferred approach and demonstrated.
Other requirements restricting propellant levels during loading to satisfy
hardware thermal limits were also imposed. Such requirements were managed by
procedures.
Late recognition of these requirements necessitated total development of
concept, necessary engineering, and procedures after system testing had
commenced. Primary concem relative to control method implementation was tank
overstress and potential blowup. Considerations of both normal and contingency
operations were required for not only ullage pressure control but for other
disciplines such as loading to assure geysering did not occur.
Prooeltant Loading Instrumentation and Softwar_
SSME oxidizer-to-fuel consumption is 6:1 and has been essentially constant
during missions. Propellant quantities loaded were thus based on engine
L
v
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consumption requirements plus performance reserves and unusable propellants.
To facilitate loading to specified requirements, propellant level sensors are located
at designated locations in each tank. Multiple sensors are located at the
designated 100 percent propellant level and other levels in close proximity.
Sensors are also located within tanks to provide propellant levels during loading
and prevent tank overfill.
Flight mass is achieved when monitored sensor sensors register wet a
specified percent of the time-15 to 75 percent-continuously under specified
conditions. Loading activity at KSC is computer controlled and major parts of
software development are critically dependent upon propellant loading sensor data
collected during propulsion system testing.
This complex area resulted in many surprising findings, thus test requirement
changes were necessary as events unfolded. Data collection time exceeded that
for any test requirement. Unexpected propellant flow currents in tankage adversely
affected sensors and required sensor shielding. Initially available electronics for
automated loading control were inadequate and required replacement; software
changes for hardware compatibility were essential; and necessary input data were
collected during hours of testing devoted to this one subject.
OxvaenlHvdroaen Feedline Safina_
Propellant delivery systems on the orbiter plus parts of the fill-and-drain
systems (both hydrogen and oxygen) are filled with propellants. Hardware sating
after main engines shutoff, and ET/orbiter separation is necessary. Hydrogen fill-
and-drain valves and prevalves are opened, and the system is vented to vacuum.
The oxygen prevalve and main engine oxygen valve are opened and the oxygen
system vented to vacuum through engine nozzles. Both systems are then purged
with helium from vehicle storage bottles. Appropriate valving is then closed
preparatory to orbiter reentry at some later date. Test objectives for this issue and
the following issue, return-to-launch-site (RTLS) dump, are not unique but were
necessary to verify prepared procedures with particular emphasis on the time line.
RTLS Dumo System
An aborted Shuttle mission with the orbiter returning to the launch site results
in propellant delivery systems full of propellants. Disposal of hydrogen is most
important prior to re-entering earth's atmosphere. Opening RTLS valves permits
hydrogen propellant to escape. System purging with ambient temperature helium
further safes the system.
Aft Comoartment Safina
The aft compartment of the orbiter, between bulkhead 1307 and the aft heat
shield, contains three SSMEs (excluding nozzles), total propellant delivery systems
located on the orbiter, propellant fill-and-drain systems, SSME control electronics,
vehicle propulsion system electronics/instrumentation, other propulsion system
equipment, and a gas distribution system for inerting and thermal conditioning
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compartment and equipment. Many low and high pressure pipe connections for
both oxygen and hydrogen systems are sources for leaks.
The compartment inerting and thermal control system consists of numerous
nozzles for distributing a ground supplied heated nitrogen flow. Gas sensing
probes within the compartment alternately provide compartment gas samples for
real-time analysis and test operation decisions regarding safety. Strategically
located vacuum sample bottles throughout the compartment obtain gas samples
during simulated flight phases for postflight analysis. For safety enhancement,
propulsion system test hardware uses non-heated nitrogen purges of significantly
greater quantity than the heated nitrogen purge used on both the flight and test
article. Also, fast response hydrogen sampling devices are located within the aft
compartment of the test article, as are fire detection sensors. Other compartments
of the vehicle such as the ET intertank use somewhat similar inerting, thermal
control and monitoring systems.
Miscellaneous Vehicle Systems
Numerous systems such as the hydraulic system for vehicle control and
systems for tank inerting prior to propellant loading have not been discussed.
Proper operation of each system collectively with other systems is essential for
success. Previous discussions of systems are believed to suffice for portraying
insight into Space Shuttle and the propulsion system test program.
Soace Shuttle Main Engine
The SSME is a high performance, high technology engine with reuse.
capability. None of these characteristics impose significant complexity to design or
operating features of the vehicle propulsion system. It merely implies a compact,
high performance thrust package for vehicle use. Such an engine design,
however, generally requires longer development time and more testing to reach
maturity, and if used prior to achieving maturity, vehicle risks occur and test
program delays are likely. The SSME was not adequately mature for
approximately the first half of the propulsion system test program.
The SSME uses a staged combustion cycle in which propellants are partially
burned at low mixture ratio, high pressure, and relatively low temperature in the
preburners and then completely burned in the main combustion chamber. The
SSME flow schematic is shown in Figure 3-5. The propellant system uses four
turbopumps. The two low pressure turbopumps operate at relatively low NPSP to
permit low pressures in the vehicle tanks. The function of these pumps is to
provide sufficient pressure at the inlets of the high pressure turbopumps to permit
them to operate at high speeds. Approximately 75 percent of the flow from the high
pressure oxidizer turbopump (HPOTP) goes directly to the main combustion
chamber. Approximately 10 percent is directed to the preburner pump, which
raises the pressure to that required by the preburners. Small quantities are bled
through the heat exchanger for oxidizer tank pressurization and POGO
suppression pressure. The balance of the oxidizer drives the turbine powering the
v
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low pressure oxidizer turbopump (LPOTP) and is then recirculated to the inlet of the
HPOTP.
Approximately 20 percent of the high pressure fuel turbopump (HPFTP)
discharge flow is used to cool the main combustion chamber (MCC), drive the low
pressure fuel turbopump turbine, cool the hot-gas manifold and injector, and
provide fuel tank pressurant. The remaining fuel is first used to cool the nozzle,
then supply the preburners.
The hydrogen-rich steam generated by the fuel and oxidizer preburners first
drives the high-pressure pump turbines, then flows to the main injector where it is
mixed with additional oxidizer and fuel and injected into the main combustion
chamber.
The main injector is baffled, coaxial-element injector, having dual faceplates
that are transpiration-cooled by gaseous hydrogen. The gimbai bearing is bolted
to the main injector and dome assembly and is the thrust interface between the
engine and vehicle. It also enables the engine to be gimballed to provide pitch,
yaw, and roll control. The MCC consists of an internal coolant liner and an external
structural jacket. The main combustion chamber operates near 3300 PSI and
experiences exceedingly high wall heat transfer rates. Thus to avoid burn through,
a unique design is necessary. To enhance heat transfer, the chamber is made of
copper alloy which is cooled regeneratively with hydrogen flowing through milled
axial coolant channels. The nozzle is bolted to the MCC and is constructed of
tapered tubes reinforced by a structural jacket with insulated hatbands. The tubes
provide an up-pass fuel coolant circuit that is supplied with hydrogen through three
down-pass transfer ducts connected to the aft inlet manifold. The nozzle has an
expansion ratio of 77.5, although during development, two engine nozzle
configurations were utilized-flight nozzle configuration with large area ratio and
non-flight configuration with much smaller area ratio.
Commands to and within engines are controlled by a separate controller for
each engine. To work effectively as an engine system and as a subsystem within
Space Shuttle, other significant engine components are required as control valves,
sensors of all types (temperature, pressure, accelerometers), hydraulic actuators,
and ignition systems.
SHU17"LE PROPULSION SYSTEM TEST OBJECTIVES
Propulsion system test objectives were initially developed to assure inclusion
of capabilities essential for satisfying vehicle, engine, facility, and GSE needs. The
broad test objectives follow:
• Determine structural acceotability of engines in the propulsion system test
environment
• Determine functional ca0ability of engines in the propulsion system test
environment
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• Validateengine-imposed vehicle design requirements
• Determine engine propellant leakage integrity
• Validate structural integrity of major elements (ET, Orbiter, SRB) and the
interactive loads between major elements
• Validate structural integrity of propulsion systems of individual elements to the
interacting environments
• Validate the functional capabilities of propulsion
components/subsystems in the propulsion system environment
system
• Validate the functional capability of electrical hardware, computer control
system/software with vehicle/propulsion system environments
• Validate vehicle/propulsion system imposed engine requirements
• Determine propulsion system leak integrity
• Determine vehicle external design environments
• Determine functional compatibility of the vehicle structure, fluid, electrical,
hydraulic, and software systems with the ground/GSE interfacing systems.
These broad objectives were amended as appropriate and specific test
requirements to be satisfied during propulsion system testing were developed.
Table 3-1 is a total list (approximately 300) of test requirements, including initial
requirements and others added throughout the program. The initial requirements,
approximately 200, were carefully integrated and scheduled to form a test program.
Twelve hot firings of varying time durations from a few seconds to approximately
550 seconds, one non-firing propellant loading test, and two structural tests
(resonant survey) were identified to be necessary.
Composition of each of the twelve hot firings actually conducted during
propulsion system testing bears little resemblance to initially planned tests
because: (1) hardware available for use largely controlled specific test
requirements; (2) testing delays created immediate data needs to be satisfied
wherever possible to minimize program impacts and; (3) test requirements were
added to the program. Although test requirements were altered (shifted)
significantly between tests, each test requirement of Table 3-1 was totally or
partially satisfied (all satisfied to an acceptable level) in the propulsion system test
program.
Additional test requirements, which were identified as testing progressed and
integrated into the program, were in many cases crucial to Space Shuttle
development/verification. These test requirements, involving both hot firings and
non-hot firing type tests, resulted from oversight during the initial planning period,
design changes to the vehicle/facility from earlier periods, failure of
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TABLE 3-I. SPACE SHUTTLE PROPULSION SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS
(TRSD PARAGRAPH TITLES AND NUMBERS - AMENDED)
TDS 5.1.1 TVC Performance Evaluatlon (12)
I. Stnusotdal Engine Glmba111ng
- 0.2 ° Amplitude
- 0.4 degrees amplitude
- 0.6 degrees amp]ltude
2. Step Response
3. Ramp Response
4. Strokin,
5. ht Profile
rin
on
taneous ng and POGO
TD5 5.1.2 Hydraulic System Performance Verification
1. Evaluate Hydraulic System during Engine
Throttling and Steady State Engine Performance
2. Hydraullc Warmant Flow Evaluation at Constant
Pressure_ Constant Supply Temperature T and i
KSC Countdown Timellne -- I
I
TDS 5.2.1 LO2 Flight Pressurization System Performance(15))
1. Demonstrate satisfactory transition from I
}ressurlzatlon to auto :nous rStem.
I 4
one
en(
pressur_ control with all engines being
throttled.
12. Verify pressurization system will )upport SSME's
during LO2 depletion cutoff.
13. Switch to spare ullage pressure transducer after
ET is pressurized.
14. Simulate RTLS or AOA with an engine out for at
least 300 seconds.
15. Optimize flow control valve orifice size.
Note: TRSD - Test Requirement & Specification E_c_ment
(XX) -iJmber if Orlglnal Requirements per iDS.
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TABLE3-1. SPACESHUTTLEPROPULSIONSYSTEMTESTREOUIREMENTS
(CONTINUED)
TDS 5.2.2 L02 Prepressurlzatlon System Performance (9)
Verification
)ress within allotted
tomlntailn )ressure within
countdown,
)ressure within
stemwlll support drain of
that system wlll support pre- and
post-tanking purge operations,
6. verify that the heated helium purge in
pressurization llne prevents ice and frost
formation on line.
7. Evaluate LO2 tank ullage back pressure. .
8. Evaluate ET vent valve relief performance.
9. Demonstrate that system wJ11 support 5000 qpm
drain rate.
TDS 5.2.3 Propellant Conditioning LH2 Recirculatlon (12)
Performance
1. Evaluate MPS-SSME Prestart LH2 Conditioning
2. Demonstrate ability to meet SSME start require-
ments during operational tlmeltne.
3. Valtdate system heat leak design analysis.
_Z Evaluate operation of LH2 hlgh point bleed.Determine tin, a/sequence requirements for
Initiation of LH2 reclrculatton.
6. Detemtne effects of propellant loading operations
on rectrculatlon system.
7, Demonstrate compatibility of recirculatlon cutoff-
SSME start se uenctn , s.
i
12. LH2 Reclrc 14anlfold Rel. Vlv. Check
I
TDS5.2.4 Pneumatic Systm Performance (16)
1, Demonstrate GSE sequence for ftllln9 and maintain-
ing helium bottles.
2. Evaluate 'helium storage twperaturelpressure pro-
files during tanklnglprelaunch operations,
3. Detemtne effects of countdown holds.
4, Determine effects of countdown recycles.
5. Determine optimum pressurization sequencing.
6. Demonstrate system capability for OFT Mission and
extended boost duration.
7. Demonstrate ablllt_ to operate Orbiter valves for
worst case post-MECO conditions.
8, Demonstrate LO2/LH2 feedilne repressur -_tlon.
v
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TABLE 3-I. SPACE SHUTTLE PROPULSION SYSTEM TEST REOUIREMENTS
(CONTINUED)
TDS 5.2.4 (Continued)
9. Support LO2 dum through SSME's.
10. Demonstrate RTL_ dump/purge operation.
11. Evaluate capability to distribute helium to the
SSME's.
TDS 5.2.5 Propellant Conditioning - LO2 Bleed (11)
I. Same as H2 discussed previous except for following:
2. Determine bleed system chllldown/sequencing
requirements.
3. Determine optimum L02 bleed flowrate.
4. Evaluate POGO recirculation 11ne conditioning
5. Verify bleed system compatibility wlth POGO
reclrculatlon flow.
6. Evaluate effects of L02 dralnback on bleed system
performance.
7. Evaluate Effects of Antlgeyser 11ne removal.
TDS 5.2.6 MPS Cluster Performance (29)
I. Verify MPS design compatlblllty with Orbiter
structural heat shleld and engine mounted heat
shleld.
2. Verify three-englne simultaneous start capability.
3. Evaluate MPS configuration effect on SSME
operations.
4. Evaluate SSME start/shutdown transient variations.
5. Verify SSME operation at power levels from 65 to
109%.
6. Verif_ satisfactory MPS performance with engine out,
7. uemonstrate LH2 depletion SSME shutdown.
8. Demonstrate seven-hour unpressurlzed hold condition.
9. Demonstrate two-minute pressurized hold condition.
I0. Demonstrate SSME POGO suppression system effectlve-I
ness. I
11. Demonstrate effects of Engine gimballing. I
12. Demonstrate ETlOrblter/SSME Interface compatlblllty.l
13. Demonstrate capablllt_ to operate for at least 300 !
seconds wtth englne out. I
14. Demonstrate LO2 depletlon SSME shutdown from 65%
power levelt at varying dep1etlon timer settings.
ormance(16:
1. Same as for z system previously covered.
i. Evaluate start transients to
uate start transients for simultaneous three-
Englne start.
3. Evaluate steady-state operation for three SSME
operations at various power levels.
4. Evaluate steady-state operation with upper and /owe
engine at various power levels.
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TABLE 3-1. SPACE SHUTTLE PROPULSION SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS
(CONTINUED)
5.2.8 (Continued)
5. Evaluate throttlln) transients:
6. Demonstrate effects of POGO osclllatlons
7. Evaluate effects of early en)ine Cutoff
8. Validate ET/Orbiter and SSME/Orblter Fluid
i
Mechanical Interface.
g. Evaluate engine cutoff transients.
10. Validate prevalve closln_ sequence at MECO.
11. Valtdate ECO sensor system) cutoff delay I resldules,
12. Verify prevalve relief function with no close
and closed comands,
TDS 5.2.9 LH2 Propellant Feed System (19)
1. Same as for 02 previously covered,
TDS 5.2.10 LH2 Prepressurtzatlon System Performance (7)
Verification
1. Same as discussed earlier for 02.
TD5 5.2.11LH2 Propel)ant Loadln_/Oetalnktn _ Procedures {19)
1. Vertfy draln.... capability for propellant trapped
between the inboard/outboard fill and drain valve.
round interface re(ulrements
screen on
rements.
I
I
effect t venes s.
15. Determine effect of seven-hour hold with LH2 tank
|1 i
unpressurlzed
16. Detemlne effect of two-minute hold with LH2 tank
pressurized.
17. Determine MPS/ET LH2 vent system back pressure under
crj/o_entc _as flow durln) chllldown_ fast fill) and
rep1 eni sh
18. Verify re;tef capability of inboard F&D valve.
19. Perform a countdown rec_/cle from T-4.3 sec.
and replenish LH2 to i00_.
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TABLE 3-I. SPACE SHUTTLE PROPULSION SYSTEM TEST REOUIREMENTS
(CONTINUED)
TDS 5.2.12 LO2 Propellant Loading and Detanklng Procedures
(23)
I. Same as for H2 prevlously discussed except as
follows.
2. Determine effect of helium bubbling on L02 loading.
3. Evaluate effectiveness of LO2 antl-geyser system.
_ valuate adjustments of engine L02 variable bleed.
Evaluate effects of ant/geyser line removal.
6. Evaluate 5000 gpm drain
7. Optimize vent orifice size.
8. Evaluate 1300 GPM Loading with Vent Valve Cycling
9. Demonstrate 5 minute Pressurized Hold Capability
TDS 5.2.13 Engine GN2 Purge Verification (2)
i. Demonstrate MPS GN2 purge sUPPly from the GSE meets
ICD requirements
2. Verify proper control and operation of GN2 purges
during countdown sequence.
TDS 5.2.14 ETlOrblterlSSME Propellant Systems Purge
and Inert/rig (3)
I. Develop procedure to purge the propellant systems
prior to propellant loading
2. Develop integrated Orbiter7ET/SSME MPS purging/ I
inerting procedure which minimize the quality of I
purge gas and number of samples required. I
3. MPsDevel°Pwhileaprocedureis l ted fromf r purgingthe ET. of the Orbiter/SSME il
i
TDS 5.2.15 Pneumatlc Launch Support GSEVerlflcatlon (7)
i. Verify capability of GSE to prepressurlze the L02
and LH2 tanks with ambient helium.
2. Evaluate capability of GSE to fill/maintain the
onboard helium spheres,
3. Evaluate GSE monitor/control functions during
propellant loadtng/dratnln 9.
4. Evaluate integrated pressurization system control
durln 9 countdown operation,
5. Demonstrate capability of SSME GN2 purge panel,
6. Demonstrate capability of LH2 and L02 pressurization
panel.
7. Demonstrate capability of helium pressure
reduction and bottle fill panel.
TDS 5.2.16 LO2/LH2 ET Self-Pressurization and Botloff (2}
1, Evaluate the L02 and LH2 Et vent valve relief
operation during self-pressurization,
2. Determine L02 and LH2 bolloff rates with tanks
loaded to 100% and vent valves open.
TDS 5.2.17 LH2 RTLS Dump Verification and llne relief valve
Verify L02 Dump through the SSME's and feed
line relief valve.
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TABLE 3-1. SPACE SHUTTLE PROPULSION. SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS
(CONTINUED)
TDS 5.2.19 L02 Antlgeyser System Integrated Performance(2)
I. Verify L02 antigeyser system performance over full
range of replenish and bleed flow rates r replenish
temperatures_ and helium supply pressures.
Z. Verify adequacy Of system operating procedures and
determine hold times for loss of helium bubbling
during replenish.
TDS 5.2.20 POGO Suppression System verification (2) ]
1. Verify POGO accumulators remain charged with gas. )
2. Verify POGO suppression system can vent the
required flow without affecting engine performance T
L02 depletion sensors and other engines in case of
early shutdown.
TDS 5.3.1 Malntalnabllity Evaluation
TDS 5.3.2 ET and Orbiter T-O Umblllcal Motion Measurement
due to cryogenic loading.
TDS 5.4.1 Engine Firing Thermal Soakback Determlnatlon (3)
I. Obtain Heat Shield Temperature Profile.
2. Determine engine firing thermal soakback effects.
3. Determine MPTA component temperature proflles.
TDS 5.4.2 Aft Fuselage Thermal Study (5)
i. Evaluate helium sphere pressures and temperatures
during operational sequencing.
)Z Evaluate aft fuselage purge effectiveness.Evaluate propellant feed system heat loads.
4. Determine SSNE thermal characteristics during
chtlldown and propellant )oadlng.
5. Evaluate MPTA component temperatures during all
operational phases.
TDS 5.4.3 Determine H_d Actuation Systnm environment
TDS 5.4.4 SSNE Plume-Induced Environment and SSME (2)
Theme1 Performance Verification.
1. Evaluate thermal environment and thermal
response of SSME nozzle, hat bandstand.thermal
protection material r turbine seal dratnllnet
and manifold for all operational modes.
2. Obtain data to validate the plume thermal model.
TDS 5.5.1 Aft Fuselage Primary and Thrust Structure (3)
Dynamic Stress and Load Transmission
Evaluation.
1. Evaluatellaft fuselage structural loads.
2. Determine SSME ignition overpressure effects.
3. Evaluate LPOTP lnlet housing strain s on Engines.
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TABLE 3-i. SPACE SHUTTLE PROPULSION SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS
(CONTINUED)
TDS 5.5.3 MPT POGO Pulsin 9 Evaluation (i)
I. Evaluate POGO characteristics of Integrated
propulslon system by pulsln 9 the L02 feed system:
With and without suppressours.
TDS 5.5.4 Vlbro-Acoustlc Environment (I)
I. Evaluate aft fuselage vlbro-acoustlc environment
With Vibro-Acoustic Water before 19nition
TDS 5.5.6 Perform MPT Resonant Modal Vibration Survey Test
(i)
TDS 5.6.1 EIU Evaluation (I)
i. Evaluate capability of engine interface unit to
control and monitor the SSME's durin 9 flrin 9 and to
reprogram the SSME controller memory.
TDS 5.6.2 FC-MDM and Flight Instrumentation Evaluation (i)
1. Evaluate fllght instrumentation (DFI t OI)
function performance I compatibility wlth other
avionic elements and functional performance of
FC-MDM In controIlln 9 SSME 91mballlng.
Operation rsls - latlon
I. Evaluate com )ower ioad
control es with nterfacln 9 subsystem I
components. I
TDS 5.7.1 Compartment Positive Pressure/Purge Flow Test(2)l
[
i
: TDS 5.7.2 Purge/HGDS Operations durtn 9 TanktnglStattc
Flrln 9. (1)
) I. - Evaluate ET/Orblter disconnect plate cavities and
franglble nut canisters.
TDS 5.7.3 Aft Fuselage Purge Flow Balance and Verlftcattor
Test. (1)
TDS 5.7.4 HGDS Slmulated Inertln 9 Test with simulated
leakage.
TDS 5.7.5 ETlOrbtter LH2 and LO2 Disconnect Purge Leakage
nd Flow Balance Verification Test (1) .
I. L02 and LH2 Disconnect - Ambient Conditions.
Verify minimum plate gap pressurel flows out of
frangible nut canisters and plate 9ap cavity
outlets.
TDS 5.8.1 Transportablllty and Handllng Demonstration
TDS 5.8.2 Checkout and Processln 9 Demonstration - ET
TDS 5.8.3 Intertank Leak Measurement Verification
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TABLE 3-1. SPACE SHUTTLE PROPULSION SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS
(CONTINUED)
TDS 5,8.4 Antige_ser Performance with and without Anti-
9eyserllne and LO2 Screen Evaluatlon
TDS 5.8.5 Ventln 9 Performance and LO2/LH2 Botloff Rate
Evaluation (2)
1. Verify performance of ET vent s_stem during
propellant 1oadlng, topping, replenish t pre-
pressurlzatlon_ and detankln 9.
2. Valldate method of monltorln 9 L02 u11age pressure
TDS 5.8.6 Intertank Purge Verification (1)
I. Evaluate Intertank purge effectlveness T Intertank
environmental thern_l model and ET Intertank
temperature fix,
TD) 5.8.7 _nt Llnes Structural Verlfi_
_vamuate llne capability to withstand loads
Induced during purging, propellant loading/
unloading, and static _lrlng.
TD5 5.8.8 L02 and LH2 Tank Diffuser qualification
TDS 5.8.9 LH2 Stratification Model Validation
TOS 5.8.10 ET Electrical/Instrumentation System
Performance
TDS 5.8.11ET Thernml Protectto_ System Performance
Verification.
i i
TDS 5,8,13 LOZ and LH2 Tank Structure Thermal Model i
validation.
TDS 5.8.14 L02 and LH2 Tank Thermal Protection system
Surface Temperature
Validation.
TDS 5.8.16 Intertank "Y" Joint nttrogen Condensation
Investigation.
TDS 5.8.17 Intertank EUCL_pment Panel Therma! Performance
TDS 5.8.19 LH2 Tank Ullage Gas Thermal Model Validation
TOS 5.8.22 L02 Feedltne and Ant tgeyser Line Thermal
Protection S_stem Performance Validation
TDS 5.8.23 GH2 Vent Ltne Thermal Protection System
Performance Validation
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TABLE 3-I. SPACE SHUTTLE PROPULSION SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS
(CONCLUDED)
TDS 5.8.24 Pressurization Llne Mountin_ Heat Leak
Determination
TDS 5.8.25 Structural Dynamic Performance Validation - ET
TDS 5.8.26 ET Nose cap GN2 pur_e
TDS 5.8.27 GH2 Vent and Relief Valve Sense Line Pur_e
evaluation.
TDS 5.8.28 Maintainability Evaluation - LRU and replacemenl
retest
TDS 5.8.29 ET Ice Formation Assessment
TDS 5.8.30 RSS Thermal Model Simulation Test
TDS 5.8.31 Verify capability to maintain LH2 Tank
Pressurized durln_ fill.
GENERAL - -NO SPECIFIC TDS COVERAGE:
I. Verify vehicle fll)ht test data evaluation
techniques by assessln 9 MPTA test data
2. Provide tralnin 9 for launch site 9round operations
personnel.
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hardware/procedures to yield expected results, and hardware/system
improvements. Requirements for non-firing type data were so great that such data
were collected for most scheduled hot firing tests during a time interval between
propellant loading and actual hot firing. The following are some of the special tests
which were conducted:
• SSME cold gimballing
• Liquid oxygen tank pressure undershoot
• Liquid hydrogen tank vent flow rate
• Calibration of 100 percent propellant loading sensors
• Evaluation of propellant temperature stratification
• Helium bottles blow down
• Liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen tank self pressurization
Two examples of "add on" test requirements are: (1) anti-geyser line removal
and (2) operation of hydrogen recirculation pumps at increased speed-500 Hertz
versus the normal 400 Hertz power frequency.
Data collected with the anti-geyser line for preventing fluid geysering provided
clues that safe operation may be possible without the anti-geyser line. Line
removal would save money and vehicle weight. Deliberate data
evaluation/analysis and careful planning were necessary because of serious safety
implications. A series of tests were planned and successfully conducted, thus
proving the line could be removed. Today's Space Shuttle does not use this line.
The recirculation pumps, one per engine, circulate fluid through the engine,
liquid hydrogen hardware, and feedlines prior to engine start command for
purposes of thermal conditioning. Serious difficulties were experienced in early
testing relative to an imbalance between heat input to the hardware and pump
capacity. Doubts regarding pump flow/delta pressure adequacy existed; however,
pump replacements without program impact were not possible. Increased pump
speed offered increased flow quantity and pressure dse and consequently could
resolve a potentially marginal condition without schedule impact. The test was
conducted and system performance established for future use if necessary.
MAIN PROPULSION TEST ACCOMPLISHMENTS
This section presents a listing and discussion of: important issues
representing accomplishments of the program; unworkable designs/procedures
which were made workable by changes and then verified; workable
designs/procedures for which adjustments to achieve acceptance were initially
anticipated and were accomplished; improved hardware for performance, safety;
and other issues. The listing cannot be considered complete and cannot be
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compared line by line with test requirements of Table 3-1, which includes initial
requirements plus requirements added during the program. Nevertheless, this
specific listing qualitatively demonstrates the worthiness of propulsion system test
programs for complex vehicle designs. Twenty-five percent of the listing is
estimated to have resulted from "add on" test requirements during the test program.
This statistic is most important and demonstrates the knowledge and discipline to
prevent oversights and to enable the necessary design insight. Complex
development programs without a flexible propulsion system test can expect major
unpleasant technical, schedule and cost surprises.
To enhance the understanding of the accomplishments, issues with some
similarity have been grouped under arbitrary titles as follows:
• Liquid Hydrogen Recirculation Pump Operational Procedures/Hardware
Changes
• Liquid Oxygen Engine Pump Chill Down System and Oxygen Tank Loading
Liquid Hydrogen Tank Loading
• Firing Initiation
• Firing Termination
• Miscellaneous
To further enhance insight, each individual issue has been related according to two
other factors as indicated in parentheses after each issue title: (1) classification of
the issue relative to consequences--catastrophic; unworkable; workable with
adjustments, as was originally anticipated; and product improvement, with
implementation being optional; and (2) time phasing of operation in which the
issue occurs--preflight or flight. Table 3-2 is repeated from the main body of the
report and provides a summary as to distribution of issues according to identified
categories.
Table 3-2. Reported Propulsion System Testing Accomplishments Classified by
Consequence and Time Phased m MPTA
Stage
Shuttle
Catastrophe
Flight! Preflight
3 3
Unworkable
Flight Preflight
5 17
Workable Mod.
Flight Preflight
3 6
Improvement Total
Per
Flight Preflight Staqe
1 2 40
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Liauid Hvdroaen Recirculation Pumo Operational Procedures/Hardware Change,_
Hiah Point Bleed Seauencina/Line Back Pressure (unworkable. orefliaht ).
Hydrogen gas, created within the propellant delivery system during periods of zero
or low flow rates, collects at the high point of the 17-inch feedline--immediately
downstream of the ET/Orbiter disconnect. A 3/4 inch diameter line from this
location, through the Orbiter/ground interface and connecting with the facility vent
line, permits removal of this collecting gas. In order to conserve liquid hydrogen
propellant in the system, a programmed mode of operation was adopted for the
control valve within this line. The valve would open prior to recirculation pump start
and close prior to tank pressurization preparatory to engine start. Unfortunately,
excessive delivery system heat leak and other factors resulted in a large gas
volume which the high point bleed could not remove; thus recirculation pumps
would not operate (due to cavitation) and engine start w.'--: impossible. Procedures
were modified to open the high point bleed line valve auring propellant loading
prior to formation of the large gas volume.
High back-pressure at the vent line exit also reduced line flow potential, thus
relocation of the line exit was required. Incorporation of both hardware and
procedural changes led to successful removal bf the gas volume, successful
operation of hydrogen recirculation pumps, and acceptable propellant
temperatures at SSME pump inlets and throughout the feedlines. Successful
operation was demonstrated on all subsequent firings of the propulsion system.
Prgp_llant Loading TemDerature /unworkable. oreflighti. Initial vehicle
propellant loading operations used propellants from supply barges. Supplied
propellants were anticipated to be approximately the same quality as supplied from
storage tanks at KSC. Vehicle liquid hydrogen recirculation pumps, exposed
almost directly to this supplied/incoming flow, cavitated, thus revealing the
influence of incoming liquid hydrogen temperature on pump performance. A
procedural change requiring propellant supply barge venting to reduce liquid
hydrogen temperature several hours prior to planned vehicle propellant loading
resolved the problem and provided valuable insight for necessary KSC operations.
500 Hertz Recirculation Power (workable - rood exoected, preflight!. It was
concluded that liquid hydrogen propellant delivery system thermal conditioning
(recirculation pump operation, high point bleed operation, and system heat leak)
was sensitive to a number of variables and that the current design was marginally
acceptable. Normal pump operation used a 400 hertz power supply; however, all
involved hardware could accommodate operation with 500 hertz power. Operation
at 500 hertz would increase recirculation pump flow and pressure rise capabilities,
thus increasing system margin. A contingency test was performed successfully,
and a performance data base was developed for future use as appropriate.
R_start Procedure (imorovement. orefliohtL Possible events can result in
liquid hydrogen recirculation pump cutoff and consequently require restart at some
later time. Procedures for reinitiating recirculation pump start existed and were
proven acceptable during testing; however, the procedures were unduly complex.
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A procedure which is simpler and requires less time was developed and verified to
be acceptable.
Liqui_ Oxygen Engine Pump Chilldown System and Oxygen Tank Loadina
Liauid Oxvaen Drain Back Time (workable - mod. exoected, orefliahtl. The
major part of lic/uid oxygen replenish flow does not progress into the ET liquid
oxygen tank, but is diverted from the orbiter liquid oxygen manifold into the three
12-inch diameter feedlines as engine pump/equipment chilldown flow. Liquid
oxygen within the propellant delivery system upstream of the orbiter manifold is
virtually stagnant, relatively warm, and will not satisfy engine start requirements.
Prior to engine firing, the feedline liquid oxygen is exchanged by colder liquid
oxygen from the ET liquid oxygen tank. This is accomplished by terminating
replenish and continuing engine chill flow with all liquid oxygen flow now supplied
from the ET liquid oxygen tank. Propellant conditions within the feedline and
engine thermal conditions were investigated for various times of liquid oxygen
drainback from the ET. The optimum time of nine minutes was selected and
procedures finalized. (Drainback time was driven to five minutes by other
requirements well into the flight program.) The ET liquid oxygen loading manifest
accommodates propellant drainback quantities. The provided data base allows
flexibility in adjusting the liquid oxygen load at KSC.
Inertina Purge Procedures (workable - mod. exoected, orefliahtl. Propellant
tanks, valving, and lines require inerting prior to exposure to propellants. A
continuous flow procedure is used where an inert gas is introduced into the tank
simultaneously with expulsion from tankage of a similar quantity of gas. This
process continues until strategically located instruments are recording safe
concentration levels within tankage. Humidity levels are also evaluated. Testing to
minimize time required for inerting and inert gas helium quantities required were
conducted and procedures were finalized.
Facility/Vehicle Chill !workable - mod. exoected, orefliahtL Transition of
facility liquid oxygen supply lines from ambient temperature to liquid oxygen
temperature is a critical phase relative to avoiding vehicle hardware damage. The
fluid dynamics encountered as fluid changes state in the transfer lines can result in
"slugging" which is destructive to vehicle hardware. While test site and launch site
hardware differ in many respects, carefully prepared procedures are necessary for
each, and experience from one site benefits the other site. For example, the ET
was one of a limited number of stages loaded at the launch site which did not
experience hardware damage, due to such experience from test sites.
Propellant Loadin_a Temoerature and Slow Fill (catastroohic. Dreflight_. As
discussed for liquid hydrogen earlier, liquid oxygen temperatures from supply
barges were unacceptably warm. The relatively warm liquid oxygen created the
potential for a geyser which could result in devastating consequences. A
procedural change to vent supply barges several hours prior to vehicle loading
was implemented, thus reducing the temperature of supplied propellant. Liquid
oxygen geysering can also result from the transfer of stored engine thermal energy
to liquid oxygen within the propellant delivery system. The engine liquid oxygen
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c_;ll flow is beneficial for removing engine thermal energy. Procedural changes
were made which prevented propellant loading beyond vehicle station 1616 prior
to liquid oxygen chill flow expelling propellant warmer than -281°F through the
engine bleed valve. This is accomplished by restricting slow fill rate to 75 gpm until
the necessary temperature is achieved.
Tank Loading Under Pressure (unworkable. 0reflight). This subject applies to
both liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen. External tank structural deficiencies
required positive internal pressure during loading of propellant tanks. This was
contrary to initial design requirements and required changes in the loading method
and procedures. The method adopted was to control tank pressure by cycling
vehicle vent valves, a method not previously used and inherently introducing risk.
The approach was explored and thoroughly developed, and procedures were
established. Liquid oxygen replenish rates to ensure proper flight levels were also
accomplished at elevated tank pressures while cycling vent valves. The ET
structural capabilities changed frequently necessitating changes to the procedure.
Tank redesign to preclude this condition remains impractical, thus the procedures
are permanent.
Closed Looo Prooellant Level Control (unwork_hle. oreflight). Space Shuttle
propellant loading at KSC is automated, while at the propulsion system test site,
only replenish/topping phases were planned to be automated. Extensive data
collection was necessary to properly implement automation. Initial test results from
the test site demonstrated that the control electronics could not satisfy requirements
and that replacement of control electronics was required. Similar changes to the
launch processing system (LPS) at KSC were required. Availability of replacement
control electronics resulted in extensive testing to collect necessary data for total
system development and verification.
Re-lnitiatina Reolenish lunworkable, orefliahtL Contingency planning
required procedtJres for replenish flow termination-and subsequent re-initiation.
Initial procedures for liquid oxygen resulted in a large pressure spike when the fill-
and-drain valves were opened to re-initiate replenish. The cause was release of
stored energy from self-pressurized, trapped liquid oxygen in the facility lines. New
procedures to eliminatelreduce the pressure spike were developed and verified for
use at both test and launch sites.
ET Oxvaen Off Loadina/catastroohic. grefljghtL Procedures developed for off-
loading liquicl oxygen from-vehicle to facility resulted in unacceptable initial flow
rates within Orbiter hardware and unacceptable pressure spikes in facility
hardware. An orifice was installed at the Orbiter/facility interface to reduce both the
transient and steady state flow rate. Procedures were modified to reduce facility
surge pressure.
Anti-Geyser Line Removed (improvement. preflight). Anti-geyser line removal
increased payload capability and afforded significant cost savings. Important
development work using subsystem test hardware for the initial configuration led to
an understanding of system performance, later verified on MPTA, and the operating
margin. From this work, the idea for removing the anti-geyser line was conceived.
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The concept was demonstrated on MPTA and later was accepted. Oxygen
geysering is a critical safety issue, thus procedures must be carefully developed
and verified for all normal and contingency operating modes.
HyUrogen Tank Loadin a
Toooina Flow Rate (workable - mod. exoected, orefliahtL Orbiter lines were
shown by test to have higher pressure loss than predicted. -An increase in interface
pressure was required to achieve the ICD topping flow rate.
Tank Thermal/Tank Loadina Under Pressure lunworkable, orefli0htl. The
liquid hydrogen tank, similar to the liquid oxygen tank, required internal pressure
during loading and with propellant on board. Vent valve cycling was again used to
satisfy the requirement. An additional requirement related tank propellant level to
bulkhead temperature during initial loading phases. Techniques for accomplishing
this later requirement were developed. Procedures for both requirements were
developed and verified. Since launch and test site facilities are not identical,
similar procedures were developed for KSC.
Firing Initiation
Engine Ready Logic Chanoes _unworkable. Drefli_ahtl. Initially "engine ready"
activity completion, necessary for engine start, was accomplished immediately prior
to start command, thus causing its failure to result in recycling the countdown,
which was undesirable. To minimize roll back, engine ready was revised with
completion planned immediately following ET prepressurization. This provided the
flexibility to hold the countdown for strategizing/action without recycling.
Procedures were amended and satisfactory operation was demonstrated many
times.
Countdown Interlock Reduction _unworkable. orefliohtL Difficulty in achieving
necessary conditions for a successful countdown resulted in reassessment of
interlocks. The number of interlocks was reduced and many were simplified to
enhance launch probability.
Aft Fuselage Inertino/Thermal Control (workable - mod. exoected, orefliohtl.
Two objectives were considered in this development: (i) assuring-that
components, both propulsion and electrical, do not become excessively hot or cold
during prefiring and firing periods; and (2) assuring that gas sampling devices are
properly located to detect gas leaks (primarily preflight). Variables involved are
quantity, temperature, discharge location, and direction or purge gases and gas
sampling probe locations. Gas sampling systems for flight were developed. With a
new vehicle design, particularly if several verification/development firings are to be
made, a higher than normal purge system capability is necessary for safety. These
systems have been instrumental in preventing total stage/facility loss. All above
aspects were an important part of the program, and launch redlines and
procedures were developed accordingly.
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Feedline Screens (unworkable. preflight). Oxygen and hydrogen feedline
screens located near low pressure (oxygen and hydrogen) engine pump inlets
provide protection from foreign particles. Current usage on Shuttle is a result of the
test program. Loss of needle bearings from the oxygen drain valve and distribution
of these bearings throughout the hydrogen and oxygen systems was the motivator.
Screen usage affected available engine NPSP, which was marginal; thus the
design approach was critical. Valve redesign was necessary; a replacement spool
piece was required to permit testing to continue.
Hvdroaen Pressurant Diffuser Structural Failures lunworkable. Dreflight/fliaht).
The pressurant diffuser, located internal to the liquid hydrogen tank for distributing
pressurant gas throughout the tank ullage and achieving required tank pressures
and minimizing pressurant gas weight, structurally failed as did several improved
designs. Flow induced vibration created by incoming high velocity pressurant gas
resulted in metal fatigue. Change of material from aluminum to steel resolved the
issue. Component testing had not experienced this difficulty although testing was
incomplete.
Oxvoen Tank Preoressudzation Overshoot (unworknble. flight). Liquid oxygen
tank Ullage pressure exceeded the allowable control band during
prepressurization. The pressurizing gas is helium which is supplied from the
facility. Flow capability is regulated by appropriate facility valve, and orifice and ET
located pressure sensors provide necessary flow control. The problem was
resolved by eliminating a short delay in the SATS program and removing the
helium supply valve actuator orifices. Subsequently, ullage pressure requirement
was maintained within the control band.
Pressure Transducer Drift (unworkable. Dreflight). Pressure transducers
mounted to or in close proximity to hardware containing cryogenic fluids yielded
inaccurate pressure readings. Some measurements were crucial for firing initiation
and safe operations. It was necessary to relocate transducers which were used for
establishing engine ready. Other transducers were removed from the control logic
while others were insulated to minimize drift.
ET Pressure Transducer Failure funworkable, fliahtL Flow induced vibrations,
created by propellant tank vent valve cycling required to maintain a positive tank
pressure for structural considerations, resulted in fatiguing the poteniometer-to-
wiper interface of the pressure transducer. Transducer redesign was necessary.
Systemenvironments identify problems which otherwise are not identified because
testing is regulated by input requirements, which frequently are limited due to lack
of system knowledge.
POGO Accumulator Gas Collaose (unworkable. orefliahtl. An accumulator
containing both liquid and gaseous oxygen located on the-SSMEs between the
low pressure and high pressure pumps changes response frequencies of the
propulsion system. During engine start, the accumulator ullage gas, oxygen,
collapsed and pressure spikes in the upstream feedline were observed.
Incorporation of a helium gas precharge into the accumulator prior to engine start
=
V
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resolved the problem. A helium precharge was incorporated into the normal
engine start sequence.
Feed System Stability (workable - mod. exoected, fliQhtl. POGO (interaction of
vehicle structure with dynamically created disturbances occurring within the
oxygen feedline/engine system) is a major concern for vehicle designers.
Complicated math models necessary to establish vehicle stability margin prior to
vehicle flight require input data which are obtained from special ground testing
utilizing flight configuration hardware. Extensive data of the oxygen feed
system/engine were obtained with dynamic disturbances established by applying
pressure pulses of varying magnitude, frequency, and mode shape upstream of the
pump inlet. This was accomplished both with and without hardware which was
provided for preventing dynamic problems. Quantifying safety margins was vital
data for the program.
Enaine Start Positionina (imorovement. oreflightl. Unknown magnitude of
sideload-s during the SSME start transient required flared outward positioning of
engine nozzles to provide maximum clearance in the event the TVC relief valve
relieved and the engine moved. Testing demonstrated engines could be safely
started in the preferred null position. Procedures were changed to start in the null
position.
Aft H_I _hield Over-Pressure (unworkable. oreflightl. Hydrogen gas exits
SSME nozzles for a brief time period immediately prior to engine start. Ignition of
hydrogen, which may accumulate in the vehicle base under some conditions, can
result in unacceptable pressure spikes at engine ignition. A system to prevent
accumulation by burning hydrogen as it exits SSME nozzles can prevent pressure
spikes from occurring. Propulsion system testing confirmed that a burn-off system
was required. A burn-off system was designed for the launch site and was verified
during propulsion system testing.
ET/Orbiter Oxvaen Prooellant Disconnect (catastroohic. unworkable.
oreflight/flight!. This-valve is located immediately downstream of a 90 degree
elbow and near the aft end of the ET. It is a 17-inch diameter quick disconnect (two
valve butterfly - poppet concept). The turning flow forces generated by the close
proximity of the upstream elbow could overload the valve actuating mechanism
resulting in unplanned rapid valve closure which could be disastrous. Fortunately
this was discovered prior to MPTA hot firing. This event, differing from most others
cited herein, is an example of subsystem rather than full system testing benefits;
however, the proper environment must be used to achieve representative data.
Unfortunately, in many cases, system level testing is the only source of the correct
environmental conditions and sometimes hardware exclusions restrict such
environments during system testing--the following issue is an example.
Facility to ET Orbiter Hydrogen Umbilicals {unworkable. oreflight). This is an
example of hardware exclusions restricting environments for system level testing--
noted immediately above. Umbilicals were not a part of the orbiter to test site
interface for MPTA, and a flight configuration ground and airborne disconnect was
not used for the ET. Extensive difficulties were experienced at the launch site on
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both of these connections, and yet the actual launch site procedure had been
performed many times at the test site.
Firina Terminatign
Solid Nitrogen Formation in Enaine MFV fcatastroohic, orefliaht). Main fuel
valve leakage after engine cutoff was an infrequent problem. Diffusion of the
nitrogen engine purge into the fuel system and resultant solidification were
corrected by engine software modifications permitting the helium fuel system purge
application once each hour after propellant loading to remove the nitrogen.
Liauid Oxvaen Low Level Cut Off (catastroohic. fliahtl. Ability to use the
maximum quan:tity of onboard oxygen is supportive of maximizing vehicle payload.
The liquid oxygen low level cutoff system is included to allow maximum usage of
oxygen and yet prevent engine pump operation with inadequate NPSP, which can
be destructive/hazardous. Propulsion system test termination by the liquid oxygen
low level cutoff system was successfully demonstrated for differing test conditions m
numbers of engines operating, engine thrust level, etc. Optimum time delay--time
interval between cutoff sensor dry indication and engine shutdown command--was
determined for various engine combinations. Extensive development activity
relative to sensor performance, location, etc., was necessary prior to conducting of
meaningful propulsion system testing.
Liauid Hvdroaen Low Level Cutoff (worknhle - mod. exoected, fliahtl. Sensors
for liquid hydrogen low level cutoff are lOcated within the liquid hydrogen tank near
the tank bottom. The primary purpose of the liquid hydrogen low level cutoff system
is prevention of an oxygen rich shutdown and engine operation with inadequate
NPSP. Hydrogen residuals are small because propellant density is low. The low
level cutoff system was successfully demonstrated and engine performance was
shown to be adequate.
Liauid Hvdroaen Dumo Seauence (workable - mod. exoected, flight!.
Hydrogen residuals within the propellant delivery system for the Orbiter must be
removed for sating purposes for any normal or aborted mission. RTLS clump
valves located on the orbiter near the ET/orbiter disconnect can safe the system for
an aborted mission. For normal missions, hydrogen is dumped overboard through
the fill-and-drain line. Tests verified proper valve sequencing and line pressurizing
with helium for inerting for both the RTLS and fill-and-drain valve options. An
additional venting option was evaluated and determined to be feasible.
Liauid Oxvaen Prevalve Closure Demonstration (unworkable. fliaht). The
liquid oxygen t_igh pressure pump available NPSP for flight was predicted to be
zero during last engine cutoff. Operation at zero NPSP is hazardous. A procedure
to prevent zero NPSP operation, to rapidly close the prevalve and pressurize the
downstream feedline was devised and demonstrated.
v
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Nitroaen Purge Termination (unworkable. Dreflight). SSME nitrogen purge
supply pressure decay time was established to define a sequence at KSC.
Orbiter/ET Umbilical Cavity Purae (unworkable. preflight}. The required purge
flow for the orbiter/ET umbilical varied significantly as a result of varying leakage
rates; thus the existing "fixed" purge supply approach was inadequate.
Modifications were necessary. A regulated supply concept was implemented at
both the test and launch site.
Liauid Nitroaen Formation (unworkable. preflight1. Liquid nitrogen exited the
intertank drains, and aft fuselage cameras determined the presence and sources
for liquid nitrogen in the aft fuselage. Improvements primarily to engine insulation
to prevent local liquid nitrogen generation and modifications to prevent liquid
nitrogen impacting sensitive hardware were made in the intertank and aft fuselage.
Freezina Hydraulic Warmant Flow (unworkable. orefliahtl. Testing revealed
that SSME MFV and CCV actuators could not be maintained within required
temperature limits to prevent freezing with warmant hydraulic flow. Heaters were
added to the MFV actuators and a warming purge was directed over the CCV
actuators. A number of special tests of extended time duration were required to
obtain appropriate data and validate the solution.
Steer Horn Failure (catastroohic. fliahtl. A flight configuration engine nozzle
line containing hydrogen failed at the steer horn---external engine line carrying
hydrogen to and from nozzle coolant tubes_udng hot firing. Extensive hydrogen
leakage resulted, and burning external to the vehicle occurred. The potential
cause of line failure was probably interaction between engines firing in a cluster
configuration. Steer horn redesign was required.
Liauid Oxvaen Pump Bearina Soallina /workable - mod. expected, fliahtl.
Liquid oxygen high pressure pump beadng-spalling was a problem during single
engine development testing. Engine liquid oxygen bleed valve cycling was a
successful "fix" for the bearing spalling problem. Bleed valve cycling was
demonstrated during propulsion system testing and incorporated into the launch
site countdown.
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MPS HARDWARE PROBLEMS BY TEST
The preceding section on accomplishments, while including some hardware
issues, emphasizes system issues. Hardware performance is also a primary
requirement to be verified. This section provides information on orbiter/ET and
engine hardware although the two are separated. Presented data on both
orbiter/ET and engine hardware, as well as the summary, Table 3-3, repeated from
the main body of the text (Table 13), demonstrates a lack of hardware maturity
during earlier testing. Without tests to uncover and help resolve the issues early in
the program, many of these failures/experiences will occur on flight vehicles.
Orbi_r/F:T Hardware Problems bv Test
This section provides a tabulation by test of some of the MPS hardware
problems experienced during the MPTA program. The tabulation is illustrative and
is not complete. Repeated problems from test to test are frequently listed only
once. The following guide will help to interpret the tabulated information.
Table Interpretation Guide
Pre SF-X and SF-X
• Selected Major Events
- 1_ Prefiring
• _ Test Events
• (x) = Firing Duration and y = Date
Stage propulsion hardware related - non engine
Non-stage propulsion hardware related - engine
Note: {1)
(2)
(3)
Most engine GSE items not included
Repetition between firings omitted in most cases
SF-X = Static Firing No. X
v
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Table 3-3. Hardware Replacement and Repair by Test for MPTA
Note: Hardware changes made prior to designated test number
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NDN0_I
Pre SF 1 and SF 1
• Prevalve closure rate slowed
• 17" 02 disconnect flapper removed
• Redesigned AFT heat shield for increased loads
• Engine 2 LH2 prevalve position indicator erroneous
• LO2 level sensor failed to indicate
• (1.5 sec) 04/21/78
Pre SF 2 and SF 2
• 02 vent orifice installed. Load under pressure. ET structural problem
Many HFA, LFA and acoustic measurement failures
LH2 tank diffuser failed
MFV 3 leak
ET/ORB attach fittings over-torqued
• (20 sec) 05/18/78
Pre SF 3 and SF 3
• Two auto sequence holds - LH2 recirculation valve failed to close
• Engine 1 02 prevalve position switch failed
• LH2 level sensor failed
• (42 sec) 06/15/78
v
Pre SF 4 and SF 4
ET wall corrosion (under insulation) - discovered post test during 9 months
down period
• (104 sec) 07/07/78
Pre SF 5A and SF 5A
• Installed liners in LO2 F&D disconnect
• Installed new 17" 02 disconnect
• Installed flight design feedline screens
• Changed torque on aft ET/orbiter fittings
• Installed remote mounted engine inlet pressure transducers
• Installed steel GH2 ET Diffuser
• 02 tank minimum pressure of 1.7 PSIG instituted
.... ...o...
- Main fuel valve leak
• LO2 and LH2 100 percent sensors 3 and 4 failed
• EIU intermittent problems
• Recirculation pump electrical and mechanical problems
• EIU problem. Two changeouts
• (1.5 sec) 05/04/79
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Pre SF 5 and SF 5
• LO2 ullage pressure offset 2 PSI
Full duration test aborted by faulty pump radial accelerometer
• Numerous EIU problems
• Various EIU and MDM problems
• (54 sec) 06/12/79
Note: (1) Test 6-01 ; 19 sec of planned duration on 07/02/79 - engine problems
resulting in major stage repairs
(2) Test 6-02; 0 sec of planned duration on 10/24/79 - Faulty H2 gas
controller within aft compartment
(3) Test 6-03; 10 sec of planned duration on 11/04/79 - engine steer horn
failure
Pre SF 6-04 and SF 6-04
• 02 engine cutoff sensors moved from orbiter to ET
Installed He tank vent line venturi
• Lost several temperature/pressure red line measurements
H2 concentration excessive in aft compartment
• EIU swap for trouble shooting
• (555 sec) 12/17/79
Pre SF 7-02 and SF 7-02
• Outboard LO2 fill-and-drain valve mechanism failure - changeout
• One LH2 prevalve changeout
• Six pressurization orifices enlarged
• Baffle added to both 100 percent LO2 sensors (liquid level)
Two step turbine discharge temperature redline incorporated for start
Changed LO2 bleed flow rate/temperature/time required
• Increased engine stagger time - reduce overpressure
• Faulty closed indicator on LO2 auxiliary drain valve
• LO2 ECO sensors responded slowly
• (555 sec) 02/28/80
Pre SF-8 and SF-8
• All GH2 pressurization orifices enlarged
• LO2 engine cutoff sensors indicated wet until after cutoff
• Several orbiter flight transducers failed
• (541 seconds) 03/20/80
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Pre SF 9-02 and SF 9-02
• Removed baffle from 100 percent LO2 sensor 2
• EIU replaced
• LH2 flight type ullage transducers installed
• 17" interconnect valve failed to seat
• (574 sec) 05130/80
Pre SF 10 and SF 10
• Position indicator switches on 17" disconnect replaced
• Capacitance probe installed for 02 engine cutoff
• One EIU replaced
• Minimum LH2 tank pressure requirement of 3 PSI during replenish
Engine fuel preburner burn through aborted test
• (106 sec) 07/12/80
Pre SF 11o02 and SF 11-02
• New design O2/H2 ullage pressure transducers
• Maintain 2 PSIG minimum in 02 tank for levels above 20 percent
• Repaired 17" LH2 disconnect valve
• LH2 auxiliary drain valve would not close after detanking
• (588 sec) 12/04/80
Pre SF 12
• (624 sec) 01/17/81
v
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t_ngine Hardware Problems bv Test
This section provides a tabulation by test of the engine (component) hardware
problems experienced during the MPTA program. The following guide will help to
interpret the tabulated information.
Table Interpretation Guide
Pre SF-X and SF-X
• Selected Major Events
• 1_ Prefiring
• _ Test Events
• (x) = Firing Duration and y = Date
Note: (1)
(2)
(3)
Most vehicle experiences not included
GSE experiences not included
SF-X = Static Firing No. X
Pre SF-2 and SF-2
• No gimballing
• Start to 70 percent thrust
• MFV leak alter fidng
• LO2 flow meter straighteners cracked
• (20 sec) 05/18/78
Pre SF-3 and SF-3
• Replaced leaking MFV
• No gimballing
• Start to 70 percent thrust. Maximum = 90 percent
• (104 sec) 07/07/78
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Pre SF-4 and SF-4
• No gimbaling
• Thrust limited to 90 percent
• Engine controller channel A electronics failed
• All 02 flow meters removed post test
• (104 sec) 07/07/78
Pre-SF-5A and SF-5A
• One engine changeout
• Several (each) H2 and 02 pump changeout - both high/low pressure
• Flight nozzles replace stub nozzles
• MOVs modified to prevent buzz problem
• No gimballing - LPOP ball strut galling
• MFV leak - burning vehicle base area
• Nozzle replaced - bad steer horn weld
• (1.5 sec) 05/04/79
Pre SF-5 and SF-5
• Changed turbopump feedline bolts
• Gimballing limited by LPOP strut galling
• Controller channel B, one engine required post firing replacement
• Pump accelerometer aborted test.
• POGO suppressor bubble collapsed
• (54 sec) 06/12[79
Pre SF-6-01 and SF-6-01
• Strain gages added to steer horn
• Controller failed before firing - test rescheduled
• MFV cracked - bad damage to vehicle and engine controller
• POGO accumulator, one engine, failed to charge
• One engine controller channel A failed
• Critical flow size (fracture mechanics) became issue
• High time components became issue
• (0 sec) 06/39/79, (19 sec) 07/02/79
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Pre SF-6-03 and SF-6-03
• Vehicle rebuilt after SF-6-01 problems
• Same engines as SF-6-01 but approximately 1/2 controllers, pumps, etc,
exchanged
• Engine turbine seal failed - test aborted
• Steer horn ruptured at shutdown
• (10 sec) 11/04/78
Pre SF-6-04 and SF-6-04
• Replaced one engine
• Stub nozzles replaced flight nozzles
• Replaced three turbopumps
• Seventy percent minimum operating thrust
• Liftoff seal for H2 pump failed to close
• (555 sec) 12/17/79
Pre SF-7-01 and SF-7-01
• 02 pump turbine discharge temperature spike - aborted test
• (5 sec) 02/01/80
Pre SF-7-02 and SF-7-02
• Turbine temperature redline changed - two step during start
• 02 engine bleed flow rate change
• H2 pump liftoff seal leaked
• Engine anomalous start up
• (555 sec) 02/28/80
Pre SF-8 and SF-8
• OPOV reset
• Seventy percent minimum operating thrust
• H2 pump seal broken
• Controller channel B failed
• (54 sec) 03/20/80
3-43
Pre SF-9-01 and SF-9-01
• H2 pump changeout - one engine
• Controller changeout- one engine
• H2 pump manifold collapsed - test aborted
• 02 pump secondary seal failed
• (6 sec) 04/18/80
Pre SF-9-02 and SF-9-02
• One fuel pump replaced
• All high pressure 02 pumps replaced - FMOF capability
• FASCOS added - one engine
• POGO accumulator rake removed
• Bifurcation heat exchanger inspected for faulty material
Controller channel B ddfted
Chamber pressure over-shot during transition to mainstage
02 heat exchanger interface temperature excessive
• (574 sec) 05/30/80
Pre SF-10 and SF-10
• Stub nozzles replaced with flight nozzle - all engines
• Fuel preburner burn-through
• All three engine controllers failed
• (106 sec) 07/12/80
v
Pre SF-11-01 and SF-11-01
• Replace two 02 turbopumps,
• Changed two H2 turbopumps
• Hole developed in engine nozzle
• (20 sec) 11/03/80
Pre SF-11-02 and SF-11-02
• Flight nozzles replaced with stub nozzles
(586 sec) 12/04/80
Pre SF-12 and SF-12
• (624 sec) 01/17/81
v
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APPENDIX 4
SATURN V S-IC MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM
The S-IC stage was the first stage/booster of the Saturn V vehicle (Figure 4-1 ).
Other stages were S-II, the second stage discussed in Appendix 5, and S-IVB, the
third stage discussed in Appendix 6.
The S-IC stage utilized the propellant combination of RP-1 fuel and liquid
oxygen in its five F-1 engines. The engines were arranged in a cluster with one
engine mounted in the center and the other four mounted outboard around the
center engine. Thrust vector control was accomplished by gimballing the four
outboard engines.Figures 4-2 through 4-6 support the stage and systems
description which follows.
Major components of the S-IC included the thrust structure, fuel tank, intertank,
liquid oxygen tank, and forward skirt. The thrust structure absorbed the punishment
of the five engines and redistributed the forces into uniform loading around the
base of the rocket. The thrust structure also provided support for the engines and
engine accessories and miscellaneous equipment. There were four holddown
posts to hold the vehicle in place prior to liftoff. Four fins mounted at the base of S-
IC provided necessary stability margins for the total Saturn V vehicle.
The propellant tanks included Special fill-and-drain hardware to fill the tanks at
high flow rates (2000 GPM for RP-1 fuel and 10,000 GPM for liquid oxygen). The
original design of the propellant system included a fuel bubbling system using
nitrogen to prevent temperature stratification of the fuel. During propulsion system
testing, this was determined to be unnecessary and was eliminated. Liquid oxygen
bubbling with helium to prevent geysering and stratification was continued
throughout the program.
Pressurization of the RP-1 fuel tank in flight was accomplished with helium
drawn from four elongated aluminum bottles mounted in the liquid oxygen tank.
The cold helium was heated by ducting it through heat exchangers on the F-1
engines. The liquid oxygen tank was pressurized with oxygen obtained by tapping
off liquid oxygen from the engine liquid oxygen domes and ducting it through heat
exchangers on the engines.
The hydraulic system used to gimbal the four outboard engines featured a
somewhat unconventional approach in that it used RP-1 fuel as the actuating fluid.
The RP-1 fuel was taken directly from the high-pressure fuel duct, routed to the
gimbal system, then returned to the engine fuel system. To compensate for the
shortcomings of RP-1 fuel as the fluid, special care was taken in the design of
valves.
Brief descriptions of some of the major subsystems of the S-IC stage are
contained in the following paragraphs:
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LiQuid Oxygen System (Figure 4-2)
• One tank - forward position.
• Five suction lines (one per engine) routed through fuel tank tunnels.
Liouid Oxygeq FILL
• Prevalves, vent valves and inter-connect valves 1, 3, and 4 in open
position.
• Open liquid oxygen fill-and-drain valves 1 and 2.
• Fill rate: ~10,000 gpm (~5,000 gpm per valve).
• Mass loaded controlled by liquid oxygen loading level sensor.
• Fill and drain valve 3 available for use, if required.
Liauid Oxygen ReDleni_h
• Required continuously until start of prepressurization.
• Replenishing controlled by liquid oxygen loading level sensor.
Normal Liauid Oxygen Drain
• Vent helium bottles and close vent valves.
• Pre-valves and interconnect valves 1, 3, and 4 in open position.
• Pressurize liquid oxygen tank (from ground)
• Open fill-and-drain valves 1 and 2, which allowed drainage of cylindrical
portion of tank.
• To drain lower bulkhead and partially drain suction lines, opened liquid
oxygen interconnect valve 2 and liquid oxygen fill-and-drain valve 3.
Emeraencv Liouid Oxvaen Drain
• S-IC had double-piston, pneumatically-actuated 17-inch emergency drain
valve installed for static-removed after static.
Prevalves
S-IC used normally-open, pneumatically-closed,
redundant closing provisions using ground supplied
and/or on-pad abort.
17-inch valves, with
nitrogen for static test
Liauid Oxvaen Conditioning
Geysering suppression by thermal pumping.
Suction lines interconnected to establish flow path.
Two separate thermal pumping systems isolated by interconnect valve
2.
Thermal pumping initiated during initial filling by injecting helium into
suction lines 1 and 3.
V
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- When any prevalve or interconnect valve (other than 3) was closed,
helium bubbling was required in all suction lines.
- Prevalves relieved at ~50 psig.
Pump inlet temperature controlled by thermal pumping. Initiated helium
bubbling in lines 1 and 3 at T-10 minutes and continued until start of liquid
oxygen pressurization. Interconnect valves closed immediately prior to
ignition.
Engine Cutoff Sensor
• Inboard: liquid level sensor
- Signal from sensor initiated time, expiration of which signaled IECO.
• Outboard: Four liquid level sensors - signals required from two of four to
initiate timer, expiration of which signaled OECO.
P-U Slosh Measuring
• Five continuous capacitance probes provided data for continuous profile
for determination of sloshing and consumption as function of flight time.
• No active P-U system in flight: "tailored tanking" used to insure
simultaneous depletion of propellants.
Liauid Oxvaen Pressurization System (Figgri_ 4-_)
Pre-lanition" Ground Suoolied Helium
• Closed vent and relief valves.
• Helium admitted through coupling and check valve to tank.
• Liquid oxygen prepressurization switch (actuated 26.0 psia, deactuated
24.2 psia, 501 and 502; 503 and subs actuated 26.5 psia, deactuated 24.2
psia) signaled ground valve to close.
• Liquid oxygen relief switch (actuated 29.0 psia, deactuated 27.5 psia, 501
and 502; 503 and Subs actuated 30.0 psia, deactuated 28.0 psia) signaled
liquid oxygen vent and relief valve to open.
• Helium supply remained connected until liftoff.
• Liquid oxygen tapped off liquid oxygen dome to engine heat exchanger.
Liquid oxygen transformed to gaseous oxygen and routed to common
manifold through gaseous oxygen flow control valve to tank.
• Gaseous oxygen flow control valve: Designed to maintain liquid oxygen
tank ullage pressure at 20.5 +/- 2.5 psia. Used liquid oxygen tank pressure
as reference.
• Modulated flow to tank between an optimized 30 - 50 #/sec, with maximum
flow capacity of 70 #/sec.
• Minimum flow through heat exchanger ensured by using mechanical stop
(adjustable) in gaseous oxygen flow control valve.
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• Liquid oxygen vent and relief valve controlled by either the liquid oxygen
relief switch or the liquid oxygen vent and relief switch (actuated 25.5 psig,
deactuated 23.7 psig, 501 and 502; 503 and subs actuated 25.0 psig,
deactuated 22.0 psig) between -T+65 sec and ~T+75 sec. After ~T+75
sec, the vent and relief switch assumed pdmary control of the vaJve.
• Vent and relief valve mechanically relieved at 24.0 - 25.5 psig.
Fuel System (Figure 4-4)
• One tank (aft position) RP-1 fuel
• Ten suction lines (two per engine)
• Prevalves and vent and relief valve(s) in open position
• Opened N.C fill-and-drain valve (6" diameter)
• Fill rate: ...2000 gpm
• Mass loaded controlled by liquid oxygen loading level sensor
• Temperature sensors (total of nine, three sets of three) in tank for density
determination
Normal Fuel Drain
• Opened vent-,_.nd-relief valve
• Opened fill-and-drain valve
• Drained by gravity or closed vent-and-relief valve(s)
• Pressurized tank
• Opened fill-and-drain valve
Emergency Fuel Drain
• S-IC had double-piston, pneumatically-actuated 12-inch diameter
emergency drain valve installed for static test-- removed after static test.
Prevalves
S-IC used normally-open, pneumatically-closed 12-inch valves, with
redundant closing provisions using ground supplied nitrogen for static
tests and/or on-pad abort.
Enaine Cutoff Sensor_
Engine cutoff normally initiated by liquid oxygen-orientated system.
Fuel-oriented back-up cutoff system provided (to guarantee fuel-rich
cutoff).
Fuel bi-level sensor with redundant sensing elements at both levels--
fuel passed upper level, inboard engine cutoff (IECO) initiated; fuel
passed lower level, timer initiated, expiration of which signaled
outboard engine cutoff (OECO).
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Cutoff circuitry for outboard and inboard completely separate. Each
system armed ~5 seconds prior to predicted IECO and OECO,
respectively.
Propellant Utilization (P-U) and Slosh Measurinn
• Five continuous capacitance probes provided data for continuous profile
for determination of sloshing and consumption as function of flight time.
• No active P-U system n flight; "tailored tanking" used to ensure
simultaneous depletion of propellants.
Thrust Chamber Fuel Jacket Prefill
• Thrust chamber jacket tubes and fuel manifold were filled with sodium
nitrate solution prior to engine start to aid in the prevention of rough
combustion.
• Solution supplied to vehicle manifold and routed to each engine fuel
manifold.
Fuel Pressurization System (Figure 4-5!
Pre-lanition: Ground Suoolied Helium
- v
• Closed vent and relief valve(s).
• Helium admitted through coupling and heat exchangers to common
manifold to tank.
• Fuel prepressurization switch (actuated 29.0 psia, deactuated 27.5 psia)
signaled ground valve to close.
• Helium supply connected until liftoff.
• All five pressurization valves remained closed until liftoff.
Flight: Chilled HeliumMHeat Exchanaer
• Four helium storage bottles in liquid oxygen tank.
Pressurized to 1500 psig prior to liquid oxygen loading.
Pressurized to -3150 psig after liquid oxygen loading; hi pressure OK
pressure switch (actuated 3150 psia +/- 40 psia, deactuated 3010 psia
minimum) interlocked in firing command circuitry. Helium temperature -
283"F maximum.
N.C. emergency dump valve provided for rapid evacuation of bottles, if
required.
• Five pressurization valves: one N. O. and four N.C.
Four programmed
One operated off pressurization switch (actuated 26.0 psia, deactuated
24.2).
• One N.C vent-and-relief valve operated off vent switch (actuated 31.5 psia,
deactuated 29.7 psia). Valve mechanically relieved at 30.5 - 35.0 psia.
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I=-1 Engine (Figure 4-_1. The general features of the F-1 engine were:
• Single start
• Fixed thrust: 1,500,000 pounds at sea level
• Propellants: liquid oxygen and RP-1 fuel
• Engine mixture ratio: 2.2:1
• Lubricant: RP-1 fuel
• Control fluid: RJ-1 for standby and start, RP-1 fuel for operation
Engine Start Seouence
• The ignition sequencer controlled start of all five engines.
• Checkout valve moved to engine return position
• Electrical signal fired igniters (four each engine)
- Gas generator combustor and turbine exhaust igniters burned igniter
links to trigger electrical signal to start solenoid of four-way control
valve.
- Igniters burned approximately six seconds.
• Start solenoid of four-way control valve directed GSE hydraulic pressure to
main oxidizer valves
• Main oxidizer valves allowed liquid oxygen to flow to thrust chamber and
GSE hydraulic pressure to flow through sequencer valve to open gas
generator ball valve.
• Propellants, under tank pressure, flowed into gas generator combustor.
• Propellants were ignited by flame of igniters:
• Combustion gas passed through turbopump, heat exchanger, exhaust
manifold and nozzle extension.
• Fuel rich turbine combustion gas was ignited by flame from igniters.
- Ignition of this gas prevented backfiring and burping.
- This relatively cool gas (approximately 550" C) was the coolant for the
nozzle extension.
• Combustion gas acceleratedthe turbopump, causing the pump discharge
pressure to increase.
• As fuel pressure increased to approximately 26,400 grams per square
centimeter(375 psig),itrupturedthe hypergolcartridge.
• The hypergolicfluidand fuelwere fomed intothe thrustchamber where
they mixed withthe liquidoxygen to cause ignition.
Transition to Mainstaae
• Ignition caused the combustion zone pressure to increase.
• As pressure reached 1,400 grams per square centimeter (20 psig), the
ignition monitor valve directed fluid pressure to the main fuel valves.
• Fluid pressure opened main fuel valve.
• Fuel entered thrust chamber. As pressure increased, the transition to
mainstage was accomplished.
• The thrust OK pressure switch (which sensed fuel injection pressure)
picked up at approximately 74,500 grams per square centimeter (1060 psi)
and provided a THRUST OK signal to the IU.
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Enaine Cutoff Seauence
• Cutoff initiated by electrical signal which energized the Stop Solenoid (part
of the four-way solenoid valve).
• Actuation of Stop Solenoid closed the pressurization port, venting
entrapped fluid and directing closing pressure to the GG valves, MOVs and
MFVso
• MOVs closed before MFVs to provide fuel-rich cutoff.
Engine Gimbal Svst@m
• Incorporated on outboard engines.
• The gimbal system positioned the outboard engines by gimballing the
entire engine with two servo valve and actuator assemblies, which used
high pressure fluid (RJ-1 from GSE during standby and start, RP-1 fuel
from fuel pump outlet during engine operation) as the actuating medium.
• First gimbal system to use engine fluid at engine turbopump pressure to
gimbal engine for stage thrust vector control.
• Operational pressure: 1800 - 2200 psi
• Rated flow at rated load: 120 gpm
• Rated load: 72,000 pounds
• Rated velocity: 5 deg/sec minimum
• Engine gimbal angle: +/- 5 deg
S-IC PROPULSION SYSTEM TEST OBJECTIVES
The major objective of the S-IC propulsion system test program was the
establishment of the feasibility of making a major step upward in thrust from 1.5
million pounds for S-IB to 7.5 million pounds thrust for S-IC.
Additional objectives were:
• Establish functional compatibility between the ground support equipment and
the stage systems
• Establish adequacy of operating procedures
• Evaluate performance of the thrust vector control system
• Evaluate fuel and oxidizer feed systems performance
• Evaluate fuel and oxidizer onboard pressurization systems
• Evaluate propellant loading systems and procedures
• Evaluate liquid oxygen geyser prevention system and procedures
• Evaluate performance of flight instrumentation and telemetry system
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• Evaluate structural capability of the stage
• Evaluate optimum engine start-up sequence
• Verify F-1 engine performance in a clustered configuration
A total of 15 development static firings were required to satisfy these
objectives of which three were full duration.
S-IC TEST ACCOMPLISHMENTS
Following is a listing of accomplishments achieved by the S-IC propulsion
system test program. Each issue has been classified as to consequence and time
phasing for which the issue may apply as was done in Appendix 3 for Space
Shuttle.
Hydraulic Suoolv Une Failure fcatastroohic, flight). The S-IC stage was the
first to use RP-1 fuel-as the hydraulic fluid in the stage hydraulic system. During
static test S-IC-13 on the all systems test stage, the flight supply line from the fuel
high pressure duct to the gimbal filter manifold on engine position 2 failed
structurally and leaked. This presented a fire hazard, as well as the possibility of
impairing the performance of the stage "I'VC system. A redesign of the supply line
was made to prevent a recurrence of this problem.
Inadeauate Liauid Oxvoen Pumo Seal Puroe SuDoly (catastroDhic. flight).
The F-1 engine liquid oxygen pump seal formed-a barrier which prevented liquid
oxygen from the liquid oxygen pump and the RP-1 from the fuel pump from coming
in contact with each other. The cavity in which the seal was located was purged
with nitrogen during operation to carry any seal leakage overboard. Mixing of the
liquid oxygen and RP-1 would create a hazardous situation. The original S-IC
design incorporated only one 1.27 cubic foot storage sphere of nitrogen. During
the propulsion system test program, it was determined that this volume was
inadequate for the planned S-IC flight duration. A redesign added two additional
storage spheres for nitrogen.
Loose Helium Bottle Retainer Nuts in Liouid Oxvoen Tank (catastroohic.
_. The S-IC stage used helium to pressurize the li¢]uid oxygen tank during
flight. As a weight saving measure, the helium storage bottles were located inside
the liquid oxygen tank. Results from the propulsion system test program revealed
that the retainer nuts holding the storage bottles in place were becoming loosened
during propulsion system operation. A redesign was made to fasten the nuts more
securely.
F_ilure of Engine Mount Bolts (catastrophic. flioht!. During a post-test
inspection following a propulsion system static fidng, it was determined that three 1
3/8 inch bolts which attached the center engine to the stage thrust structure had
failed. Investigation found that the bolt material was not suitable for use in these
mount bolts. A redesign changing material for the bolts was made.
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Terminal Countdown Seauencer Deficiency (unworkable. orefliaht_. The
terminal countdown sequencer (TCDS) was cliscovered to have a design
deficiency which caused it to output all its commands at one time should a
malfunction or loss of power supply occur. Since this occurrence might cause a
catastrophic failure, the TCDS was modified for future use.
Deletion of Fuel Bubblina System (imnrovement. orefliahtL The original
design of the S-IC stage incorporated a fuel bubbling system to prevent
temperature stratification in the fuel tank. Data obtained during the propulsion
system test program proved that temperature stratification in the fuel tank was not a
problem and that fuel bubbling was not necessary. Fuel bubbling was deleted from
the flight stages resulting in simplification of procedures and hardware and weight
reduction.
Liauid Oxygen Pump Seal Puree Orifice Removal (improvement. flight1. The
initial S-IC design incorporated stage mounted orifices in the liquid oxygen pump
seal purge supply lines. Data from the propulsion system tests showed that the
orifices were unnecessarily restricting the purge flow rate below the specification
requirement. Removing the orifices resulted in the required flow rate being
obtained and simplified the stage design.
Liauid Oxvoen Low Level Cutoff System Calibration (workable. fliahtl. For
flight stages which use liquid oxygen for an oxidizer, a low level liquid oxygen
cutoff system is necessary to obviate the possibility of a liquid oxygen rich cutoff
occurring with possible catastrophic results. During the S-IC propulsion system
test program, liquid oxygen low level cutoff sensors were installed. These sensors
were monitored during tests in order to gather data on their operation for the
purpose of properly calibrating them for flight stage use.
Erroneous "Dry" Sionals From Liauid Oxvaen Denletion Sensors
(unworkable. fliohtl. During-the S-IC propulsion system-test program, it was found
that bubbles in the liquid oxygen engine feedlines could dse past the liquid oxygen
low level cutoff sensors giving an erroneous "dry" signal which could trigger engine
cutoff. This required that provisions be made for a propellant system reset
command to be initiated from the stage switch selector. This was necessary to
prevent launch delays because of erroneous cutoffs during launch countdown.
Ice and Frost Formation on Enaine Iniector Faces (unworkable. Dreflight_.
Pretest checkout for tests in the S-IC propulsion system test program revealed that
ice and frost were being formed on the injector face of the F-1 engines. Ice and
frost on the injectors could be deleterious by plugging holes in the injector and
affecting the engine mixture ratio. Investigation revealed that the following three
conditions were required for injector frosting to occur:
• Liquid oxygen admitted to the engine for sufficient time to "cold soak" the liquid
oxygen dome and injector
• Thrust chamber prefilled
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• Liquidoxygen dome servicepurge in use
Based on these findings, two procedure adjustments were made:
• The thrustchamber prefilloperation was accomplished priorto liquidoxygen
tanking.
• Use of the liquid oxygen dome service purge was minimized when liquid
oxygen was on board.
Thrust Chamber Inert Pre-Fill GSE Malfunction funworkable, oreflight!. As a
means to reduce the likelihood of rough combustion in the F-1 engine, the thrust
chamber tubes were pre-filled with an inert liquid which acted as a fuel lead in the
combustion chamber and cushioned the engine against a hard start. The original
design of the GSE which was to be used for the pre-filling operation incorporated
full sensors which were to terminate the filling operation automatically when the
proper level was reached. Experience with the equipment during the test program
showed that the automatic fill feature did not function properly because solution
sloshing during flow activated the full sensors prematurely. Based on this
experience, the automatic filling control circuits were deleted.
Erroneous Ioniter Failure Cutoffs (unworkable. fliaht_. The F-1 engine used
igniters in the ignition sequence to initiate combustion in the gas generator and the
turbine exhaust gas. Burning of the igniters was monitored by electrically recording
when a link broke during the burning phase of the igniters. Originally, the igniter
link break was incorporated in the engine start sequence and automatic cutoff was
received if the links did not break in a timely manner. Test experience showed that
the igniter lips did not always exhibit a clean break when burned and could cause
an erroneous igniter failure cutoff. Circuit changes were made to remove igniter
link break from the automatic cutoff circuit to prevent erroneous cutoffs.
Distorted Gimballina Drive Sionals (unworkable. fliahtL Data obtained during
the S-IC TVC system gimballing_ tests showed that the TVC servo amplifiers
provided noisy, distorted drive signals, causing erratic positioning of the engines.
A new gimbal actuator signal amplifier circuit was incorporated in the operational
amplifier.
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APPENDIX 5
SATURN V S-II MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM
The S-II stage, the second stage of the Saturn V launch vehicle, was a
cylindrical booster 81.5 feet tall and 33 feet in diameter. It was powered by five
liquid propellant J-2 rocket engines which developed a nominal vacuum thrust of
200,000 pounds each and were ignited at altitude approximately 2 1/2 minutes
after liftoff. Four J-2 engines were equally spaced on a 17.5 foot diameter circle
and were mounted on gimbal bearings to provide thrust vector control while the fifth
engine was mounted on the stage centerline and was fixed. A cut away drawing is
shown in Figure 5-1.
The S-II stage propulsion system consisted of the propellant tanks, (included
in the airframe structure), propellant systems, pressurization systems, and J-2
engines.
The propellant tanks included the liquid hydrogen tank and the liquid oxygen
tank. The tanks provided structural support between the forward and aft skirts.
The liquid oxygen tank (Figure 5-2) consisted of ellipsoidal fore and aft
bulkheads with waffle-stiffened gore segments. The tank was fitted with three ring-
type slosh baffles to control propellant sloshing and minimize surface disturbances,
and cruciform baffles to prevent the generation of vortices at the tank outlet ducts.
A six port sump assembly located at the lowest point of the tank provided a fill-and-
drain opening and openings for the five engine feedlines.
The liquid hydrogen tank (Figure 5-3) consisted of a long cylinder with a
concave modified ellipsoidal bulkhead forward and a convex modified ellipsoidal
bulkhead aft. The aft bulkhead was common to the liquid oxygen tank.
All exposed surfaces of the liquid hydrogen tank were covered with foam
insulation to prevent air liquification and reduce temperature rise during cryogenic
operation.
prgoellant Systems
The propellant systems consisted of the fill, feed, recirculation, and propellant
management systems.
The liquid hydrogen fill-and-drain system consisted of the fill valve and the
airborne part of the fill disconnect coupling, while the liquid oxygen fill-and-drain
system included the fill valve mounted to the liquid oxygen pump interface, 16 feet
of 8-inch line with a pressure-compensating bellows, one free bellows and two
universal bellows ball-joints to provide movement, and the airborne part of the fill
disconnect coupling.
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Propellant conditioning was required to cool the vehicle feedlines and the
engines and ensure required propellant temperatures were available to the
engines prior to and at ignition. This was necessary to ensure acceptable engine
start.
Liquid oxygen conditioning was accomplished by recirculating liquid oxygen
from the tank through feed ducts and the prevalves to the engine turbopump, into
the return lines and back into the liquid oxygen tank. Liquid oxygen flow was
initiated after start of liquid oxygen fill and continued until T-30 minutes. Pumps
were not used to recirculate flow as is often the casemflow was dependent on
thermally-inducted flow. At that time, helium was injected into the liquid oxygen
recirculation return line to boost recirculation and was continued until just before S-
II ignition.
Liquid hydrogen recirculation was initiated at T-30 minutes and was
terminated immediately prior to S-II ignition. Forced recirculation during launch
consisted of closing the liquid hydrogen prevalves and operating the liquid
hydrogen recirculation pumps.
The liquid oxygen feed system (Figure 5-2) supplied liquid oxygen to the five
engines. The system included four 8-inch vacuum jacketed feed ducts, one 8-inch
uninsulated feed duct, and five normally open prevalves. At approximately 300
milliseconds after the main valves closed, the liquid oxygen prevalves were closed.
This provided a redundant shutoff for the liquid oxygen feed system.
The liquid hydrogen feed system (Figure 5-3) supplied liquid hydrogen to the
five engines. The system included five 8-inch vacuum jacketed feed ducts and five
normally open prevalves. The prevalves were closed following tank loading,
recirculation system operation was initiated and continued until 2.2 seconds before
S-II engine start at which time prevalves were opened and engines started.
Approximately 425 milliseconds after the engine main valves closed, the liquid
hydrogen prevalves were closed. This provided a redundant shutoff for the liquid
hydrogen feed system.
T_nk Pressurization
After completion of propellant loading and shortly before launch, the oxygen
propellant tank was pressurized to the required level by helium from separate
ground supplies. Liquid oxygen tank pressurization (Figure 5-4) from vehicle
sources was initiated at S-II ignition and continued until engine cutoff.
Pressurization was accomplished by using gaseous oxygen obtained by diverting
a portion of the liquid oxygen supplied to the engine into the heat exchanger. The
exiting gaseous oxygen flowed into a common pressurization duct through the tank
pressurization regulator, and into the tank through the gas distributor. The
pressurant flow rate was varied according to tank ullage pressure which was
sensed by the reference pressure line from the tank.
The liquid hydrogen tank was initially pressurized with ground-supplied
helium immediately prior tO liftoff, as was done for oxygen. Liquid hydrogen tank
5-3
OVERFI LL
CUTOFF SENSOR
FAST FILL
CUTOFF SE]_ISOR
CONTINUOUS
CAPACITANCE
PROBE LOX T/_IK
CUTOFF
SENSOR (5)
- !
VALVEIS),L- r_No
TPRE-VALVE(5)
TO
l ENGINE
I_IGINE
FILL &
DRAIN V
FIGURES-2. S-II STAGE LOX SYSTEM
R-ENG 0055.01
5-4
OVERF I LL
CUTOFF SENSOR
FAST F I LL
CUTOFF
CONTI NUOLIS
TANCE
RETURN
VALVE
\
_NO LOX TANK
PRE-VAL_ (51
f
TO
ENGINE
ENGI NE CUTOFF
SENSOR (5)
FILL &
DRAIN
FIGURES-3. S-II STAGE FUEL SYSTEM
5-5
R-ENC 0056.01
PR_-
PR_55_I_TI'_
PRESSURE
SI/I TC}.I
YE
I ,I I HEAT
1
VENT &
,/RELIEF
FIGURES-4.S-II STAGE LOX PRESSURIZATIONSYSTEM
5-6
R-ENG 0057.01
pressurization (Figure 5-5) from vehicle sources was initiated _fter engine ignition.
Hydrogen was bled from the thrust chamber hydrogen injector manifold of each of
the four outboard engines. The hydrogen from each injector manifold flowed into a
stage manifold, through the pressurization line and tank pressurization regulator
(orifice for later vehicles), and into the liquid hydrogen tank ullage space via the
gas distributor. The flow rate was varied according to the liquid hydrogen tank
ullage pressure which was sensed by the reference pressure line from the tank.
J-2 Engine
The J-2 rocket engine (Figure 5-6) utilized the propellant combination of liquid
oxygen and liquid hydrogen propellants and provided a nominal thrust of 200,000
pounds. The basic engine envelope was 116 inches long with a diameter of 80
inches. Dry weight was 3,500 pounds. Each engine incorporated self contained
provisions for propulsion, control, and initial starting energy.
Primary engine propulsion components consisted of an axial flow liquid
hydrogen pump, a centrifugal liquid oxygen pump, a single gas generator
combustor, a tubular wall hydrogen cooled thrust chamber, a concentric orifice
sweat-cooled injection plate, and a tubular wall hydrogen-cooled nozzle..
The two independently operated turbopumps were driven in series by the
exhaust of the gas generator combustor and provided high pressure propellants to
the thrust chamber/injector assembly. The gas generator was powered by
propellants tapped off downstream of the turbopumps.
Each engine provided gas for pressurization of the stage propellant tanks.
Hydrogen was tapped off downstream of the thrust chamber cooling jacket, liquid
oxygen was provided by a heat exchanger mounted in the gas generator exhaust.
The S-II engine start sequence was as follows:
• Start command (occurred at T3 +1.4) engine ready.
Augmented spark igniter (ASI) spark plugs and gas generator (GG) spark plugs
fired.
• Bleed valves stopped return flow to propellant tanks.
• Oxidizer dome and gas generator oxidizer injector were purged.
Main fuel valve allowed liquid hydrogen to flow into engine thrust chamber and
into ASI.
• ASI oxidizer valve allowed liquid oxygen to flow to ASI.
• Sparks ignited the propellants in the ASI.
• Stage supplied mainstage enable signal.
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Start tank clischarged hydrogen causing the liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen
turbopL:mps turbines to buildup propellant pressure.
Liquid oxygen turbopump bypass valve opened to control liquid oxygen pump
speed.
Main oxidizer valve opened allowing liquid oxygen to be injected into thrust
cnam_er
GG valves admitted propellants. (Spark ignited propellants causing pressure
buildup.)
MAINSTAGE
• OK pressure switches sent maJnstage OK signalto CM.
• Engine out lights went out.
• Engine reached and maintained g0 percent thrust or more.
PU valve controlled mass ratio by returning liquid oxygen from pump discharge
to pump inlet.
Propellant combustion was initiated within a cavity called the augmented
spark igniter (ASI) which was located in the body of the main injector plate. Ignition
was provided by spark plugs. Tank heed provided propellant supply pressure, An
engine mounted start tank precharged with hydrogen gas provided starting power
for the turbopumps.
A self contained pneumatic system was used to actuJe all engine valves.
The system was comlxtsedof a 1000 cubic inch storage bottle, regulator package,
and low pressure aocu_r. An electrk_ control _mbly provided control of
valve seo_encing during _I/¢utoff, si=uk plug exctt_on and intemai emergency
detection. The mixture retio control valve provided control of combustion mixture
ratio as well as thrust control. The valve was mounted on the liquid oxygen pump
ancl was pneumsticsBy _uated by an engine mounted stage controlled solenoid.
The valve rectrculsted Ikluid oxygen from the pump outlet manifold back through
the inlet.
The four outboard engines were gimbai mounted to allow thrust vector control.
A hydraulic pump mounted in the liquid oxygen turbopumps shafts provided
hydraulic power for the stage engine actuation system.
S-II PROPULSION SYSTEM TEST OBJECTIVES
Verification of the S-II configuration required extensive testing that included
separate system and component tests. The assemblies for propulsion system
testing included the Battleship stage at the Santa Susana Field Laboratories and
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the All Systems Test Stage (S-It-T) at the Mississippi Test Facility. Ac_ditionaJ;es;
articles used in the S-II program are listed below.
The S-II-S configuration was a structurally complete stage used to certify the
integrity of the entire airframe under simulated critical loads and pressure
differentials.
The S-II-F/D configuration was used at KSC to verify its compatibility with
other launch vehicle stages, ground support equipment, the launch pad, and other
supporting facilities of launch complex 39. At MSFC the vehicle was used in the
Saturn V dynamic testing to determine the dynamic characteristics of the launcl_
vehicle.
A listing of Battleship and S-II-T test objectives follows. Fifteen Battleship and
seven S-II-T fidngs before the first flight were required to satisfy these objectives,
although total fidng attempts for the total program were sixty-three with twenty-eight
successful completions.
• Verify the capability of the stage to accept and deliver cryogenic propellants
• Evaluate performance of the integrated GSE and stage systems
• Verify thermal and struciural adequacy of the stage insulation
• Verify acceptable operation of the liquid oxygen anti-geyser system
• Verify operation of the liquid hydrogen and oxygen recirculation systems
• Verify operation of the propellant utilization system for automatic replenishing
and control of the engine mixture ratio
• Evaluate performance of the thrust vector control system
• Evaluate flight instrumentation and telemetry system
• Evaluate and calibrate the liquid oxygen depletion cutoff system
• Evaluate the performance of J-2 engines in the clustered configuration
• Determine structural capability of stage systems
• Evaluate the performance of the stage flight propellant pressurization systems
S-II TEST ACCOMPLISHMENTS
A summary of significant accomplishments experienced during S-II stage
propulsion system testing is presented in the following paragraphs. Again each
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issue has t3een classified as to consequence and time phasing for which the issue
may apply as was done previously in Appendix 3 for Space Shuttle.
Actuator Abnormal Motion (unworkable. orefliaht/flioht). For four to five
seconds after "slam" release during S-II-3 static firing, the Engine 3 yaw actuator
exhibited abnormal piston position output. The cause was attributed to noise
induced on the actuator command by an improper instrumentation circuit. The
command current measuring resistor was incorrectly installed. The resistor was
relocated and the problem did not recur.
Faulty Solder Joint/Seals (unworkable. oreflioht/flioht I. Numerous pressure
switch failures were attributed to defective (porous) solder seals. Although a
number of corrective actions were taken to eliminate the problem, it was concluded
that the solder joint seal was not acceptable for sealing vacuum cavities. Welded
cavity seals were implemented and acceptability confirmed in propulsion system
testing.
Fill-and-Drain Valve and Recimulation Valve Position Indicator Anomalies
(unworkable. orefliahtL Dudng checkout of the liquid oxygen fill-and-drain valve on
S-II-6 at MTF, the =OPEN" indication was not received and could not be corrected
by subsequent trouble-shooting adjustment. The same type of problem had been
experienced on the recimulation valves and early prevalvas which incorporated a
similar magnetically actuated position indication device. The failure of the closed
or open indication to pick up when the valve was actuated was attributed to an
apparent shift in the indicator dead band between ambient calibration and usage at
cryogenic testing, and by tolerance on the initial switch setting. The pnmary
concern was that malfunctions of the position indicators on the fill valves would
cause propellant loading reverts, holds, and/or scrubs dudng static firing or launch
countdowns due to intedocks. SCD's were revised, quality control procedures
were improved, and electrical intedock requirements were deleted/revised. These
actions were proper and adequate, although not necessarily comprehensive in that
an effective complete redesign was not feasible and probably not possible
because of the time required for an effective solution to the problem.
Vent Valve Poslt_n Indir._tor Anomalies (unworkable. oreflioht_. Numerous
vent valve position indication anomalies occurred throughout the S-If program on
flight stages, test stages, qualification testing, and acceptance testing. The
anomalous condltlons consisted of dual indications ('open" and "closed"
indications both received), erratic indicators, slow or no response, and chatter. The
problem was attributed to freezing of air or nitrogen within the switch causing
binding of the actuatlon mechanism. Fixes were made; however, anomalies
continued to occur.
Ljauid Oxvoen Vent Valve Low Reseat {unworkable. orefliahtl. During
prestatic firing Jests on the S-Ii-1 stage, a liquid oxygen tank vent valve failed to
reseat within the specified pressure range. This was found to be caused by
pressure osdllations in the vent valve portion of the pressure-sensing system. The
oscillations were eliminated by adding a double-odflced plenum chamber to the
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._s,,_e sress,.,re sensing system external to the valve ma=n housing. No, f,_.'-:_e,
problems were encountered.
Liau_a Oxygen Tank Mast Percolation (unworkable. fliaht). During S-II-4 static
firing at MTF, percolation of liquid oxygen tank mast caused a premature shutdown.
Investigation revealed that presence of liquid in the annular section of the liquid
oxygen tank pressurization mast caused an erroneous ullage pressure indication
which ultimately led to termination of the firing. Resolution included hardware and
ooerational changes to prevent the entrance of liquid into the mast annular section
ancl to obtain accurate ullage pressure measurements.
Liauid Oxygen Fill and Drain Line Cracked Bellows (unworkable, flight!. Post
firing inspection of S-II-2 at MTF detected a cracked pressure carrier bellows in the
' _t ball joint of the liquid oxygen fill-and-drain line inboard of the GSE disconnect.
Fadure was attributed to flow induced vibration of the single ply bellows
convolution. Redesign of the line assembly included addition of flow liners to all
bellows and three ply bellows replaced all single ply bellows. There were no
further problems with flow induced vibration in bellows on the S-II program.
AS-502 (S-II-2_ Fliaht Anomaly (unworkable. fliahtL During the Apollo 6 (AS-
502) mission, the S-11-2 stage experienced premature shutdown of two adjacent
outboard engines (Engines 2 and 3). Post flight investigation attributed the cause
of Engine 2 failure to breakage of the fuel line to the augmented spark igniter (ASI);
Shutdown of Engine 3 was caused by closure of its liquid oxygen prevalve by the
Engine 2 cutoff signal. The most probable cause for this anomaly was the cross-
connection of the electrical connectors to the solenoids of liquid oxygen prevalve 2
and liquid oxygen prevalve 3.
Changes included redesign of both the fuel and oxidizer lines to the ASI
assembly, revision of the engine checkout program at KSC to include individual
prevalve checks, inspection of electrical wire harnesses on subsequent stages to
uncover any incorrect or unclear electrical reference designators (ERD),
reassignment of ERD as necessary to prevent misconnections, and installation of
additional instrumentation to check the redesigned ASI lines.
The J-2 fuel and oxidizer ASI line modifications were extensively tested in
cluster fidng8 on the Battloehip. Over 1000 seconds of Battleship testing was
conducted with the ASl line modifications installed on three engines.
The new ASI lines were subsequently installed on S-II-3 through S-I1-15. The
engine performance of these stages verified the adequacy of the ASI line design
change.
Ljauid Oxvaen Sumn Baffles limnrovement, fliaht_. During sump screen
replacements 0r_ the S-II-5, it was discovered that one Liquid oxygen anti-vortex
sump baffle had a tab sheared off. Similarly, two baffles in S-II-3 and one baffle on
the Battleship were found to have cracked tabs, The condition was attributed to
high-cycle, low-stress fatigue.
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Ba_,,es,,,p tests successfully demonstrated that the sump ioaffles coui¢ oe
removed witr_outimpairing liquid oxygen drawdown. The go-ahead was given for
removal of the sump baffles from flight stages S-II-3 and subsequent.
Liauid Oxyaen Recircutation System (unworkable. orefliqhti. The Battleship
boattail environment tests conducted at Santa Susana established the liquid
oxygen recirculation system design and procedure to be used on all S-II flight
stages. Accomplishments included design and installation of an in-flight liquid
oxygen helium injection system and stage and engine insulation.
Liauid Oxygen Tank Vent Valve (unworkable. orefliohtl. Liquid oxy=en tank
vent valve instability during venting and reseating operations were investigated on
the Battleship stage. Modifications were made that proved to be stable. The
modified liquid oxygen tank vent valves were acceptable for the flight S-II stage.
Deoletion Sensors and ECO Time Delay Performance (workable, mod.
exoected, fliaht). The maximum safe liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen depletion
cutoff time delays for use on flight vehicles were obtained.
Vibration Study /unworkable. flioht_. Comparisons were made between
single-engine and Cluster-engine vibration environments during firings on the
Battleship stage to investigate repeated engine tube and component failure during
Battleship testing.
gontrol Line Mcxlifications /unworkable. flioht_. A series of Battleship firings
was conducted to evaluate structural integrity of flight configuration modifications
made to the main fuel valve, OTBV control lines, and the ASI liquid oxygen lines on
all five Battleship engines. No hardware problems were noted with these changes.
Liouid Oxvaen/l__uid Hvdroaen Vent Valves/unworkahle. orefliahtL During a
12-hour hold test on the Ba,ffiasllip, liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen vent valve
microswitches malfunctioned repeatedly under cryogenic conditions. Although the
valves opened/closed as required, the open/closed indicators in these valves
failed.
Twelve-Hour Hcdd Environment Freeze Test/workable. oreflioht_. A 12-hour
hold test was conducted, simulating the KSC environment and using flight-type
components. Analysis indicated that the propulsion system and components were
capable of withsta_ng a 12-hour hold.
Liauid Oxvaen Pmvidve Relief Valve (unworkable. orefliaht/fliahtl. During
liquid oxygen tanking in support of liquid oxygen recirculation test ST-3, a piece of
the liquid oxygen prevalve relief valve housing sheered off on Engine 5 liquid
oxygen prevalve. InvestigatiOn revealed this was caused by contraction of the
liquid oxygen tank during chilldown, pulling the liquid oxygen feed duct assembly
into the cruciform. The relief valve was deleted from Engine 5 liquid oxygen
prevalve,
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L,Qu_C Hvctroaen Tank Ruoture tcatastroohic, orefliaht/fliaht). The S-II-T :est
stage was ctestroyed on May 28, 1966, when the liquid hydrogen tank rupturecl
during pressurization with helium. Failure resulted from propagation of a small
fracture on a raised boss in cylinder 2 at a pressure below design ultimate.
Liauid Hydroaen/Liauid Oxvaen Vent Valve Failures lunworkable.
_. During the S-II-T test-program, vent valve failures were numerous,
although temporary in nature. The most common malfunction was the need for a
long warmup period to open the cold-soaked vent valve after holding an override
closed position. New design valves were provided for the flight stages.
RE and Measurement Systems _unworkable. oreflight/fliaht/. Noise and
random signals were noted in flowmeter and tachometer measurements. A new
configuration plug-in module for flow and tachometer measurements were tested
on the Battleship stage and produced acceptable flow/tachometer data.
ASI Uauid Oxvaen Su0oly Line Fatiaue (catastroohic. oreflight/flia_htl. A full
duration firing on S-II-T was terminated 196 seconds after reaching mainstage.
Engine 5 ASI liquid oxygen supply line ruptured causing a fire in the Engine 5
area, which burned the mainstage OK pressure switch cable, causing the
automatic engine cutoff.
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APPENDIX 6
SATURN V/SATURN IB S-IVB MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM
The S-IVB stage was the third stage of Saturn V and the second stage of
Saturn IB (Figures 6-1 and 6-2). While the basic stage design for the two missions
was the same, several design and operational features differed. The Saturn S-IVB
stage with its single J-2 engine represented a unique "slice" of history for tiquicI
cryogenic propulsion systems. Advanced technology was required for the
development of such significant areas as engine start/re-start; propellant
conditioning, containerization, pressurization, propellant slosh and utilization;
thermal conditioning; engine shutdown; vacuum propellant dump; control systems
and aborts. The "unknowns and leading-edge" technologies required were many
for new stages using new J-2 engines (Figure 6-3) of 200,000 pounds thrust
(vacuum)--which were later uprated to 230,000 pounds thrust.
The S-IVB stage consisted of an aft interstage, an aft skirt, a thrust structure, a
single gimbailed J-2 engine, a divided propellant container, and a forward skirt.
The S-IVB/V and S-IVB/IB were similar. However, S-IVBN translunar excursion
mission configuration demanded a heavier payload and required engine restart
capability, which necessitated certain structural and system changes. One major
structural change was the much larger diameter aft skirt.
Thrust Structure. The thrust structure was an inverted truncated cone attached
at its large end to the aft dome of liquid oxygen tank and attached at its small end to
the engine mount. The aft dome of the liquid oxygen tank was the lower portion of
the propellant container (liquid oxygen and hydrogen tank assembly). The thrust
structure provided the attach point for the center line mounted J-2 engine and
distributed the engine thrust over the entire tank circumference. Attached external
to the thrust structure were the engine piping, wiring, interface panels, eight high
pressure helium spheres, hydraulic system, and certain engine and liquid oxygen
tank instrumentation.
proogllant Container. The divided propellant container (Figure 6-4) was an
internally insulated cylinder with hemispherical bulkheads at each end and a
common bulkhead to separate the lower tank of liquid oxygen from the liquid
hydrogen tank above. This 21.7 foot diameter common bulkhead was a sandwich
type construction consisting of two parallel, hemispherical shaped, aluminum alloy
(2104-1"6 A1) domes bonded to a fiberglass phenolic honeycomb core (1 3/4").
The internal surface of the liquid hydrogen tank was a milled waffle pattern for tank
stiffness and minimum structural weight. To minimize liquid hydrogen boiloff,
polyurethane insulation blocks, covered with a fiberglass sheet and coated with a
sealant, were bonded into the milled areas of the waffle patterns in the liquid
hydrogen tank. The liquid hydrogen tank volume was 10,418 cubic feet and the
liquid oxygen tank volume was 2,830 cubic feet.
Forward Skirt. The forward skirt was a longitudinally stiffened cylindrical
structure which attached to the forward end of the propellant container and
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supported t_,e vehicle instrument unit and the Saturn Apollo payload. For safety,
the forward skirt area was purged with nitrogen from the vehicle instrument unit
while propellants were being loaded or stored in the stage.
Aft Interstag_. The aft interstage for Saturn IB was a semimonocoque
structure which supported the 21.7 foot diameter S-IVB second stage, the Saturn IB
instrument unit, and the Apollo Spacecraft payload prior to first stage separation.
The cylindrical aft interstage provided mounting facilities for four of the Thiokol
30,000 pound thrust solid propellant retromotors with aerodynamic fairngs. Upon
detonation, these retro motors provided a negative acceleration to the Saturn IB at
the aft interstage/aft skirt interface.
S-IVB/IB Aft Skirt. The S-IVB/IB aft skirt was a semimonocoque structure
which attaclned to the aft end of cylindrical portion of the propellant container and
provided mounting hardware for three ullage motors. Three Thiokol 3390 pound
nominal thrust solid propellant motors (TX-280) were equally spaced to provide a
positive acceleration of the second stage to settle the liquid oxygen and hydrogen
propellants for the J-2 engine one time start for Saturn IB usage. Two diametrically
opposed attitude control modules were attached to the aft skirt. Each of these
attitude control modules contained the three TAPCO 150-pound thrust (vacuum),
hypergolic (MMH and N=O4) rocket engines.
S-IVB/V Aft Skirt. The S-IVBN aft skirt was a truncated cone that provided the
load support structure between the S-IVB stage and the 33-foot diameter S-II stage.
The structure was of aluminum skin panels externally stringer-stiffened, riveted
construction bolted to the S-IVB aft skirt and the S-II forward skirt. The aft skirt
provided the focal point for the required electrical and mechanical interface and an
envelope for the aft environmental control. Retromcket motors were attached to
this interstage and at separation, the interstage remained attached to the S-II stage.
-=_,.._t_g_. The S-IVB/IB single bum of the single J-2 engine, with 200,000
pound thrust, occurred immediately after the S-IB stage burn was completed and
S-IVB/S-IB stage separation. The S-IVB/IB placed the vehicle instrument unit (lU)
attached to the Apollo l_yloa¢l into orbit. Similarly, the S-IVB/V first bum of the J-2
engine occurred immediately after S-II/S-IVB stage separation and lasted long
enough to insert the vehicle into earth orbit. Approximately two to four hours later,
the second bum of the ,I-2 engine injected the S-IVB instrument unit/spacecraft into
a translunar trajectory. During burn periods, the vehicle control was provided by
the J-2 engine which giml_dled + 7.0 degrees in a square pattern powered by a
hydraulic actuator control system.
The J-2 engine was a high performance multiple restart engine using liquid
oxygen and liquid hydrogen as propellants. The engine attained a thrust of
approximately 200,000 pounds. The only substances used in the engine were the
propellants and helium gas. The extreme low operating temperatures prohibited
the use of lubricants or other fluids. The engine featured a single, tubular-walled,
bell-shaped thrust chamber and two independently driven, direct drive, turbopumps
for liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen. Both turbopumps were powered in series by
a single gas generator, which used the same propellants as the thrust chamber.
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The rna_n ,:yaraulic pump was driven by the oxidizer turl3opump turbine. The rat_o
of fuel to oxidizer was controlled by passing liquid oxygen from the oxidizer
turt3o!:)umu to the inlet side through a servo valve.
The engine valves were controlled by a pneumatic system powered Dy
gaseous helium which was stored in a sphere inside the start bottle. An electric
control system, which used solid state logic elements, was used to sequence the
start and shutdown operations.
During the burn, the liquid oxygen tank was pressurized by flowing cold
netium through the heat exchanger in the oxidizer turbine exhaust duct. The liquid
hydrogen tank was pressurized during burn penocls by hydrogen from the thrust
chamber fuel manifold.
The restart of the S-IVBN J-2 engine was identical to the initial start.
Helium Storaae. Helium was stored in nine cold helium spheres located in
the liquid hydrogen tank, eight ambient helium spheres mounted on the thrust
structure, and one sphere located inside the start bottle on the engine. The nine
cold helium spheres supplied cold helium for pressurization and repressurization
of the liquid oxygen tank anti repressudzation of the liquid hydrogen tank. Five of
the eight ambient helium spheres provided an alternate source of helium for
repressurization of the liquid hydrogen tank, two provided an alternate source of
helium for repressudzation of the liquid oxygen tank, and one provided pressure for
operation of the stage pneumatic controls. The engine could control which helium
sphere provided pressure for operation of the engine controls.
Liauid Oxygen System. Uquid oxygen was stored in the aft tank of the
propellant tank structure (Figure 6-5) at a temperature of -297 degrees F. Total
volume of the tank was approximately 2830 cubic feet with an ullage volume of
approximately 108 cubic feet. The tank was prepressurized between 38 and 41
psia and was maintained at that pressure during boost and engine operation.
Gaseous helium was used as the pressurizing agent.
The liquid oxygen fill-and-drain valve was capable of allowing flow in either
direction for fill or drain operations. During tank fill, the valve was capable of
flowing 1000 gpm of liquid oxygen at an inlet pressure of 51 psia. Pneumatic
pressure for operating the fill.and-drain valve was supplied by the stage pneumatic
control bottle.
Pressure switchas were used to control the tank pressure during fill. In the
event of tank overpressurtzation (41 psia) the pressure switch sent a signal to close
the liquid oxygen ground fill valve.
Liquid oxygen tank pressurization (Figure 6-6) was divided into three basic
procedures. These procedures were called prepressurization, pressurization, and
repressurization. The term prepressurization was used for that portion of the
pressurization performed on the ground prior to liftoff. The term pressurization was
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_sea :3 ;no,care pressurization during engine burn periocls, and _ast;y,
repressurization indicated pressurization just before a burn period.
The pressurant used during the three liquid oxygen tank pressurization
procedures was gaseous helium. Cold helium from a ground source was used
during the prepressurization period. This ground source of cold helium was also
used to charge the nine cold helium storage spheres. The cold helium storage
spheres, located in the liquid hydrogen tank, supplied cold helium for both the
pressurization and repressunzation periods. A hydrogen/oxygen burner was used
to heat helium gas supplied from the cold storage spheres. The ambient helium
storage spheres, filled by ground support equipment, were the alternate source of
helium for use during repressunzation prior to the first and second burns.
The liquid oxygen tank pressure was controlled by the flight control pressure
switch regardless of the pressunzation procedure used. These switches controlled
solenoid shutoff valves in each of the supply subsystems.
The liquid oxygen tank vent subsystem provided for controlled liquid oxygen
tank venting during normal stage operation and for pressure relief venting when
tank overpressures occurred. The liquid oxygen tank venting subsystem included
a propulsive venting vent and relief valve and a latch open non-propulsive vent
valve. The vent and relief valve was pneumatically operated upon receipt of a
ground command.
Successful engine start required the liquid oxygen pLimp and related
hardware to be at liquid oxygen temperature and that all oxygen available for
consumption be single phase and satisfy specific requirements. This was
accomplished by a small pump and valve in a fluid circuit about the feedline
prevaive. With the prevalve closed, oxygen from the tank was forced through the
feedline, the engine, and a small return line connecting the engine and oxygen
tank. The system operated prior to launch and during powered flight until engine
ignition. For the orbital restart mission, a similar sequence was used, however,
pumping was not initiated prior to ullage rocket firing. This ensured continued
oxygen availability to the small pump.
Liauid Hvdroaen ,_wtom. The liquid hydrogen (Figure 6-7) was stored in an
insulated tank witll a totil volume of approximately 10,400 cubic feet with an ullage
volume of approximately 300 cubic feet. The liquid hydrogen tank was
prepressurized to 28 _ minimum and 31 poia maximum.
Prior to loading, the liquid hydrogen tank was purged with helium gas. At the
initiation of loading, the ground controlled combination vent and relief valve was
opened, and the directional control valve was positioned to route hydrogen
overboard to the bum pond.
Liquid level during fill was monitored by means of liquid hydrogen mass
probes. A backup overfill sensor was provided to terminate flow in the event of a
100 percent load cutoff failure. Pressure switches controlled the tank pressure
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during fill. In the event of tank over pressurization (31 psia), the pressure sw_tcn
sent a szgnal to close the liquid hydrogen ground fill valve.
Liquid ,hyclrogen tank pressurization (Figure 6-8) was also divided into
prepressurszation, pressurization, and repressunzation procedures similar to the
liquid oxygen tank.
The pressurants used during the three liquid hydrogen tank pressurization
procedures were gaseous hydrogen (hydrogen) and gaseous helium. Cold helium
from a ground source was usecl during the prepressurization period. The cold
helium storage spheres (2), located in the liquid hydrogen tank supplied cold
helium for use during the repressurization period. The five ambient helium storage
spheres filled by ground support equipment supplied an alternate source of helium
for use during the repressurization period.
The liquid hydrogen tank pressure was controlled by the flight control
pressure switch regardless of the pressurization procedures used. This switch
controlled solenoid shutoff valves in each of the supply subsystems.
The liquid hydrogen tank vent subsystem was equipped to provide either
propulsive or non-propulsive venting. Non-propulsive venting was the normal
mode used, except for the Satum V S-IVB orbital mission. During the two to four
hours the vehicle was in earth orbit, excluding approximately five minutes prior to
engine start, hydrogen gas from the tank was vented propulsively. This was
necessary to keep hydrogen "settled" to avoid venting liquid hydrogen, thus
preserving hydrogen for the engine second bum mission.
Similarly, as for oxygen, successful engine start required a cold engine
hydrogen pump and related hardware and acceptable propellant for consumption.
A similar system to the oxygen system was used.
S-IVB PROPULSION SYSTEM TEST OBJECTIVES
The major objectives of the S-IVB stage for both Saturn V and IB missions are
presented. Both battleship and all system vehicle configurations were involved,
and the objectives apply to each as appropriate. There were a total of 24 firing
attempts, excluding altitude testing, which was conducted in a test chamber located
at the Arnold Engineering Development Center and later S-IVB testing at the
MSFC. Test objectivu follow:.
• Determine structural acceptability of engines and vehicle hardware in the
propulsion system test environment
• Determine functional capabilityof engines and vehicle hardware in the
propulsionsystem testenvironment
• Validate engine-imposed vehicledesign requirements
• Validate vehicle/propulsion system imposed engine requirements
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• Oeterm;"e :re engine and vehicle hardware propellant leakage _ntegrrty
Vatiaate the functional capability of the engine and vehicle electrical hardware
and instrumentation
Determine functional compatibility of vehicle structure, fluid, electrical, and
hydraulic systems with the ground/GSE interfacing systems
• Establish adequacy of operating procedures
• Verify thermal and structural adequacy of the stage insulation
Demonstrate acceptable operations and adequacy of all systems to satisfy
requirements
S-IVB TEST ACCOMPLISHMENTS
Following is a list of accomplishments achieved by the S-IVB propulsion
system test program. Each issue has been classified as to consequence and time
phasing for which the issue may apply, as was done in Appendix 3 for Space
Shuttle.
Recirculation system
Recirculation Pumo Destruction (unworkable - orefliahtl. Electrically driven
vehicle located pumps, one oxygen and one hydrogen pump, were utilized to
circulate small quantities of each propellant through the engine and respective
feedline to remove heat and provide acceptable quality propellants in each
feedline at engine start. During tank inerting prior to propellant loading and tank
biowdown post firing, these pumps were frequently run as a turbine (wrong
direction) at excessive speeds thus damaging pump bearings and inverters and
necessitating hardware ¢hangeout. This required addition of protective braking
devices to the pumps arid extensive changes to procedures.
Uouid Hvdrooen Puma Chill Procedure {_t==_roDhic - flight! Early battleship
testing indicated the potential for liquid hydrogen pump stall during the initial phase
of J-2 engine start. Engine start for S-IVB/1B and first start for the S-IVB/V was
approximately 2 and 11 minutes alter liftoff respectively. S-IVBN was restarted
several hours after iiftoff. Potential consequences were that the engine would fail
to start and mission failure would result. Turbopump chill procedures were
changed and validated.
Thrust Chamber Chill Down (catastroohic - fliqht} Early battleship firings
satisfied the engine supplier's thrust chamber start requirement of 260 + 50
degrees Rankin; however, further testing discovered that the requirement was
inadequate to assure a satisfactory start in all circumstances. Extensive additional
tests were necessary to explore a number of other variables to assure satisfactory
start in the various vehicle environments. Some variables were liquid hydrogen
lead time, helium supply quantities and supply conditions.
Jv
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System Evaluation of S-IVB Liquid Hydrogen/Liquid Oxvaen Enaine and
Feedlines Chilldown Systems (_atastro_llic - flight). The performance of the
systems provided for chilldown of the engine and feed ducting for both the liquid
hydrogen and oxygen propellants were of utmost importance to stage operations
and mission success. Performance of each system was sensitive to the
environment, to stored energy of the appropriate vehicle lines and the engine, and
to the quality of the S-IVB stage and J-2 engine propellant line and pump
insulations which controlled heat flow to the engine. Each design utilizea electnc
driven pumps as the fluid "driver". Systems were required to operate at gravity
levels of one, greater than one and significantly less than one thus complicating
design and verification. Extensive system testing was necessary to support
detailed analysis for the S-IVB initial start and particularly the restart mission which
occurred near zero gravity. A special orbital flight experiment was necessary to
confirm acceptable system operation along with other test objectives. Specific
issues to resolve were many: (1) removal of sufficient engine heat; (2) maintain
only liquid propellant within the feedline at engine start; and (3) accomplish the
above without reorienting propellant within tankage.
Pressurization System
Liauid Hvdroaen Pressurant Diffuser _catastroohic - flightl. The initial
pressurant diffuser clesign for the hydrogen tank of S-IVB/1B and V resulted in tank
pressure decay during tests. The diffuser created excessive gas velocities at the
liquid gas interface which reduced/destroyed the stratification layer near the liquid
surface. The diffuser was enclosed within a woven nylon bag which uniformly
diffused the high velocity gas and resolved the issue. To achieve a structurally
sound bag, more than one bag and test was required.
OxvaenlHvdrooen Burner Intearation fcatastronhic . fliaht_. The
oxygen/hydrogen bumer was utilized to h-est cold helium gas for repressurizing the
liquid oxygen and hydrogen tanks for approximately 8 minutes prior to S-IVB/V
restart in earth orbit. Problems were encountered during component development
and significant problems were experienced during integration and system
verification. A similar device termed "the helium heater" had been previously
developed and used on the S-IV stage for oxygen tank pressurization during
powered flight and many of the same/similar problems were experienced. For S-
IVB/V, ignition occurred near zero gravity in a vacuum and in a thermal
environment which could only be estimated. Quantities of helium gas required
were influenced by heat transfer mechanisms within the hydrogen and oxygen
tanks and the heat transfer from external surroundings to the vehicle which in turn
were influenced by vehicle orientation, timing for vehicle start, surface properties,
insulation thermal conductivity, etc. Problems encountered in integration are too
numerous to discuss herein; however vehicle "system" tests are necessary to
identify many of the problems and to collect important data to resolve problems.
The alternative to the oxygen/hydrogen burner is many ambient temperature
storage containers filled with 4500 PSI helium gas.
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p,essur_zation System Control Modules /unworkable - fliaht, orefliaht).
Hardware proolems necessitating changeout and design change Were frequent
occurrences for both the hydrogen and oxygen pressurization control modules.
The Battleship program identified/resolved many difficulties in the initial design,
although flight vehicle acceptance testing experienced numerous additional
problems which had to be resolved, and the Battleship, in some instances, assisted
in resolving flight vehicle difficulties. A sampling of difficulties expenenced follow:
a. The liquid hydrogen module permitted a sudden 400 percent increase in
pressurant flow. An orifice became displaced; thus a retaining system
redesign was required.
b. The liquid hydrogen module shutoff valve failed to open when required
valve performance was affected by the cryogenic temperature environment.
c. The liquid oxygen module shutoff valve failed to close prior to vehicle start
thus causing scrubbing of two tests. Excessive valve gate closing velocity
damaged the lip seal necessitating redesign.
Side Wall/Bulkhead Insulation
Ljouid Hvdrooen/IJauid Oxygen Common Bulkhead (unworkable - orefliohtL
S-IVB Battleship utilized an evacuated steel common bulkhead versus-the
honeycomb structure used for the flight configuration. Exposure to operational
pressure and thermal environments of static firings resulted in wrinkles in the face
sheet on the liquid hydrogen side of the bulkhead. The flight design initial
exposure to environments of all system testing was the S-IB-201 flight vehicle
acceptance firing although structural testing had occurred on the structural test
article. During acceptance testing a wrinkle in the face sheet on the hydrogen tank
side was observed plus local debonding.-a stdp approximately t 1/2 inches wide
and the length of the wrinkle across one gore, across the bulkhead dollar plate,
and into another gore. A similar failure had previously occurred on the S-IV stage
common bulkhead. Extensive testing was conducted, including dye penetration,
and bulkhead vacuum decay to determine the physical state of the hardware.
Finally the S-IVB-201 vehicle was determined usable subject to an acceptable
repeat of the bulkhead vacuum decay test at KSC.
Liauid Hvdmoan Tank Insulation Debondina /unworkable - oreflinhtl.
Pressure and-thermal cycle exposure during prol}eliant loading and vel_icle
operation resulted in numerous areas of insulation which were debonded. Such
testing foretold of similar concerns for the flight vehicle and the necessity of
including schedule time for inspection and repair.
Hyclrogen Tank Insulation Thermal Conductivity (unworkable. fliohtL The stage
utilized 3-D reinforced foam tile insulation internal to the hydrogen tank side wall
and top bulkhead. A special liner matedal bonded to the insulation was to
separate the foam insulation from the liquid hydrogen. Full scale vehicle tests
proved the liner was not impervious to hydrogen and that the insulation thermal
conductivity was equivalent to that of hydrogen gas which was significantly greater
than pure foam. Extensive testing and analyses were necessary to establish this
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fat:, Wnlie narOware changes were not required, extensive analytical motel
changes and stage design parameter reassessments were necessary.
P"ooellart Manaoement
prooellant Manaaement (catastroohic - fliahtl. This subject includes loading
a specified propellant quantity, consumption (_f a specified propellant quantity,
mmntaining necessary reserves for safe shutdown and mathematically
representing rocket engine performance accurately for predicting total vehicle
performance. The static firing program was essential for developing ancl or
verifying the involved hardware and procedures. The S-IVB stage utilized active
propellant management systems for controlling propellant consumption during
flight. These systems utilized mass probes (capacitor) and the probes were also
used for loading. Propellant depletion sensors were used for assunng controlled
engine shutdown. A quantity of each propellant is not useable for engine
consumption for various reasons. This quantity must be minimized ancl must be
known. The quantity of propellant which a tank may store is influenced by
accumulative tolerance during construction and dimension of changes resulting
from thermal expansion and applied loads. Tank calibration by some means is
necessary. Propellant management is thus a broad, complex, and major task
which must be developed and carefully verified. The flight vehicle configuration is
the best source for development and verification of subject system, analytical tools,
and procedures. Problems with development and verification of the propellant
management systems were numerous and changes were required in hardware,
analysis techniques, anti operational procedures. Emphasis on individual issues
and problems experienced would be counter productive because of the breadth of
the verification activity.
Available Rocket Enaine Pumo Inlet NPSP ('catastroohic. fliohtl. Rocket
engine pumps require a minimum NPSP to operate properly. Available NPSP is
dependent upon many parameters: (1) tank pressure; (2) propellant temperature;
(3) pressure drop of the p.ropellant in the feedlines between the tank outlet and
pump inlet; and (4) propellant liquid head. Propellant temperature is dependent
upon three variables for a particular propellant: (1) heat entering the propellant;
(2) initial temperature of propellant which depends upon propellant tank vent
system back pressure and propellant head; and (3) the stratification characteristics
of the propellant near the surface at the liquid/gas interface. All parameters are
important objectives of any vehicle design and verification program. Stage system
testing required procedure changes, hardware design changes, and hardware
changeout. Excessive high insulation thermal conductivity required propulsion
system re-evaluation. Vent system back pressure is a critical parameter,
particularly for hydrogen propellants which must be ducted and burned. This area
is always eventful as characteristics of launch site disposal for hydrogen burn
ponds differ from burn stacks normally used on verification sites. Feedline
pressure loss, while seemingly routine, must be accurately known to verify design
estimates and the "end-to-end values" needed are rarely available from other
sources. The parameters not discussed in detail are likewise important and must
be thoroughly understood.
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ComDartmentJEauioment Hazardous Gas and Thermal Control (catastroohi_; -
An engine gas generator fire and explosion occurred at ignition on the
Battleship. The cause was gas generator failure clue to low hardware temperature
resulting from long exposure to surrounding cold hardware and inaclecluate local
compartment purges for thermal control ancl inerting. This is one issue of many
involved in development and system testing for controlling hazardous gas (for
engine compartments and inner stage areas) to acceptable concentration levels,
systems for monitoring concentration levels, thermal control of propulsion ancl
electronics equipment and necessary thermal measurement systems. Restart from
eanln orbit after several hours exposure complicates thermal control. A heater
blanket was the "fix" for the gas generator problem. Most electronics were mounted
on cold plates and temperatures were controlled by active systems, thus avoiding
the difficulties of some propulsion hardware.
Liauid Hvdrooen Leak Detection fworkable - orefliahtL Propellant leakage in
closed or vented compartments is a critical issue. Liquid hydrogen propulsion
component leakage on S-IVB Battleship resulted in an explosion and fire during
the first S-IVBN firing. S-IVB/V battleship was a conversion from the S-IVB/1B
configuration. Saturn V and S-IVB/V had approximately 7000 and 400 fluid
connectors respectively as leak sources. Demonstration of leak free hardware is a
prime objective of system testing.
Prooulsion System Ductina/Vent Valves (unworkable - fliaht, orefliaht_.
Hardware problems necessitating changeout and design change were frequent
occurrences for both the hydrogen and oxygen systems. The Battleship program
identified many and assisted in the resolution. Some of the many issues follow:
a. Environmental factors caused liquid oxygen tank vent valve signal
irregularities during venting and pressurization functions. Bench tests
indicated normal operation. Redesign was required.
b° Environmental conditions caused liquid hydrogen fill-and-drain valve position
feedback irregularities during loading and unloading. Bench tests indicated
normal operation.
C. The liquid hydrogen feedllne inner liner failed, wrinkled, or collapsed, during
Battleship testing. Initial..fallures discovered early in the program were in the
upper line section. The duct was redesigned using a triple ply liner. In 1969
during B=ttlaship testing at MSFC, similar failures occurred in lower sections
of the feeqline. This section had not been redesigned earlier. The lower line
failures are life type issues versus basic design deficiencies for upper lines
observed early in the program.
d° The liquid hydrogen feed duct utilized vacuum jacketed ducting to reduce
heat input to the propellant. The loss of vacuum and thus its thermal
insulation characteristics was a frequent occurrence during Battleship testing
and early vehicle acceptance firings, Vacuum loss resulted from leaking of
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:he rupture disk and crack failures of the ioellows. The venicie reauArea
frequent servicing to maintain the necessary vacuum, and hardware
cnangeout was often necessary. Continual working with suppliers of the
cucting was necessary for satisfactory resolution.
Late Battleshio Tests
In late 1968 and 1969, Battleship testing was resumed at MSFC. Primary
em0hasis was mission enhancement safety improvements. Five issues from
suloject testing are included. For reference, Apollo 8, first manned Saturn V. flew ,n
Decemloer 1968 to the vicinity of the moon.
Engine Start Tank Recharae in Orbit (imorovement - fliaht_. A leaking engine
start tank system could jeopardize successful stage restart from earth orloit. Start
tank repressunzation from the stage repressurization gas system was investigated
and verified.
Enaine StructurallProoulsion System Interactions {unworkable - fliahtl. The
S-II stage center engine of Flight 503 experienced structural oscillations at a
frequency of approximately 18 Hertz. The validity of pump pressure transfer
functions which had been used in analyses to determine vehicle stability were of
concern, November 1988. A hydraulic driven pulser was installed on the oxygen
feedline of the S-IVB Battleship to input pressure oscillation and study transfer
functions of the feed system/J-2 engine. Test data revealed the engine
manufacturer supplied data, which had been used in structural/propulsion system
dynamic analyses, were incorrect. The data were collected to support S-tl stage
development. Structural/propulsion interaction was not an S-IVB problem.
Helium Pressurization Shut-Off Valve Failure (unworkable - flioht_. The cold
helium pressurization storage system shut-off valve failed to close during the
countdown demonstration test in S-IVB-503 at KSC. The replacement pressurizing
control module and alternate or backup modules for several vehicles were
cryogenically tested on S-IVB Battleship prior to designated usage.
Liauid Oxvaen Vent and Relief. Relief Valve Failure Due to Freezina
(unworkable - fliahtL Battleship testing determined thermal operational/hardware
problems. Tests were conducted to determine if the liquid oxygen vent and relief
valves would both freeze in the closed position or operate in a cyclic mode (freeze-
thaw, freeze-thaw, etc.), with failure of the cold helium shut-off valves. Freezing did
OCCUr.
Liauid Hvdroaen Prooellant Tank Drainaae dmorovement - fliaht_. A liquid
hydrogen feed duct collector manifold to improve utilization of residuals was tested
in the MSFC S-IVB Battleship. The large screen section of the collector manifold
collapsed at specification conditions.
Note: There was no all-systems vehicle for S-IVB. Also, the battleship program for
S-IVB/V was extremely short in duration-approximately 1 week. It was
shipped to MSFC for some testing, then to Tullahoma, Tennessee for
6-19
a_t_tuae/enwronmental testing, then to MSFC for more testing. Because of
thas series of events, acceptance testing of stages experienced an
a_undance of failures since they were, of necessity, development vehicles.
v
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APPENDIX 7
SATURN I, S-I STAGE AND SATURN IB, S-IB STAGE
MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM
S-I and S-IB stages were the first stages of the Saturns I and IB launch
vehicles respectively (Figure 7-1), Both were designed and developed principally
by the MSFC. The S-IB stage was an improved S-I stage primarily to achieve
increased performance capability, Because of the similarity of the two designs
most development testing was conducted with the S-I stage configuration (Figure
7-2). Figures 7-3 through 7-7 provide insight relative to the stage configuration and
important system designs.
The S-I stage was fueled by liquid oxygentRP-1 fuel. Thrust was provided by
eight H-1 engines which initially produced a thrust of 165,000 pounds eacr_. The
engines were arranged in a cluster of four inboard and four outboard engines. The
four outboard engines could be gimballed in both pitch and yaw to provide thrust
vector control.
The stage used clustered cylindrical tanks for fuel and oxidizer storage. The
tank arrangement was such that four 70-inch diameter fuel tanks, alternating with
four 70-inch diameter oxidizer tanks, were clustered around a 105-inch diameter
center oxidizer tank. Each of the four fuel tanks fed two engines, yet were
interconnected with the other tanks. The center oxidizer tank provided series flow
to the-four outboard oxidizer tanks, which also fed two engines apiece.
Pressurization of the oxidizer tanks was done by a heat exchanger from each
engine which produced gaseous oxygen which was collected and ducted to the top
of the center oxidizer tank and subsequently to individual tanks. Gaseous nitrogen
from 48 fiberglass spheres mounted at the top of the stage pressurized the fuel
tanks. This was later changed to a helium system which included two helium
storage bottles mounted to the top of the stage.
The cluster of tanks was held together at the base by the tail section and at the
top by a structural component known as the "spider beam'. The tail section
consisted of the thrust structure assembly as well as the heat shield, shrouding for
engine components, holddown points, stabilizing fins (on later S-I and S-tB
stages), and other components.
A test booster called SA-T was manufactured for use in the propulsion system
test program. The SA-T booster was modified throughout the program to keep it
updated to the current flight configuration. As soon as a flight booster completed its
acceptance test series and was shipped to Cape Canaveral, the updated SA-T was
installed into the test stand for verification of the next flight configuration.
In most respects, the S-IB stage retained the size and shape of its S-I
predecessor. The upper area was modified to take the larger diameter and heavier
S-IVB stage, and the aerodynamic fins were redesigned for the longer and heavier
vehicle. The thrust of the H-1 engines was increased to 200,000 pounds each, and
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later to 205,000 pounds. There was no ground test stage since the S-IB was so
s_milar to the S-I that a separate ground test program was not necessary. The S-IB
stage configuration is depicted in Figure 7-2.
S-IB stages were manufactured at the Michoud Assembly Facility by the stage
contractor, Chrysler Corporation Space Division. After checkout, they were
transported by barge to MSFC, where a number of systems tests were performed.
This test series consisted of simulated flight tests, a propellant loading test, short
duration firing (approximately 35 seconds), and a full duration firing (135-145
seconas). A total of 34 hot-fire tests were performed on the 12 stages, incluaing
four special combustion instability tests performed on stage S-IB-11.
Stage Prooellant System. The stage propellant system (Figure 7-3) was
composed of five liquid oxygen tanks, four RP-1 fuel tanks, propellant lines, control
valves, vents, ancl pressurization subsystems (Figures 7-4 and 7-5). The sumps of
each group of tanks were interconnected to provide uniform propellant levels and
pressures. Loading of liquid oxygen and RP-1 fuel tanks was controlled by ground
computers. After the RP-1 fuel hacl been loaded ancl just before the start of liquid
oxygen loading, ground source nitrogen was bubbled through the RP-1 fuel suction
lines to prevent temperature =ratification. At the start of the automatic sequence,
the RP-1 fuel tanks were pressurized with ground source nitrogen. During stage
burn, fuel tank pressurization was maintained by helium from two 20-cubic foot
spheres located above two of the fuel tanks. Ground source helium was bubbled
through the liquid oxygen lines and tanks at the start of the automatic sequence to
prevent temperature stratification in the engine liquid oxygen suction lines. Prior to
engine ignition, the bubbling was discontinued and the liquid oxygen tanks were
pressurized with helium from a ground source. After liftoff, the liquid oxygen tank
pressurization (Figure 7-6) was maintained with gaseous oxygen from heat
exchangers.
H'I Engine C)Deration (Raum 7-6_. A start signal ignited the solid propellant
gas generator (SPGG) which accelerated the liquid oxygen and RP-1 fuel pumps.
Increasing fuel pressure opened the main oxidizer valve which, in turn, opened the
sequence valve permitting fuel pressure to rupture the hypergolic cartridge.
Primary ignition occurred when the RP-1 fuel and hypergoli¢ fluid contacted liquid
oxygen in the thrust chamber. The injector fuel pressure opened the main RP-1
fuel valve and provided propellant flow to the liquid propellant gas generator
(LPGG) which sustained turbine operation.
When the predetermined propellant level was sensed (within 1.8 seconds),
the digital computer initiated inboard engine cutoff. Outboard engine cutoff was
initiated by either the thrust OK switches, the backup timer (from the computer), or
the fuel depletion probes. Both cutoff signals were routed through the stage switch
selector. The cutoff signals opened the explosively actuated Conax valve
equalizing the RP-1 fuel pressure at the main oxidizer valve. The valve closed to
interrupt fuel flow and terminate engine operation.
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Staae Thrust Vector Control System IFiaure 7-71. Each of the four outJooara
H-1 engines was g_mbal mounted on the stage thrust structure to provide engine
thrust vectonng for vehicle attitude control and steering. Two hydraulic actuators
were used to gimbal each engine in response to signals from the Flight Control
Computer located in the Instrument Unit.
The actuators were part of an independent hydraulic system on each
gimballed engine. Hydraulic fluid flowed to the actuators from the high pressure
accumulator and returned to the low pressure reservoir. An electric motor driven
auxiliary pump operated only during pre-launch checkout of the thrust vector
control system.
Detail information on all aspects of the S-I and S-IB test and flight program is
included in Table 7-1 and 7-2 of this appendix. The material is included both for
information and historical purposes. Summary information on test program
accomplishments includes appropriate information from this table and other data
sources.
SATURN S-I/S-IB STAGES
S-I/S-IB Test Obiectives
The S-I/S-IB test objectives were initially developed to demonstrate the
feasibility of clustering a number of rocket engines and fuel and oxidizer tanks as a
means of providing large thrust launch vehicles. Objectives were later added to
demonstrate the capability for flight of the stage. Additional objectives were added
as the test program evolved. Some of the major objectives were as follows:
• Evaluate H-1 engine performance in a clustered configuration
• Evaluate clustering of several tanks as flight storage containers for propellants
• Evaluate stage hydraulic system
• Evaluate stage thrust vector control system
• Evaluate performance of propellant fuel supply systems
• Evaluate performance of propellant pressurization systems
• Evaluate performance of aft compartment flame and heat shields
• Evaluate performance of propellant loading systems
• Evaluate performance of engine rough combustion cutoff system
• Evaluate capability of GSE to support vehicle launch operations.
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These objectives were evaluated and specific objectives to be satisfied during
each individual tests were carefully factored into the test plan for that test. A total of
31 development static firings were made during the S-I/S-IB program.
S-I/S-IB Test Accomolishments
The major accomplishment contributed by the Saturn SI/S-IB program all-
system firings was verification that the clustered engine and tank concept for
providing large thrust launch vehicles was feasible.
Specific accomplishments obtained from the S-I/S-IB propulsion system test
program are presented in the following paragraphs. Each issue has been
classified as to consequence and time phasing for which the issue may apply as
was done in Appendix 3 for Space Shuttle.
Engine Purge Seauence !workable, rood. exoected, flight). The H-I engine
used a hypergolic substance to lead the RP-1 fuel into the combustion chamber to
establish ignition with the liquid oxygen before the fuel entered the chamber. A
cutoff sequence had been established which initiated a hypergol purge at 100
milliseconds after cutoff signal. It was determined that the 100 millisecond purge
was forcing hypergol into the main fuel valve actuators on the four inboard engines
resulting in slow closing times for the valves. The hypergol purge sequence was
changed to two seconds after cutoff which eliminated the slow main fuel valve
closing problem.
lanition Delays on Solid Prooellant Gas Generators (unworkable. oreflioht_.
The H-I engine used a solid propellant gas generator (SPGG) for the initial spin-up
of the turbopumps prior to liquid oxygen/RP-1 ignition in the gas generators.
During the test program, problems with SPGG ignition delays, or hang fires, was
experienced. It was determined that the delays were caused by igniter pellet
shifting due to a weak cover. The cover was redesigned and the problem solved.
Fuel Temoerature Stratificatioq (catastroohic. oreflioht_. The H-I engine start
sequence was extremely sensitive to mixture ratio o:f propellants during gas
generator ignition. A mixture ratio that was too liquid oxygen rich could be
destructive to the turbopump turbine blades. Controlling the temperature of the fuel
at the pump inlet was vital. It was determined that temperature stratification of the
fuel could be prevented by bubbling the fuel with gaseous nitrogen injected into the
fuel feedline for each engine.
Liouid Oxvaen Pumo Inlet Temoeratures [catastroohic. oreflioht). The Liquid
oxygen pumps On the H-I engine were extremely sensitive to NPSH and the gas
generator was sensitive to ignition mixture ratio. It was necessary to control the
liquid oxygen pump inlet temperature within a narrow band to satisfy both
requirements. It was determined that the liquid oxygen temperature could be kept
within the required start box by bubbling the liquid oxygen feedlines with helium for
ten seconds prior to ignition signal.
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Enoine Comoartment Heating (catastroohic. DrefliohtL The S-I/S-IB engine
compartment contained components which were sensitive to the temperature
range at which they operated. The primary temperature sensitive components
were the SPGGs and the MFV actuators. It was necessary to control the
temperature in the engine compartment to assure proper functioning of these
components. An engine compartment heating system was developed and
demonstrated to have the capability to maintain satisfactory temperatures for all
critical components.
Turbine Bearina Seizure (unworkable, fliqht). The H-I engine turbopump gear
box used RP-1 fuel-for a bearing lubricant. To improve the lubricity of the RP-1,
oronite was added to the fuel. During the test program, difficulty was experienced
with turbine bearing seizure during post test turbopump torque checks. It was
determined that this problem was caused by coking of the oronite at the
temperatures of the numbers 7 and 9 bearings. The oronite additive was
eliminated from the numbers 7 and 9 bearing lubricant which solved the problem.
Enoine Comoartment Heat Shield (workable. rood. expected, flight). A
requirement existed to protect the components mounted in the engine compartment
from the heat generated by the eight clustered H-I engines. During the test
program, experimentation with various coatings established the optimum coating
material to be used on the heat shield.
Liauid Oxygen Vent and Relief Valve Position Indicators (unworkable,
_, A problem with the stage liquid oxygen vent and relief valve position
indicator micro-switches failing to indicate the valve position properly was found to
be caused by the cryogenic conditions the valve was being subjected to during
static tests. The valve had been qualified at ambient conditions. The valve was re-
qualified under cryogenic conditions and no more problems were experienced.
Liauid Oxvaen Tank Ullaoe Collaose /unworkable. fliaht_. During static firing,
the stage liquid c)xygen tanks were prepressurized with either gaseous nitrogen or
helium. On the eady tests, ullage pressure collapse was experienced during
prepressurization. The initial design of the liquid oxygen pressurizing system did
not include a gas diffuser at the inlet to the tank. A redesign was made which
incorporated a diffuser and subsequent performance of the pressurizing system
was satisfactory.
Darnaae to I_iauid Oxvoen Tank Stand oioes (unworkable. fliohtL The S-I/S-IB
stage configuration used f-o/Jr70-inch diameter liquid oxygen tanks clustered in a
circle around a central 105-inch diameter liquid oxygen tank. During propulsion
system operation, liquid oxygen was transferred from the central tank to the
outboard tanks through a standpipe located in each tank. The original design of
the standpipes had them open on the discharge end. A sudden liquid oxygen tank
ullage pressure decrease occurred mid-way into a firing. Pump NPSP
requirements were violated and aluminum standpipes failed structurally. The
cause of the ullage pressure change was spraying liquid oxygen from the
standpipes into ullage gas and subsequent pressurant condensation. A redesign
incorporated covers for the standpipes and resolved the issue.
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Damage to Enaine Com0artment Heat Shield Flexible Curtains (unworkable.
fli._/././././././_E_.The design of the engine compartment heat shield included a flexible
curtain fitted around the four outboard H-I engines which were designed to gimbal
for thrust vector control. Several failures occurred during static tests, indicating a
weakness in the design of the flexible curtains. A redesign of the curtains followed
by extensive development testing precluded further failures.
Thrust Structure Weakness (catastrophic. flight). The first TVC gimbal test
performed on the S-I static test vehicle uncovered matching frequencies between
the stage thrust structure and the gimballed engines. This forced a redesign of the
thrust structure to decouple the frequencies.
H-I Enaine Thrust Increase dmorovement, flight). During the course of the S-
I/S-IB program, the H-I engine thrust was increased in increments from 165,000
pounds to 205,000 pounds. Each thrust level was satisfactorily demonstrated to be
feasible for H-I engine operation in the clustered configuration by the propulsion
system test program.
Liauid Oxygen Pumo Seal Failure {cata,_troohic. flight). During test SA-52, a
liquid oxygen pump seal failure caused fire and explosion in engine position 8.
The following is quoted from the failure analysis report:
"Had this been a launch and the same progression of events occurred, the
launch fire detection system would not have prevented launch. Such an
instance would have most probably resulted in loss of this engine in flight. Loss
of the stage and mission is debatable since prevalves are provided which could
control damage provided the loss of this engine was mild enough so that
damage was confined to only that engine.
"It is also noteworthy that had this failure occurred in flight and progressed to the
point of engine or stage loss, it would not have been possible with the present
flight instrumentation to have isolated the cause of the gross failure, much less
the specific source of failure."
Following this failure, the S-IB liquid oxygen seal was replaced with a bellows
type seal. No additional malfunctions were noted.
Turbine Blade Failure Icatastroohic. fliaht_. A potentially catastrophic turbine
blade failure occurred during Test SA-40. Subsequent inspection determined that
five H-1 engines had turbine blades manufactured from incorrect material. Turbine
wheels were replaced on all.of these engines, and they were re-tested at the
manufacturer's site.
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APPENDIX 8
SATURN I, S-IV MAIN PROPULSION SYSTEM
S-IV (Figure 8-1) was the second stage of the Saturn I vehicle and was
developed by Douglas Aircraft Company for NASA. Development began in Aprit
1960 with the initial flight on January 29, 1964, and the final flight, number 6, on
July 30, 1965. Payload to orbit capability was approximately 34,000 pounds. All
six flights were successful. This stage served as the basis for the larger, more
powerful S-IVB stage of the Apollo program. Figures 8-2 through 8-5 provide
insight relative to stage design and important stage systems.
The stage was propelled by six Pratt and Whitney-developed RL 10-A-3
engines which used liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen as propellants. The six
engines were configured in a circle and thrust vector control was accomplished by
engine gimballing. Total vehicle thrust was 90,000 pounds, approximately 15,000
pounds per engine. The engines were ignited after S-I booster stage burn
completion, approximately two minutes after liftoff, and then burned for
approximately eight minutes. The engines operated at a nominal mixture ratio of
5:1 and were ignited only once, although they were capable of multi-starts.
The vehicle diameter was 22 feet. Liquid hydrogen propellant was located
forward in a cylinddca! single tankmunlike the booster stage which used multi
tanks for each propellantmwhile liquid oxygen was located aft in an elliptical
shaped single tank. The two propellants were separated by a single bulkhead,
commonly known as common bulkhead. The bulkhead was a complex structure
that not only physically separated propellants, but also provided thermal insulation
and a means for detecting the presence of either of the propellants within the
bulkhead interior--a serious safety concern if detected. Heat inputs to the liquid
hydrogen tank sidewalls and forward bulkhead were controlled by internal foam
insulation with an impervious barrier separating liquid hydrogen and the insulation.
Helium gas stored at high pressure in spheres located within the liquid hydrogen
tank was available for liquid oxygen tank pressurization and other purposes.
Propulsion system testing included both battleship and all system vehicles.
Other test articles were available for structural, dynamics, and other test
requirements. A total of 27 firings and total firing time of 5440 seconds were
recorded for the Battleship configuration during the time interval of December 11,
1961 to January 26, 1963. No tests were accomplished on the all-systems
configuration before its destruction on January 24, 1964.
RL 10A-3 Rocket Enaine (Fioures 8-2 and 8-3L Electrical signals controlled
pressurized helium which was Used to actuate valves for starting and stopping the
engines. Ignition of the propellants was accomplished by an electrical ignition
system. Each engine was equipped with a thrust control assembly that was a
servo-operated, variable position valve which controlled engine thrust by
regulating the amount of fuel bypassing the turbine, thereby controlling turbine
speed and fuel pumping. Thrust chamber tubular construction permitted use of a
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regenerative operating cycle. Liquid hydrogen used to cool the engine during
operation, was turned into a gaseous state and re-used to drive the fuel and
oxidizer turbopump and supply pressurant to the liquid hydrogen tank. Mere detail
on the engine follows.
Major Components Thrust Chamber, Fuel and Oxidizer Turbopump Assembly,
Oxygen Flow Control Valve, spark Ignition Subystem,
Thrust Control Assembly, Miscellaneous Control Valves.
Thrust Chamber Tubular-walled with chamber stiffeners; expansion area
ratio, 40 to 1; chamber pressure, 300 psia; liquid oxygen
to liquid hydrogen mass burn ratio, 5:1.
Turbopump Assembly
Thrust Control Assembly
Located outside thrust chamber at nozzle throat; turbine
driven fuel and oxidizer pumps; turbine power supplied
from expanding fuel.
"o
Mounted on turbopump assembly; controlled thrust
chamber pressure by regulating turbine speed; servo
supply pressure, 672 psi.
Oxidizer Flow Control Valve Mounted on turbopump near nozzle throat of thrust
chamber; controlled oxidizer-to-fuel mass ratio for proper
ignition, and consumption of oxidizer to minimize
propellant residual at burnout; mechanical stops limited
variance.
Spark Ignition Subsystem Consisted of oxidizer supply valve and ignition system;
system used hydrogen from cool down tubes for fuel;
oxidizer valve regulated oxygen supply to combustion
chamber.
Staae Oxidizer System fFiaure 8-4_. Liquid oxygen was supplied to each
engine by individual feedlines connecting each engine to a common sump located
on the liquid oxygen tank bottom. A screen/vane assembly located at the tank
outlet prevented liquid oxygen vortexing and provided filtration. Prior to launch,
cold helium gas was injected into feedlines to cool the oxygen sufficiently to satisfy
engine start requirements. Engine hardware cooling was accomplished during first
stage powered flight by a regulated flow of liquid oxygen through the engine and
exiting the nozzle. Part of this dumped flow was liquid which could solidify during
the expansion to low pressures experienced at altitude. This was an unsafe event,
thus a specially designed system using nitrogen prevented oxygen from solidifying.
Gaseous helium pressurized the liquid oxygen tank ullage immediately prior
to launch. Cold helium gas from storage spheres within the hydrogen tank was
heated in a small hydrogen/oxygen burner, called a helium heater, and used to
pressurize the oxygen tank ullage immediately prior to and during S-IV powered
flight phases. Tank located pressure-sensing switches provide the control for all
phases of oxygen tank pressurization--both preflight and flight.
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A vent system provided for relief of pressure during fill and mainstage
operation. The oxygen tank vent system was a combination vent and relief system.
Two valves vented overboard all products of vaporization resulting from ground
filling, and automatically relieved excessive pressure buildup within the tank during
other operational phases. The vent valves operated independent of the tank
pressure-sensing switches.
Staae Fuel System (Fiaure 8-5L Liquid hydrogen was supplied to each
engine b_, individual- feedlines-from the liquid hydrogen tank. Each of the feedlines,
total of six, was located external to the vehicle along the length of the liquid oxygen
tank and penetrated the aft interstage assembly before connecting with the
respective engine. Each feedline had appropriate flex and gimbal joints for
maintaining structural integrity. Each feedline used vacuum jacket hardware for
controlling heat input and anti-vortex devices and screens at the feedline tank
interface. Hydrogen flow, necessary to cool engine hardware during first stage
powered flight, was collected from each engine and dumped into three large lines
attached to the outer vehicle skin. The lines ran the length of the vehicle and
terminated outside the vehicle boundary layer in free stream flow near the vehicle
base. This was necessary to prevent hydrogen gas entrainment and burning
adjacent to the vehicle exterior.
Gaseous helium was used to pressurize the liquid hydrogen tank ullage
during terminal count immediately prior to launch and immediately prior to stage
engine start, approximately three minutes later. Hydrogen gas bled from the six
engines pressurized the tank ullage during the engine operational phase. Tank
located pressure-sensing switches provided the control function for all phases of
liquid hydrogen tank pressurization--both preflight and flight.
A vent system provided for relief of ullage pressure during fill and mainstage
operation and had similar operational characteristics as described for the oxygen
tank.
Note: Reference documents on S-IV stage were unavailable, thus the above
description and section on accomplishments presented later are reconstructed
from memory.
S-IV ACCOMPLISHMENTS
Accomplishments are from the memory of personnel involved in the program
and are thus incomplete. Reference documentation was not available.
Hvdrooen Tank Insulation Crackina (unworkable. orefliaht_. The liquid
hydrogen tank of S-IV stage used internal insulation for conU'olling-heat input to the
propellant and to control frost/ice formation on the tank wall external surface. The
insulating material for S-IV battleship was balsa wood. The all systems vehicle
used the planned flight vehicle insulation---light weight foam blocks bonded to the
internal wall and tank upper bulkhead. A light weight fiber glass cloth bonded to
the insulation inner surface and coated with a sealant, epoxy was used to prevent
insulation contamination with hydrogen. The initial propellant loading test of the all
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systems vehicle resulted in significant tank deflections and extensive insulation
cracking. Testing was halted and extensive field repairs were made.
Hydrogen/Oxvaen Common Bulkhead Leaking (catastrophic. preflight/flight).
The all systems vehicle on the next test--another propellant loading test six weeks
later--experienced an hydrogen leak in the common bulkhead--a potentially
serious safety problem because of the close proximity of the oxygen tank. The
vehicle was removed from the test stand for inspection and repair.
Engine Oxygen and Hydrogen Propellant Chill Disposal (unworkable. flight).
The RL10 hydrogen/oxygen engine required hardware cool-down prior to engine
start. The requirement was satisfied by controlled dumping of propellants through
the engine during significant parts of first stage operation. Hydrogen gas disposal
was through three large ducts attached to the vehicle skin which ran the length of
the vehicle and then outward--dumping hydrogen in a free stream flow outside the
vehicle boundary layer. Oxygen was dumped through the engine nozzle into the
S-I/S-IV inter stage. Exiting liquid oxygen present during some phases of the
dump, expanded to near inter stage pressure and solidified. This was deemed to
be hazardous, thus a system to prevent oxygen solidification was necessary and
was developed. The system using large quantities of nitrogen within the inter tank
was developed as a subsystem, verified in vacuum operation and
integrated/verified in propulsion system testing.
All System Vehicle Destruction fcatastroohic, oreflight/flight_. The oxygen tank
of the all system vehicle Was overpressurized dudng the first attempted static firing.
An explosion resulted and the vehicle was a total loss. The test stand and ground
support equipment were badly damaged.
Helium Heater Development Issues (unworkable. fliahtL A combustion device
using gaseous oxygen and hydrogen propellants named helium heater was
developed and used to heat cold He gas for flight pressurization of the oxygen
tank. Serious subsystem problems were encountered in development of the
helium heater. Hardware was unavailable for propulsion system testing when
initially required and when used was unreliable. System data was needed to verify
the total quantity of helium required, the required operational He flow rate range for
the helium heater, establish compatibility of operation of tank pressurization control
module and helium heater, etc.
Prooulsion Hardware Failures (unworkable. orefliaht/fliahtL Vacuum jacketed
feedlines, feedline expansion and gimbal devices,-pressurization system flow
control modules and tank pressure sensing devices, tank ullage pressure vent and
relief valves all experienced frequent failures during propulsion system testing and
required servicing and/or changeout. Failures resulted in test cancellation and
delayed testing. Many of the problems experienced resulted from incomplete
hardware development as components at the time required for system testing.
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APPENDIX 9
TITAN PROGRAM
The Titan program had its inception in the middle 1950's with the
development of the Titan I ICBM which, while operational, had the greatest range
and payload in the U. S. Missile Arsenal. Titan I was almost immediately
redesigned to the Titan Ii configuration which differed from its predecessor in two
very advantageous respects: (1) it used storable propellants; and (2) it was
launched directly from the silo. Titan II also had increased thrust and propellant
weight giving it increased range and payload over Titan I. The booster for the Titan
II ICBM served, in an essentially unchanged configuration, as the launch vehicle for
Gemini spacecraft and as the liquid propellant core (Stages I and II) for Titan III. In
this way, all the extensive vehicle testing and manufacturing experience was
directly applicable to space"operations. Testing activities were limited to only those
things that changed. Minor changes for improvement in manufacturing or
operations were easily evaluated. "Certified by similarity" became an accepted
technique. Figures 9-1 and 9-2 illustrate the propulsion system for stages 1 and 2,
respectively, while Figures 9-3 and 9-4 illustrate the Stage 1 engine and the Stage
1 POGO control system.
The reliability of Titan derives from the experience gained in the design,
fabrication, test, and flight of the entire Titan family (see Figure 9-5). Over 400 Titan
vehicles have been built. This number spans the T'rtan I, Titan II, Gemini, and Titan
IliA, Titan IilB, Titan IIIC, and Titan IIID configurations. Reliability of the Titan III
members of the family was enhanced through the common core concept wherein
Stages I and II of all Titan III vehicles are essentially identical. The core for all
configurations uses common parts, common drawings, and common manufacturing
and testing processes. Modifications to meet specific mission requirements were
made with discrete kits that did not degrade the reliability integrity of the basic core.
Table 9-1 lists notable firsts.
Table 9-1. TITAN III NOTABLE FIRSTS
Flight
1
6
16
17
25
28
32
35
36
39
47
48
Miss/on Launch Site Date
F'nt Tin UI-C
Unmanned Gentnl Capsule
Improved TVC
First Titan III-D Right
Silver Anniversary Flight
!cal_ canlw_
Lcape canaveral
Cape Canaver_
Vanclonbor_ Nr Force Base
Vandenberg Nr Force Base
First T_an III-E Flight
First Hellos Right
V_ II Mm
Viking I Mare
Second Helios Flight
Voyager 2
Voyager 1 (final Titan III-E flight}
Cape Canaveral
Cape Canaveral
CapeCanaven¢
CapeCanlvem
CapeCanav=_
Cape Canaveral
Cape Canaveral
06/18/65
11103/66
05105/71
06/05/71
07113/73
02/11/74
12/10/74
06/20/75
09109/75
0111 5/76
08120/77
09/05/77
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TITAN ICBM
No information could be found for this study which directly concerned the Titan
I verification process.
A single declassified technical operating report titled, Titan II Missile N-1 Flight
Test Report, dated September 1962, provided a glimpse of the Titan II verification
process. Pertinent excerpts are reprinted here.
"YLR87-AJ-5 Engine Performance. The steady state engine
performance for each subassembly, represented by Pc, was
approximately 6 percent low compared to the Pc predicted for the
engine at propellant inlet condition for the flight. The cause of the low
performance of approximately 6 percent on both engine subassemblies
has not been absolutely determined to date. A possible explanation of
the low performance would be the presence of approximately 3 to 4
percent water in the fuel propellant. This percentage of water-
contaminated fuel propellant could cause a 5 to 6 percent drop in
performance as demonstrated by research and development tests
conducted at Aerojet-General Corporation. Similar low performance of
the YLR87-AJ-5 engine was evidenced on the fliaht readiness firirlg_
which fired for 13.4 sec. At that time, both subassemblies closely
indicated the same percentage of low performance. This was attributed
to faulty data."
"YLR91-AJ-5 Engine Performance. The engine operated at
approximately 50 percent of the predicted level of performance. This
caused the missile to fall short of its intended range. The low
performance was attributed to leakage or blockage of the oxidizer flow
to the gas generator. The abnormality became evident during the start
transient and continued throughout the duration of engine operation.
"It would not be possible to distinguish between leakage or blockage
downstream of the oxidizer venturi with the instrumentation available.
"The most probable cause of the failure is blockage of the gas
generator oxidizer flow within the gas generator manifold by
contaminants. These contaminants may have been introduced when
the gas generator was retrofitted with an improved seal between the
oxidizer check valve and the oxidizer inlet port. This retrofit was
incorporated in accordance with Engineering Change Proposal No.
6016 after the gas generator was acceptance-tested."
GEMINI TITAN
The Gemini Proaram Launch Systems Final Reoort. Aerospace Report No.
TOR-1001 (2126-80)-3, dated January 1967, provides insight for this early manned
verification process. At the beginning of the Gemini program, the Titan II ballistic
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missile was chosen as the launch vehicle to be used in conjunction with the Gemini
spacecraft. The decision was made at that time to use the Titan II "as is" with only
those modifications required to enable the Titan II to perform the launch vehicle
function for a manned system.
The Gemini Launch Vehicle (GLV) engine configuration (-7 model) used the
basic Titan II (-5 model) as a building block. Certain changes were made in the
basic Titan II engine to adapt it to the critical uses of the Gemini program. The
changes were prompted by the need to man-rate the Titan II, and/or by experience
gained in the early Gemini flights.
The propulsion system of the GLV was a direct adaptation of the Titan II
propulsion system. Some deviations or additions were made to meet specific
Gemini requirements. The launch vehicle used the Aerojet-General YLR 87-AJ-7
liquid propellant rocket engine for Stage I and YLR 91-AJ-7 liquid propellant rocket
engine for Stage II, respectively. These engines burned storable hypergolic
propellants, nitrogen tetroxide and UDMH-hydrazine blend. The propulsion
systems included a propellant feed system and a tank pressurization system. The
propellant feed systems for first and second stages contained the tanks, feedlines
and associated valving necessary to store propellants in the vehicle and supply
these propellants to the rocket engines. The first stage propellant system also
contained hydraulic oscillation suppression devices necessary to eliminate
longitudinal oscillation instabilities (POGO) caused by closed loop coupling
between the structural resonances and the propulsion system. The tank
pressurization system was LJsed to provide proper propellant pressure to the
engines during start and flight.
DEVELOPMENT HISTORY - GEMINI -
The Gemini development of the propulsion system was conducted in the
propulsion system test program (PSTP) at Aerojet-General, Sacramento, January
28, 1963 to March 2, 1964. The purpose of the test program was to check and
verify the operation of that portion of the Titan II/Gemini propulsion system peculiar
to the GLV.
The PSTP results demonstrated the ability of the Gemini propulsion system to
meet its design requirements. Tests were run to determine whether reduced fuel
and oxidizer tank ullage volumes had adverse effects on engine starting
characteristics. Results demonstrated that reduced ullages did not cause violation
of engine net positive suction head requirements. Validity of the analytical
technique to predict pressurization system performance was also satisfactorily
demonstrated. The effects and calibration of engine performance with cold
propellants were also demonstrated in these tests.
Because of the performance requirements imposed on the launch vehicle,
level sensor performance and reliability became significant factors. The flight test
failures on Titan II and the problems encountered in attempting to qualify the
sensors resulted in a decision to change from the Titan II level sensor to a Bendix
unit for Gemini.
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"Piggy back testing" was used to fly GLV hardware on Titan II R&D vehicles.
Nineteen Bendix level sensors were flown on Titan II Flights N32 and N33. Flight
uncovering times were compared with readings from the Titan II level sensors in
equivalent tank locations. The agreement between all pairs of sensors was within
tolerance. On these flights, the first indications of fuel sensor uncovery and
subsequent recovery were noticed. This condition was verified on GT-1, and
subsequent corrective action shielded the fuel sensors from pressurization gas
condensation.
The first Titan II flights showed a very high "g" level of oscillation in the first
longitudinal mode in the time period preceding booster engine cutoff. The "g"
levels were too high for the equipment aboard the Titan II, much less a pilot. Titan II
pursued the problem and found that an adequate reduction in level for a weapons
system could be achieved by simply increasing fuel tank flight pressures. The
reduced levels of oscillation resulting from this change were not, however,
compatible with a manned requirement. A special program was established to
evolve a fix that would reduce the levels to the +.25 requirement for a manned
vehicle. The proposed fixes of detuning the feed system, the standpipe and fuel
accumulator, plus providing an attenuation of pressure oscillation frequencies in
the structural band, were tested and demonstrated successfully in three Titan II
flights, N-25, N-29, and N-31. These flights verified the major portion of the initial
Gemini redesign of the Titan II experimental hardware. The N-31 flight (flown with
reduced fuel tank pressure) also verified that the hardware was effective at a
reduced fuel tank pressure level, which was shown to be a strong parameter in
controlling the levels of oscillation without the fixes.
Considerable effort was directed toward the development of a remote
charging system (AGE) which was used to tune the launch vehicle oxidizer
standpipes. The system was developed to provide greater flexibility in mission
planning. The original manual charging technique _nvolved opening prevalves
and dropping propellant relatively early in the countdown, thus exposing the
engine to oxidizer. This exposure necessitated a greater recycle time in the event
of a launch scrub. The concept of the remote charging system provided increased
safety in the charging operation and greater flexibility when the charging operation
was performed because it was controlled from the blockhouse. It was proven
through development test and subsequent flight test experience that the remote
charge system provided a more consistent charge than the manual system.
QUALIFICATION HISTORY - GEMINI
Components in the GLV, like Titan items, were qualified by similarity to their
respective Titan II counterpart. Qualification problem areas existed such as the
POGO fuel accumulator position potentiometer, the tank topping system vent
disconnect, the tank topping system solenoid valve, POGO airborne ball valve
(shutoff valve) and the propellant tank level sensor.
The basic POGO hardware, oxidizer standpipe and fuel accumulator, were
qualified by successful flight test on Titan II Flights N-25, 29, and 31. During
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component vibration testing of the POGO fuel accumulator rotary potentiometer, the
potentiometer mounting screws loosened and the negator spring which connects
the potentiometer to the accumulator piston slipped off the rim of its potentiometer
attach wheel. Corrective action was taken to strengthen the potentiometer
mounting provisions and these failure modes were eliminated. The potentiometer
failed the propellant compatibility test due to penetration of oxidizer through the
front bearing of the pot. Corrective action consisted of installing an O-ring seal
external to the bearing area.
Problems were encountered with the remote operated airborne ball valve in
that the ball rotated to a slightly open position under vibration environment. The
problem was solved by incorporating a spring detent mechanism to positively lock
the ball in the fully closed position.
Excessive connecting load problems were encountered with the tank topping
system disconnect during qualification temperature testing. Corrective action
included additional lubrication and tightening of valve and seal cleaning
requirements. Sand and dust tests resulted in entry of contamination into the
disconnect valve. Corrective action added seals to the open areas.
The tank topping system solenoid valve failed to pass qualification vibration
tests by exhibiting sporadic leakage. Corrective action consisted of changing the
valve design from a normally closed to a normally open valve.
The Bendix level sensors were subjected to a complete qualification test
program. No significant problems were encountered with the component during
this program.
Using the Titan I and Titan II environmental criteria as a base, qualification
tests were conducted on components which were new, which underwent a change
in design or usage, or which experienced a more severe GLV environment. The
test program required rigid controls and precise documentation. All failures were
recorded, and Quality Control assured compliance to approved specifications, so
that qualification testing became a formal program.
CONCLUSIONS - GEMINI
The lessons learned from the Gemini qualification test program were many
and should be invaluable to a new program. Two significant areas are described
below:
• It is important to separate the evaluation/development testing from formal
qualification testing. The evaluation tests should start with prototype hardware,
as soon as the level of the critical environments are established.
. Failures are an integral part of the test program, but no qualification test
schedule has ever been permitted a "failure pad," because this would be
admitting that an inadequate evaluation test program had been conducted, or
V
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the design group had serious doubts as to the integrity of the components being
tested.
No flight failures were recorded on GLV hardware throughout the program, but
one significant failure occurred after engine ignition that caused a shutdown on the
pad. This failure (a tandem actuator) probably could have been prevented by a
better design review or a better, more extensive qualification program.
SPACE TITAN
The Titan III story began in September 1961 with the initiation of the program
definition phase for a standardized space launch system. The original concept for
Titan III identified a standard launch vehicle that would be capable of delivering
multiple payloads of various sizes and shapes into precise orbits or space
trajectories. The requirements were also levied for operational simplicity and a
reliable launch-on-time capability. This concept stimulated demanding,
technological achievements. Problems and flight failures were encountered. Most
important, it provided experience and knowledge which contributed to a successful
operational manned launch system.
The Titan III family of launch vehicles currently includes Titan IIIB, IIIC, and IIID.
The Titan IIIB configuration launched from Vandenberg AFB for classified military
missions is composed of the Titan III common core and the Agena upper stage.
Titan IIIC consists of the common core with two 120-inch diameter, 5-segment, solid
rocket motors (SRMs) for its liftoff stage and Transtage as its upper stage. Strap-on
SRMs used as the initial stage of Titan III vehicles arereferred to as Stage Zero in
order to retain the Stage I and Stage II nomenclature for the common core. Titan
IIID is designed for classified military missions also. This configuration used two 5-
segment, 120-inch diameter SRMs identical to those of Titan IIIC, in conjunction
with the common core, but it has no upper stage.
GEMINI LAUNCH VEHICLE PROPULSION SYSTEM
The propulsion system of the GLV was a direct adaptation of the Titan II
propulsion system. Some deviations or additions were made to meet specific
Gemini requirements. The launch vehicle used the Aerojet-General YLR 87-AJ-7
liquid propellant rocket engine for Stage I and the YLR 91-AJ-7 liquid propellant
rocket engine for Stage I1. These engines burned storable hypergolic propellants,
nitrogen tetroxide and UDMH-hydrazine blend. The propulsion systems included a
propellant feed system and a tank pressurization system. The propellant feed
systems for first and second stages contained the tanks, feedlines and associated
valving necessary to store propellants in the vehicle and supply these propellants
to the rocket engines. The first stage propellant system also contained hydraulic
oscillation suppression devices necessary to eliminate longitudinal oscillation
instabilities (POGO) caused by closed loop coupling between the structural
resonances and the propulsion system. The tank pressurization system was used
to provide proper propellant pressure to the engines during start and flight.
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Component Confiouration
The propellant feed systems were designed to produce a minimum pressure
loss at the design flow rates. The Stage I and Stage II propellants were stored in
ten-foot diameter aluminum tanks which also formed the primary launch vehicle
structure. Oxidizer was fed to the engine turbopump inlets by an aluminum
feedline, passing through a conduit in the fuel tank. For Stage I, the oxidizer
feedline was divided in the engine compartment to feed each engine subassembly.
The fuel tank outlets were located immediately above the engine pump inlets.
The propellant tanks had anti-vortex and anti-slosh baffles. In addition, the
oxidizer tank outlets were designed to prevent loss of energy in discharging the
propellant from the tanks.
Propellant prevalves were used in the propellant feed system. The prevalves
held propellants above the engine pumps and thrust chamber valves until opening
was necessary for terminal countdown. The launch vehicle was filled and drained
of propellants through manual disconnects located upstream of the prevalves.
Liquid level sensors were installed in the fuel and oxidizer tanks to facilitate
propellant flow rate and outage measurement for performance calculation.
Propellant temperature probes were provided in all propellant tanks to ensure
that propellant temperature at liftoff did not exceed the allowable limits based on
vehicle performance margins for each mission.
A propellant .fill-and-drain system was used to transfer propellants from the
AGE to the vehicle tanks. The ground system included transfer pumps, and
instrumentation to assure that propellants were transferred to the vehicle at proper
temperatures and in the proper quantities.
From the initial lock-up condition prior to launch until engine shutdown at
burnout, the pressurization system was designed to provide adequate propellant
tank ullage pressure to satisfy (a) minimum NPSH requirements for the engine
driven propellant pumps and (b) minimum launch and inflight structural
requirements of the tanks. Simultaneously, the pressurization system was not
supposed to exceed pressures as defined by structural limitations.
Initial pressurization of all propellant tanks was achieved with a charge of
nitrogen gas regulated to a predetermined level. In flight, tank pressurization was
provided to both fuel tanks by using cooled rocket engine turbine exhaust gases.
The Stage I oxidizer tank was pressurized by vaporized oxidizer from the engine.
The Stage II oxidizer tank was pressurized in flight by the initial nitrogen Iockup
pressure and supplemented by vaporization of the tanked oxidizer. Burst discs
were installed in each tank pressurization line.
The inflight pressurization subsystem for Gemini was essentially the same as
that used in Titan I1. Exceptions were as follows: (a) The pressurant flow to the
Stage I fuel tank was increased by a change in the engine flow control orifice size,
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and (b) Stage I oxidizer pressurant flow rate was increased through an orifice
change and the tank "lockup" pressure was increased.
A revised tank pressure control system known as the tank pressure topping
system was designed for the GLV. This system incorporated a pressure supply and
vent line which was in parallel with the main pressure supply line available to each
tank. When the main lines were disconnected, pressure control was retained
through the smaller pressure topping lines which remained connected until liffoff.
Lanyard operated pull away couplings were used to separate the GLV from the
AGE and effect a seal at the vehicle skin line. An airborne, solenoid-operated,,
normally open valve was located upstream of the disconnect coupling on the GLV.
This valve provided seal redundancy in flight and a method for leak testing during
the prelaunch countdown.
One of the big differences between Titan II and GLV in the propulsion system
was the use of suppression devices to control the longitudinal oscillation that
occurs during first stage flight. The POGO suppression devices consisted of tuned
resonators inserted into the'engine feedlines just upstream of the first stage pumps.
These devices were tuned to provide attenuation of pressure oscillations in the
frequency band of the structural first longitudinal mode. In the oxidizer lines the
resonator was a standpipe, while in the fuel lines a tuned mechanical accumulator
was used.
The oxidizer standpipe worked on the principle of using an entrapped gas
bubble to provide a soft spring for the oxidizer mass in the standpipe to act upon.
The energy due to pressure oscillations could be transferred to this spring mass
system at the desired frequency by proper choice of the volume of the entrapped
gas bubble. The fuel surge chamber or accumulator used a helical spring and
piston to perform the same job. The spring together with the piston and fuel mass
in the accumulator acted to provide the desired resonance.
GLV ENGINES
Propulsion for the GLV system was provided by the Aerojet-General
Corporation manufactured YLR87-AJ-7 Stage I and YLR91-AJ-7 Stage II engines.
These engines were modified Titan II engines.
The basic Gemini engine system and those major features which were unique
to the Gemini system are described below.
Staae I Enaine
The YLR87-AJ-7 rocket engine assembly was a storable liquid bi-propellant,
turbopump fed, dry-jacket-start engine rated for sea level operation. The engine
was composed of two independently operating subassemblies which operated
simultaneously, mounted on a single thrust structure. Each subassembly
contained a thrust chamber assembly, turbopump assembly, gas generator
assembly, starter cartridge, propellant plumbing, and electrical controls harness. In
addition, subassembly two (S/A 2) provided the energy source for tank
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pressurization. The major components of each subassembly were identical except
for the pressurization system.
The design concept of this engine system was to achieve reliability through
simplicity. This goal was achieved by use of hypergolic storable propellants which
eliminated the need for bleed down, heaters and ignition systems. The engine
required no functions during countdown beyond admission of propellant to the
engine from the tankage. Thrust level was preset by sized cavitating ventuds which
were located in the gas generator propellant feed circuits. Cavitating venturis
controlled flow to the gas generator which controlled turbine power by hydraulic
equilibrium, thereby eliminating all servo thrust control mechanisms.
Descriptions of the major components follow.
Thrust Chamber Assembly. The thrust chamber assembly consisted of a
regeneratively fuel cooled tubular construction combustion chamber, injector,
injector dome, fuel thrust chamber valve assembly, oxidizer thrust chamber valve
assembly, gimbal assembly, thrust chamber pressure switch, and oxidizer and fuel
propellant lines. The above components were packaged as an integral assembly.
The thrust chamber fuel valve consisted of a four inch gate butterfly valve with
attached hydraulic actuator. The actuator was spring loaded in the closed position.
The actuator shaft was mechanically linked to the fuel valve shaft. The fuel valve
shaft in turn had a clevis for linkage to the oxidizer thrust chamber valve.
Control of the thrust chamber fuel valve actuator was achieved by use of a
direct mounted pressure sequence valve (PSV). The PSV mechanically sensed
fuel system supply pressure and opened at a level which allowed fuel pressure to
overcome the spring force of the thrust chamber fuel valve actuator and open the
fuel and oxidizer valve by mechanical linkage. Closure of the thrust chamber valve
was achieved by an electrical solenoid which overrode the pressure sensing
element. This caused the PSV to neutralize and admit fuel pressure.to the closing
side of the thrust chamber actuator to assist spring closure of the thrust chamber
valve.
Gas Generator Assembly. Each gas generator system consisted of an integral
gas generator chamber and-injector, fuel check valve, oxidizer check valve, gas
generator feed lines, cavitating venturis and propellant strainers. The gas
generators were mounted directly to the inlet of the turbine pump assembly turbine
drive manifold.
Turbooumo Assembly. The turbopump assembly consisted of a fuel pump
subassembly, oxidizer pump subassembly, two-stage turbine drive assembly and a
gearbox assembly. The gearbox contained an integral oil pump, reservoir filtration
system and lube oil cooler. These components were integrated into an assembly
on the basic gearbox structure. The Gemini gearbox incorporated gears of 9310
alloy and SKF bearings exclusively.
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Solid Start Cartridoe. The solid start cartridge was comprised of a steel
combustion chamber which housed two concentric cylinders of ammonium nitrate
propellant (AMR 2506). An ignition train assembly was mounted at the head end of
the cartridge. Burning rate of the cartridge was controlled by a flow control nozzle,
as well as by stringent maintenance of start cartridge temperature, through the use
of cartridge thermocouples and temperature controlled air supplied to the external
surfaces of the cartridge. A teflon burst diaphragm over the nozzle hermetically
sealed the cartridge assembly. A pyrotechnic squib was installed in the cartridge
and electrically fired to initiate the ignition train.
High Pressure Prooellant Line_. The high pressure fuel and oxidizer lines
consisted of bolted flanges, tubing, and three 2-axis articulated flex joints. The flex
couplings were arranged to allow for assembly tolerances and to allow thrust
chamber flight control flexure obviating the need of rotary seals to achieve thrust
chamber motion. All thrust chamber gimbal motion was taken between the
chamber assembly and turbopump assembly. The turbopump assemblies were
stationary to the frame and did not move during gimbal operation.
Low Pressure Prooellant Plumbing. The fuel and oxidizer lines connecting
the turbopump to the tank outlets consisted of low pressure bellows assemblies,
modified by POGO gear, from tank outlet to pump inlet. The bellows assemblies
were for the purpose of absorbing relative deflections and to allow small
misalignment of assemblies.
Subassembly Two IS/A-2) Oxidizer Pressurization Suoer Heater Assembly.
The super heater assembly was a cross flow tube-type heat exchanger located in
the turbine exhaust in the subassembly two turbopump. Energy in the turbine drive
exhaust gases was used to vaporize and disassociate liquid nitrogen tetroxide.
The amount of pressurant gas was controlled by a cavitating venturi into the liquid
side of the circuit. Energy in the gas was controlled by a back pressure nozzle in
the gaseous side of the circuit. The oxidizer pressurant system included the
associated plumbing.
_ubassemblv Two (S/A-2 Fuel Tank Pressurant Heat Exchanoer. The gas
cooler assembly consisted of a bundle of U-shaped tubes enclosed in a cylindrical
shell. Fuel was circulated on the interior side of the tubes as a heat exchange
medium. Hot gas passed through the external passages around the tubing to the
fuel autogenous system. The hot gas flow rate was controlled by a sonic nozzle in
the plumbing circuit.
Seauence of Ooeration. At a minimum of 30 seconds prior to engine start,
propellant valves at the tank outlets were opened allowing propellant into the
engines up to the thrust chamber valves (TCV's). The engines were self-bleeding
by gravity head.
Each Stage I subassembly start was initiated by providing a 28-vdc signal to a
redundant bridge wire squib in the solid start cartridge initiator. The initiator fired
the ignition train which started burning of the solid propellant grain. Energy from
the solid propellant caused acceleration of the turbopump assembly. As the
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turbopump assembly generated fuel pressure head, the pressure sequence valve
shuttled at a pre-set pressure causing the thrust chamber fuel valve to be actuated
open by fuel system pressure. The oxidizer valve was opened by mechanical
linkage to the thrust chamber fuel valve. Propellant flow from the turbopump filled
the volume in the thrust chamber assembly and ignition occurred upon contact of
the propellants in the combustion chamber. As a result of thrust chamber
combustion backpressure, propellant was supplied through gas generator feed
lines downstream of the thrust chamber valve initiating the regenerative (bootstrap)
cycle. As a result of the initiation of bootstrapping, the engine achieved rated
thrust. Energy of the start cartridge was controlled to burn out immediately after the
start of the bootstrap operation as the engine approached steady state operation.
The thrust level was controlled by tuning pre-sized cavitating venturis to achieve
hydraulic equilibrium. No electrical power whatever was required by the engine
during steady state operation.
During these initial moments of life of the engine, two Pilot Safety systems
were monitored for engine parameters/characteristics in order to detect any
abnormal operation. The first was known as the Prelaunch Malfunction Detection
System and was operative until the vehicle was airborne. The second, known as
the Malfunction Detection System, continued operation and surveillance
throughout Stage I flight.
The PMDS was designed to monitor the Stage I autogenous system operation
prior to release of the launch vehicle and to furnish go/no-go signals to launch
control equipment in response to the conditions sensed in the fuel and oxidizer
autogenous systems.
The MDS was a warning system that provided a visual cue to the astronauts in
the spacecraft in the event of a launch vehicle subsystem malfunction which could
possibly result in the failure of the flight mission. The Malfunction Detection Thrust
Chamber Pressure Switch (MDTCPS), a part of the MDS package, also provided a
signal to launch control equipment verifying attainment of proper thrust prior to
vehicle release, as well as serving to initiate the controlled shutdown sequence
whenever a pre-determined decay in thrust chamber pressure had occurred.
Engine shutdown was accomplished by either oxidizer exhaustion or fuel
depletion. Although neither type of shutdown caused problems on the Gemini
engines, the oxidizer exhausting was more desirable from a hardware integrity
standpoint and shall be used to further describe the shutdown sequence. As
oxidizer was depleted, the MDTCPS sensed a decay in thrust chamber pressure;
the switch opened, causing a 28 vdc signal to be sent to the override solenoid of
the PSV. The PSV override shuttled the PSV, causing fuel system pressure to be
vented from the opening side and applied to the closing side of the actuator. As the
thrust chamber valves closed, the propellant supply to the gas generator was
terminated with a resulting thrust decay of each subassembly.
Major Chanoes. As previously noted, the GLV engine configuration (-7
model) Used the basic Titan II (-5 model) as a building block. Certain changes
were made in the basic Titan II engine to adapt it to the critical uses of the Gemini
V
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Program. The changes were prompted by the need to man-rate the Titan II, and/or
by experience gained in the early Gemini flights. Although many changes were
incorporated during the Gemini Program, certain major changes warrant sufficient
attention to be singled out for special mention.
_tage I Gearbox. Failure of the idler gear which resulted in catastrophic
failure of the turbopump was encountered. Strengthened gears were incorporated
on all Stage I gearboxes for GLV-2 through 12. A second failure, which required
resolution prior to manned flight, centered around failure of the number 6 bearing.
Gemini's solution prescribed use of SKF bearings only and redesign of the turbine
interchange labyrinth seal.
Stage I Engine Frame. The Stage I engine frame was qualified by similarity to
the Titan II engine frame. However, because of certain, though minimal,
modifications the capability of the Gemini engine frame under the conditions of
firing and gimballing was verified during the propulsion system test program.
FJexible Lube Oil Cooler Coolant Lines. The fuel return line (from the oil
cooler) fractured approximately 30 seconds after the start of a hot-fire test on
Gemini engine GLV-1011. The failure was attributed to excessive loads due to
vibration and assembly distortion. A change to flexible inlet and outlet lines (for the
fuel coolant) was incorporated to preclude further occurrences of this nature.
Start Cartridaes. Two problems were encountered which were resolved by
incorporating non-interchangeable (between Stage I and Stage II) diaphragms and
temperature conditioning of the cartridge itself.
Propulsion System Test Program. This program was promoted to
evaluate/demonstrate the satisfactory operation of Gemini unique components and
requirements for the Stage I and Stage II propulsion systems.
0-5 Volt Instrumentation System. The Gemini program used a 5 volt full scale
telemetry system, whereas Titan II had used a 40 my. full scale telemetry system.
The higher output voltages from remote transducers on the Gemini system
improved the overall signal-to-noise ratio and reduced the complexity of the
multiplex/encoder.
TCV Stress Corrosion. Failure of a thrust chamber fuel valve body prior to
liftoff on one of the Titan II vehicles was attributed to stress corrosion. Investigation
resulted in a change of heat treat from T-6 to T-73 on Gemini.
Staoe II Enoine
System Descdotion. The Stage II engine system was in general identical in
design concept to that of the Stage I engine system. The distinguishing features
which differentiate the Stage II engine from the Stage I engine were the following:
1. Stage II engine components were a reduced thrust version of Stage I
subassembly.
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2. Rated for altitude start and operation with a baffled injector.
3. The high expansion ratio chamber (49.2:1) was achieved by use of an ablative
extension from 13:1 to 49.2:1.
4. Turbine exhaust gases were ducted through a swiveled nozzle assembly to
provide roll control during Stage II powered flight.
5. Pressurization as required only on the fuel tank of the Stage II vehicle. Oxidizer
tank pressurization was supplied by precharge and boiloff only.
6. The Stage II cartridge incorporated the same design features as the Stage I
except that the propellant was a single, longer cylindrical section. It also
included a conditioning system similar to Stage I.
7. Stage II had no thrust chamber pressure switch (TCPS).
8. Stage II incorporated a redundant shutdown system (RESS) which is described
later in this report.
9. Stage It did not have a PMDS system and the MDS switch monitored fuel
injection pressure (MDFJPS) not chamber pressure as on Stage I. The
MDFJPS was not a part of the shutdown circuitry as the Stage I MDTCPS.
System Ooeration. The Stage II engine sequence was identical to the Stage I
engine subassembly. The same signal which shut down the first stage signaled
the second stage ignition. Staging was accomplished by the "fire-in-the-hole"
concept. Stage II thrust buildup caused separation of the vehicle stages. As will be
noted further on, Gemini had a unique feature of redundant shutdown capability on
the Stage II engine. This redundant shutdown capability was achieved by firing a
squib actuated valve in the gas generator oxidizer feed circuit simultaneous with
the signal to the thrust chamber valve.
Maior Changes. This section reports on major components or systems which
were unique to the GLV Stage II engine compared to the Titan II Stage Ii engine.
They were also unique to GLV Stage II compared to GLV Stage I unless otherwise
noted. These systems were developed and incorporated due to Gemini program
requirements or as the result of problem solutions.
Redundant Enaine Shutdown System !RESS). A redundant engine shutdown
capability was added to minimize the possibility of spacecraft overspeed due to a
failure of the basic thrust chamber valve/pressure sequence Valve. This redundant
system was developed under the augmented engine improvement program and
consisted of a squib actuated valve in the oxidizer bootstrap line which was
activated by the same signal sent to the PSV. This system was incorporated on
GLV-3 and subsequent vehicles,
Fuel Iniection Pressure Switch. The malfunction detection system pressure
switch initiaily monitored chamber pressure as on the Stage I engine. However,
the initial Titan III Stage !1 engine which used a similar configuration switch
encountered combustion instabilities on two acceptance tests. The analysis
indicated the most probable triggering mechanism was detonation in the sensing
tube, and the magnitude a function of line volume. As GLV corrective action, the
MDS switch was re-located to sense fuel injection pressure, which reduced
sensing tube volume to a minimum with only a chamber pressure transducer on the
combustion chamber. This action was taken because the standard Titan family
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injector (which had a higher susceptibility to instabilities) was on the first seven
GLVs. The relocation was effective on GLV-2.
GEMSIP Injector. A dynamically stable injector was developed to increase the
combustion stability margin. The new injector, GEMSIP, was incorporated on GLV-
8 and subsequent vehicles.
Start Cartridge Temoerature Conditioning. As previously described, a solid
start cartridge conditioning system was also incorporated on t_-'- Stage II engine
system.
0-5 Volt Instrumentation System. The 5-volt flight instrumentation system was
also incorporated on the Stage II engine system.
The same configuration ablative skirt was utilized of the GLV engine but due
to longer burn durations, a program was conducted to demonstrate the capability to
withstand these durations..To ensure that the incorporation of the GEMSIP injector
was also compatible with these long durations, additional testing was conducted.
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APPENDIX 10
STATIC FIRING SATURN STAGES
This MSFC Test Division memorandum (report) is included both for historical
data completeness and because it addresses a related issue.
The only copy obtained was several reproduction generations old. To ensure
readability, the liberty of re-typing the report and re-working the figures was taken.
Some conclusions drawn by this report are applicable to the value of
propulsion system testing.
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STATIC FIRING SATURN STAGES
I. INTRODUCTION
The question has often arisen as to the justification for continuing static
firing Saturn stages. The question has been asked by program management
which seeks a "mathematical" answer. A "mathematical" answer would under-
standably relieve management of having to make a decision based only on
engineering judgement or tradition. The motive is understandable because of
the real cost of the present day approach and the fear of a human failure
which can lead to the destruction of equipment as it has in the S-IV and
S-II.
Any statement regarding static firing of flight stages must be prefaced with
a statement as to why flight stages are static fired. Flight stages are
static fired to determine the quality (design and hardware) of that particu-
lar assembly at a time and place where a flight catastrophic type failure
can be best withstood and controlled. To provide this benefit to the
program, management must assume that the testing discipline and philosophy
is such that it can provide efficient screening of defective design and
hardware. To provide the most confidence, management must also assume that
the article tested is as nearly as possible the same hardware as that which
wi]l subsequently fly. The opportunity to exercise this screening process
is not a product of inventive genius, but the simple recognition that people
are fallible especially where the results of their errors are not immedi-
ately apparent to them as in factory assembly. Management should also rec-
ognize that static firing, as opposed to checkout, provides a more realistic
test stress and the only real end-to-end check of many of the stage systems
and real verification of their functional capability. The objective data
gained from this testing is a major, clear, forcing function in the develop-
ment cycle not only of the hardware but of the people (designer and
manufacturer). That neither of these appreciate this surveillance is
humanly understandable, but should not be determining factor in its
existence. Neither should management yield to their own discomfort when
this objective event reveals problems which by hindsight are ridiculous, but
whose discovery are the very reason for testing.
Static firing is a natural attribute of liquid propulsion systems (provided
their design is not too sophisticated) because the real flight hardware sys-
tem can be meaningfully, functionally tested on the ground where the static
fired, hardware is available for post-test visual inspection and where more
detailed and more accurate measurement of performance parameters can be
obtained that can in flight.
In this day and age, the design of components of a flight system is rela-
tively amenable to straight forward mathematical analysis where only that
component's self contained operational environments are considered. It is
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another matter when this component is required to function properly in a
system which produces a combination of environments which can only be
determined by empirical means. Additionally, these system environments may
change from assembly-to-assembly because no two assemblies are exactly the
same even when made from the same drawing. Processing freedom (a necessity
if you ever want to get a product) and material non-homogeneity account for
some of the natural variances from assembly-to-assembly. Therefore, manage-
ment must assume some variances in a system even though it be tightly con-
trolled by paper.
The obvious, underlying management assumption must be that the test opera-
tions can be performed with a minimum chance of catastrophic loss of the
test item by human error. Management should therefore a11ow every reaso-
nable means to be taken to sense and prevent catastrophic loss of proper
add-on instrumentation, fire systems, leak detectors, automatic safeing
features, and hazards and damage control apparatus. Secondly, extensive
instrumentation is available for static firing to be able to determine cause
of failure in an objective manner.
The mere existence of a stage static firing capability (facility and crew)
provides a key resource to fall back upon for the solution of flight
problems and the capability to verify major functional design changes.
Some specific stage systems can only be functionally tested by static firing
the stage, (such as active propellant utilization, propellant pressuriza-
tion/, engine gimbal actuation under main hydraulic pump power and flight
control systems). Conversely, there are some environmental conditions such
as vacuum and aerodynamic loads and vibratlons which are not economically
feasible to simulate on the test stand. Additlonally, a large proportion of
the flight measuring system for vibration, pressures and temperatures gets
its only real end-to-end check through propellant loading and/or static
firing.
In payload crltlcal missions, it is very important to have real charac-
teristic data for the specific flight hardware. Such characteristics as the
specific propellant tank calibration, depletion efficiency, pressurization
performance, and engine performance become most critical to furnish data for
flight prediction, especially where no active propellant utilization system
is used. Without this real data, statistically sound, and performance
trade-off negotations become a matter of pure subjective judgement.
Provided no major functional design changes occur and provided that system
quality can be Infallibly controlled (both avowed developmental goals) then
the gain in confidence provided by static firing should decrease with
increasing number of stages produced. It should be borne in mind, however,
that there are some characteristics of the Saturn system that work contrary
to these goals. Mission requirements have been and probably will be
changeable. Many parts are involved (as one contractor proudly claims more
than 2 million per Saturn V vehicle) making control very difficult espe-
cially when prime contractors do not exercise contractural control of a11
changes in their vendor's, fixed price procured, components. None the--
less, proof that not much more Is to be gained y continuing static firing
should, for any reason, be objectively evident from the decreasing rate of
occurrence of critical failures. Two sources of historical information were
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evaluated to determine whether static firing had, in fact, provided an
objective demonstration of hardware design verification, quality assurance
and subsequent successful flight assurance. The static firing and flight
histories of non-Saturn programs were eva]uated because of the large samples
provided and the different approaches involved. Secondly, the results of
static firing and flying the Saturn flight stages were evaluated because
they are directly applicable.
2. BASIS FOR SELECTION OF REPORTED FAILURES ON NON-SATURN LAUNCH VEHCILES
Data was provided by the contractors themselves and from a report prepared
by an outside system contractor. Where in conflict the responsible contrac-
tor's data was used. This data was then screened for failures in flight
which were caused by systems that were Judged to be static firing, testable,
and therefore, ideally could have been prevented from happening in flight
by a proper static firing test program. The depth of the data did not
include what in addition was discovered and corrected in those static
firings which were made nor what design changes and, disassemblies were
made after static firing and prior to launch. The data provided for these
systems can only be used to answer the gross question of whether a learning
process did exist and whether static firing, where performed, appeared to
allow an acceleration of this learning process. Additionally, the answer
might be provided to the simple question of whether static firing, testable
systems ever came to such a maturity that failures no longer occurred even
when large numbers of flights were made.
3. BASIS FOR SELECTION OF REPORTED DATA ON SATURN FLIGHT STAGES
The critical failures reported herein were selected to the exclusion of
other findings because they fitted the situation where they would not have
been found by checkouts and therefore, would have occurred during the launch
countdown or flight if they had not occurred during the first static firing
countdown of that specific stage. These failures were classified into two
categories:
a. LAUNCH ABORTS AVOIDED
These were S-I, S-IB and S-lC booster stage systems failures which
occurred during the first attempt or accomplishment which would have
caused an aborted launch if this operation was assumed to have occurred
at the launch site rather than on the test stand. Within this category
falls those failures which actually terminated the static firing between
ignition and launch commit and those failures encountered which at the
launch site during terminal countdown would have required detanking to
fix. The case assumes a Wet Countdown Demonstration Test would have
eliminated those problems found during propellant load tests and there-
fore these were not included in this category.
b. MISSION FAILURE AVOIDED
Those booster and upper stage systems' failures encountered during the
first static firing attempt or accomplishment which would have in most
probability caused a major mission loss if this operation had really
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been the flight instead of static firing. Secondor subsequent failures
were specifically excluded by this screening in order to keep the model
mathematically pure.
Saturn static firing experience provided another category of data which
is:
OTHER CRITICAL FINDINGS
Those booster and upper stage systems failures which were experienced at
any time in the propellant loading and static firing operations but
excluding those listed under the first two categories.
UNSATISFACTORY CONDITIONS
(Defects, PARS, FARS, etc.), during the static firing and post-static
operation were specifically excluded from this analysis. Some of these
conditions were found simply because a new set of evaluators worked
with the hardware in a more nearly real functional environment than can
safely be provided by factory checkout. These experiences would have
surely been passed on to the launch site and caused excesslve delays
there where the resources for their solution should intentionally be
limited so that maximum attention can be focused on the business of
launching. Others, however, were unecessarily caused by this additional
operation and traffic with the stage. The specific significance becomes
a matter of strong subjective judgement and leads to an endless
controversy.
4. RESULTS
The data from ten different systems was compiled and evaluated, (2 Army, 3
NASA and 5 Air Force). All except the Gemini, static fired flight stages
prior to launch (See TABLE i). Here the similarity ends.
Those which did employ static firing did not employ a uniform discipline,
for instance, short (less than 50% full) duration versus full duration.
Even those which did employ full duration (i.e., Redstone and Jupiter) had
less than the full stage system (TM and electrical control) on for static
firing unlike the way the Saturn stages are static fired as complete stages.
It was unofficially reported that occasionally, Titans were static fired
with "slave" engines which were removed prior to shipment to the launch site
where the flight engines were installed.
The number of stages which were static fired prior to flight varied from two
(2) to flfty-seven (57) before static firing was stopped. In all cases
except Titan Ill (Table 3), the first group of stages was static fired.
The design complexity of the systems varied widely ranging from single stage
to three stage (all liquid and combination of liquid and solid). The Titan
Ill and the Saturn 1/IB are not that uncommon if we consider that I/IB has
solid retro rockets and storable APS systems which must function reliably
for mission success and which are not static fired prior to launch.
V"
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Not all programs were executed concurrently, therefore, the later ones had
the opportunity to learn from the earlier.
In the non-NASAprograms there was a wide divergence in average yearly
launch rate (TABLE2), from nine (g) to thirty-one (31).
The mission losses (TABLE2) because of systems testable by static firing
was, in all cases, far less than those from all causes, comprising only from
10 to 33%. Of those which did fail becauseof systems testable by static
firing, failures occurred on flight stages which had been static fired prior
to launch as well as on flight stages which had not been static fired prior
to launch.
Becausesomelearning curve should result, either from static firing and
launch or from just launching, a plot was madeassuming all selective data
points to have the sameweight, but still take into account only those
mission loss, failures experienced in systems testable by firing. This data
is shownplotted in FIGURE1. There was obvious learning, on this specific
basis, in all cases except Atlas. The pay-off did not becomeapparent on
the average until after 25 to 30 launches. However, even after that,
failures did persists, but at a much lower frequency.
In the comparison of the fourteen (14) Gemini flights, which was the only
system with a complete absence of any kind of static firing, with the first
fourteen (14) flights of those systems which had somekind of a static
firing program, it can be seen from TABLES2 and 3 that the SATURNI/1B,
Titan II and Titan Ill experienced none of these specific type failures,
while the Gemini experienced two (2). However, the Redstone, Jupiter, Thor,
Atlas and Titan I did experience anywhere from one (1) to six (6). It
should also be noted however, that the Gemini should have drawn heavily on
the learning paid for in the preceding flights and tests of the Titan II.
In analyzing the Saturn stage, data contained in TABLES 4 through 8, it can
be seen that critical failures were still being experienced from static
firing of the S-IB stage even on the eighteenth (18) stage to be static
fired.
Learning has been more rapidly achieved on those stages than was apparent
from the non-NASA programs. Flight results of Saturn bear out this obser-
vation.
The same randomness of occurrence versus sequential order as observed in
non-NASA flight results, appears in the Saturn static firing experiences but
does not appear in the flight experience.
5. CONCLUSIONS
There is no evidence from these statistics which would give an unqualified
answer as to the serial number at which static firing can be stopped with
the positive assurance that no failures can occur which could have been
avoided by a properly performed static firing.
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The tenacity with which failures persist suggests that even under our most
extensive (and expensive) work control system learning is limited by other
factors.
There is no doubt that static firing of Saturn stages to-date has provided
a major contribution to its successful flight history. If the failures
listed in TABLE7 had occurred in flight rather than in static firing, the
overall flight performance of Saturn 1/1B would have been 66%successful
instead of 100%,and would have had a worse development characteristic than
that of the non-NASAprograms as can be seen from FIGURE1.
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Table 1
FLIGHT VEHICLE LAUNCH AND STATIC FIRING PROGRAM
BASIS: AVAILABLE DATA
PROGRAM LAUNCH PERIOD NO. FLIGHTS NO. STATIC FIRED TYPE STATIC FIRING
REDSTONE
THOR
JUPITER
ATLAS
TITAN I
TITAN II
GEMINI
TITAN III
SATURN I/IB
SATURN V
8/53 - 7/61
1/57 - 9/64
3/57- 5/61
6/57 ° 9/64
8/59 - 5/63
3/62 - 11/64
4/64 - 11/66
9/64 - 12/67
11/61 - 10/68
11/67 -
75
179
39
223
55
39
14
23
15
2
57
14
31
38
38
12
0
2
15
2
FULL DURATION
FULL DURATION
FULL DURATION
SHORT DURATION
SHORT DURATION
SHORT DURATION
NONE
SHORT DURATION
FULL DURATION
FULL DURATION
RHSV000745.01
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V
TabJe 5
FREQUENCY OF UNPLANNED STATIC FIRING EXPERIENCES
BASIS: ALL SATURN STAGES EQUAL
SEQUENTIAL NO, LAUNCH MISSION OTHER TOTAL (%) TOTAL
SERIAL NO. STAGES ABORT LOSS CRITICAL NO. STAGES
41
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
6
6
6
6
6
6
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
5
3
1
83
50
16
0
16
0
0
100
0
5O
5O
5O
0
5O
0
0
0
100
0
0
100
0
TOTAL I 58 4 6 8 18 31
RHSV000749.01
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TABLE 6
LAUNCH ABORTS AVOIDED
S-I-I0
S-1B-2
S-1D-4
S-IC-2
First static firing erroneously cut-off because of poor thrust
OK switch setting. (DESIGN)
Same as S-I-10 (DESIGN)
Hydraulic accumulator unable to maintain pressure because of inter-
nal leakage. Had performed satisfactorily up to 10 minutes prior to
ignition on first static firing countdown. (QC)
LOX pump seal purge regulator on stage failed during terminal count-
down for first (and only) firing; required replacement before
firing. (UNKNOWN)
10-14
S-1-8
TABLE 7
MISSION LOSSES AVOIDED
Engine turbine bearing retainer came loose during first short-
duration firing damaging turbine, resulting in thrust decrease.
(DESIGN)
S-IB-8 18 Engine turbine blade failure during first short duration, caused
severe damage to turbine and resulted in thrust decrease.
Failure traced to improper turbine blade material used in building
many engines already in field on other stages. (QC)
S-lV-6
S-IVB-202
S-IVB-203
12
13
Engine gimbaled hard over at ignition. Failure traced to mani-
fold in main hydraulic pump system that had not been drilled in
manufacturing process. (QC)
Firing I00 seconds short because fuel side propellant utilization
probe indicated fuel zero right after ignition. Failure caused
by loose wire (contamination) shorting out probe thus giving
false reading. (QC)
Fuel tank pressure collapse caused insufficient pressure to
engine inlet. Problem traced to design of pressurant diffuser.
First experience with this small an ullage in this stage
(DESIGN).
10-15
S-I-5
TABLE 8
OTHER CRITICAL FINDINGS
Fifteen to twenty, fuel, hot gas and GOX leaks occurred in the
closed boattail as the result of long duration firings. (QC +
DESIGN)
S-IVB-5O3 Destroyed by explosion during terminal countdown. If no static
firing had been planned, this explosion possibly would have
occurred on the Countdown Demonstration Test on the fully loaded
Saturn V launch vehicle. The significance of such an occurrence
is self-evident. (QC)
S-IVB-205 LOX turbine wheel found cracked through all the way around at hub
of wheel. While this whee| did not fail, there is a possibility
that some subsequent wheel failure could have occurred. If this
had happened in flight, not only would it have been hard to defi-
nitely analyze, but it would have cost a mission and possibly
lives, and many have recurred before a fix was found. (DESIGN)
S-II-1 Ignition detection probe malfunctioned causing cut-off of one
engine. This is a flight safety system. Failure was traced to
improper asse_ly. (QC)
S-II-1 High pressure LOX supply 11ne to augmented spark igniter was
found cracked after first firing. If that had happened in
flight, a fire might have resulted and possibly mission loss.
Failure caused redesign of this line. (DESIGN)
S-ll-I An exploslon occurred in the actuator of an engine main LOX
-.J
10-16
S-II-1
S-IB-11
valve. Occurrence was traced to wrong grease used in valve
build-up at factory. If not found in this manner, a more drastic
experience might have happened in flight where the cause would
have been very hard to determine. (QC)
LOXpre-valve on center engine lacked proper clearance with LOX
tank sumpand center engine beamdeflections. Pre-valve housing
redesigned. In flight, interference due to acceleration could
have caused loss of mission. (DESIGN)
LOXpumpseal failure caused fire in engine compartment. Slow
reaction of launch fire detection system would have allowed
launch to proceed with this catastrophic condition. (DESIGN)
10-17
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APPENDIX 11
PROPULSION COMMUNITY QUESTIONNAIRE
The questionnaire used to obtain the responses included in the body of this
report is included herein for reference.
k
11-1
Na',_onal Aeronaut_ts and
S_ace Aam_ms;rat_on
John C. Stennis Space Center
Stenms Sl_ace Center. MS 39529-6000
_'=_'°""_°' FA00/08MLC01
TO:
FROM :
SUBJECT :
Distribution
FA00/M. L. Carpenter
Request for Propulsion Systems Test Information
New National Space Transportation System Vehicles are currently
being planned. As the designated NASA propulsion test location,
we feel it is imperative to examine lessons learned from previous
propulsion system verification programs and to document your
thoughts on propulsion system testing.
First, we request that you jot down (handwritten is okay)
propulsion system test incidents that led to a significant design
or procedural change. We are after hard evidence that shows system
testing paid off by revealing problems that would have led to loss
of mission or loss of human life.
Next, we request that you express your professional opinion on
system verification requirements by circling the correct number of
each trade criteria. This information will be used to attempt to
quantify the subjective thinking of the propulsion community using
the Analytical Hierarchy Process described by T. L. Saaty (McGraw
Hill: NY, 1980).
In addition, a written statement that summarizes your experience,
knowledge, and judgement concerning system testing would be
helpful.
Your response to these requests will be incorporated into a study
being performed by Rockwell's Space Division for this Center. Jim
Yeager is leading the study effort to be completed in the March-
April timeframe. Of course, you will be on distribution for a copy
of the study report.
Your response by February 21, 1989, will be greatly appreciated.
Deputy Director
PropulJsion Test Operations
1 1-2
°QUESTIONNAIRE
PROPULSION SYSTEMS VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
FOR
ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEM
Please list previous propulsion system test results (or failures) that led to significant
design or procedural changes. (Test site, test article, date, test number, description of
results or incidents, etc.) Please limit to Saturn, Titan, Shuttle or foreign country
programs of this vintage.
2. Please summarize your opinion of the role of "all-up" systems testing in verification of a
new propulsion system prior to first launch.
Name RHSVOOO_.O_
11-3
. Assign a numerical rating of one to nine to one criterion in each pair that you consider
to be more important than the other one when you are planning a propulsion system
verification program for an advanced propulsion system. The scale should be used to
indicate how much more important than the other that you consider the criterion you
selected to be. Please circle the number on the scale that indicates the rating you
wish to assign the selected criterion. The first pair in the table has been marked as an
example.
For purposes of this questionnaire, the following definitions apply"
Cost - The cost of performing the system testing and analysis.
Reliability - The increased probability of propul n system success including the
reduction in probability that the launch vehicle ,_nd its payload will be destroyed
and/or the fleet grounded.
Schedule - The impact on the schedule caused by the test program.
MUCH SOMEWHAT SOMEWHAT MUCH
MORE MORE MORE MORE MORE MORE
IMPORTANT IMPORTANT IMPORTANT IMPORTANT IMPORTANT IMPORTANT
I
COST EXAMPLE RELIABILITY
I
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 _6 ,_ 7 8 9
COST L RELIABILITY
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
COST J SCHEDULE
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
RELIABILITY 1 SCHEDULE
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
RHSV000386
1 1-4
RHSVO00386.0_
4a. The criterion for this table is COST. Please select the one test plan alternative from
each pair in the table that you consider to be the least costly. Circle the number on
the scale that indicates how much less costly you consider the alternative you
selected to be. The first pair of alternatives in the table has been marked as an
example.
For purposes of this questionnaire the following definitions apply for propulsion
system components:
Cost - The cost of performing the system testing and analysis.
Analysis Only - Components are tested on individual basis and not as a system.
System verification is by analysis.
Battleship Test - Components are tested on individual basis and then installed for
testing on heavyweight tanks in a flight system configuration.
Flight Configuration Test Article - Components are tested on individual basis
and then installed in an actual flight configuration test article for static firing tests.
FRF Test Only - Components are tested on an individual basis then installed on a
flight vehicle which is checked out in a short duration static firing on the launch
pad.
Flight Test - Components are tested on an individual basis, then installed in a
launch vehicle and launched on a test flight.
CRITERION = COST
MUCH SOMEWHAT SOMEWHAT MUCH
MORE MORE MORE MORE MORE MORE
PREFERRED PREFERRED PREFERRED PREFERRED PREFERRED PREFERRED
ANAL YSlS ONLY EXAMPLE ESHIP TEST PLUS ANAL YSIS
|
9 8 7 6 5 _"4" _ 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
"'lUll"
ANAL YSIS ONL Y BATTLESHIP TEST PLUS ANAL YSIS
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
ANAL YSlS ONLY I FLIGHT CONFIGURATION TESTARTICLEPLUS ANAL YSIS
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I
ANALYSIS ONLY I FRF TEST ONLY PLUS ANALYSIS
I
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
11-5
RHSVOOO38t_
R H S V000386 01
CRITERION -- COST
MUCH SOMEWHAT SOMEWHAT MUCH
MORE MORE MOI_ MOFE MORE MORE
PREFERRED PREFERRED PREFERRED PREFERRED PREFERRED PREFERRED
ANAL YSlS ONL Y
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
L
1
FLIGHT TEST PLUS ANALYSIS
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
BATTLESHIP TEST PLUS ANAL YSlS
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
FLIGHT CONFIGURATION TEST ARTICLEPL S ANALYSIS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
BATTLESHIP TEST PLUS ANALYSIS
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
[
1
FRF TEST ONLY PLUS ANALYSIS
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
BATTLESHIP TEST PLUS ANALYSIS
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
1
1
FLIGHT TEST PLUS ANALYSIS
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I
FLIGHT CONFIGURATION TEST ARTICLE i
PLUS ANAL YSlS J
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
FRF TEST ONL Y PLUS ANAL YSiS
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I
FLIGHT CONFIGURATION TEST ARTICLE i
PLUS ANALYSIS ]
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
FLIGHT TEST PLUS ANALYSIS
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
FRF TEST ONLY PLUS ANALYSIS
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
FLIGHT TEST PLUS ANALYSIS
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
RHSVO00386
1 1-6
RHSVO00386.01
v4b. The criterion for this table is RELIABILITY. Please select the one test plan alternative
from each pair in the table that you consider to result in the most reliable propulsion
system. Circle the number on the scale that indicates how much more reliability you
consider the alternative you selected will provide. The first pair of alternatives in the
table has been marked as an example.
For purposes of this questionnaire the following definitions apply for propulsion
system components:
Reliability - The increased probability of propulsion system success including the
reduction in probability that the launch vehicle and its payload will be destroyed
and/or the fleet grounded.
Analysis Only - Components are tested on individual basis and not as a system.
System verification is by analysis.
Battleship Test - Components are tested on individual basis and then installed for
testing on heavyweight tanks in a flight system configuration.
Flight Configuration Test Article - Components are tested on individual basis
and then installed in an actual flight configuration test article for static firing tests.
FRF Test Only - Components are tested on an individual basis then installed on a
flight vehicle which is checked out in a short duration static firing on the launch
pad.
Flight Test - Components are tested on an individual basis, then installed in a
launch vehicle and launched on a test flight.
CRITERION - RELIABILITY
MUCH SOMEWHAT SOMEWHAT MUCH
MORE MORE MORE MORE MORE MORE
PREFERRED PREFERRED PREFERRED PREFERRED PREFERRED PREFERRED
ANAL YSlS ONL Y EXAMPLE ESHIP TEST PLUS ANAL YSlS
I
9 8 7 6 5 ('4'} 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
"-.i ii1."
ANALYSIS ONLY BATTLESHIP TEST PLUS ANALYSIS
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
ANAL YSlS ONL Y FLIGHT CONFIGURATION TEST ARTICLE
PLUS ANAL YSlS
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
ANAL YSlS ONLY
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
FRF TEST ONL Y PLUS ANAL YSlS
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
RHSVO00386
11-7
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MUCH
MORE
PREFERRED
CRITERION = RELIABILITY
SOMEWHAT SOMEWHAT MUCH
MOPE MORE MORE MORE MORE
PREFERRED PREFERRED PREFERRED PREFERRED PREFERRED
ANAL YSlS ONL Y FLIGHT TEST PLUS ANALYSIS
8 7 6 5 4 "2 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I
BATTLESHIP TEST PLUS ANALYSIS | FLIGHT CONFIGURA TION TEST ARTICLE
J PLUS ANALYSIS
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
BATTLESHIP TEST PLUS ANAL YSlS FRF TEST ONL Y PLUS ANAL YSiS
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
IBA 7-TLESHIP TEST PLUS ANALYSIS FLIGHT TEST PLUS ANALYSIS
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 _J
I
FLIGHT CONFIGURATION TEST ARTICLE I FRF TEST ONLY PLUS ANALYSIS
PLUS ANAL YSlS !
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
FLIGHT CONFIGURATION TEST ARTICLE I FLIGHT TEST PLUS ANALYSIS
PLUS ANAL YSlS I
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
FRF TEST ONLY PLUS ANALYSIS FLIGHT TEST PLUS ANALYSIS
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
RHSV000386
1 1-8
RHSVO00386,01
"v
4C.
MUCH
MORE
PREFERRED
The criterion for this table is SCHEDULE. Please select the one test plan alternative
from each pair in the table that you consider to cause the least schedule impact.
Circle the number on the scale that indicates how much less schedule impact you
consider the alternative you selected to have. The first pair of alternatives in the table
has been marked as an example.
For purposes of this questionnaire the following definitions apply for propulsion
system components:
Schedule - The impact on the schedule caused by the test program.
Analysis Only - Components are tested on individual basis and not as a system.
System verification is by analysis.
Battleship Test - Components are tested on individual basis and then installed for
testing on heavyweight tanks in a flight system configuration.
Flight Configuration Test Article - Components are tested on individual basis
and then installed in an actual flight configuration test article for static firing tests.
FRF Test Only - Components are tested on an individual basis then installed on a
flight vehicle which is checked out in a short duration static firing on the launch
pad.
Flight Test - Components are tested on an individual basis, then installed in a
launch vehicle and launched on a test flight.
CRITERION = SCHEDULE
SOMEWHAT- SOMEWHAT MUCH
MORE MORE MORE MORE MORE
PREFERRED PREFERRED PREFERRED PREFERRED PREFERRED
I
ANAL YSlS ONLY EXAMPLE ESHIP TEST PLUS ANAL YSiS
I
8 7 6 5 ".,..,4j 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
ANAL YSlS ONL Y BATTLESHIP TEST PLUS ANAL YSlS
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
ANAL YSlS ONL Y
I FLIGHT CONFIGURATION TESTARTICLEPL S ANALYSIS
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I
ANAL YSIS ONL Y J FRF TEST ONL Y PLUS ANAL YSIS
I
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
RHSVO00386
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CRITERION -- SCHEDULE
MUCH SOMEWHAT SOMEWHAT
MORE MORE MORE MORE
PREFERRED PREFERRED PREFERRED PREFERRED
ANALYSIS ONL Y
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
MORE
PRE_RRED
MUCH
MORE
PREFERRED
FLIGHT TEST PLUS ANAL YSlS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
BATTLESHIP TEST PLUS ANAL YSlS
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
I FLIGHT CONFIGURATION TEST ARTICLEPL S ANAL YSlS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
BATTLESHIP TEST PLUS ANAL YSlS
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
I
1
FRF TEST ONL Y PLUS ANAL YSlS
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
BATTLESHIP TEST PLUS ANALYSIS
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
1
1
FLIGHT TEST PLUS ANALYSIS
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
FLIGHT CONFIGURATION TEST ARTICLE J
PLUS ANAL YSlS J
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
FRF TEST ONL Y PLUS ANAL YSlS
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
FLIGHT CONFIGURATION TEST ARTICLE ]
PLUS ANAL YSlS J
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
FLIGHT TEST PLUS ANAL YSlS
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
FRF TEST ONL Y PLUS ANAL YSlS
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
1
1
FLIGHT TEST PLUS ANAL YSlS
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
RHSVO00386
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